University of California San Diego Management Questions please use the reading material and course handout to complete the questions. page limit: approxima

University of California San Diego Management Questions please use the reading material and course handout to complete the questions. page limit: approximately 5-7 pages (approximately 1 page per question). please let me know if you have any questions. FINAL: MGT 112
-Please answer all questions
-5 short essay questions (5 points each)
-Total points that can be achieved (25 points)
-Please upload the finished document to TritonEd by Jun 12, 10pm.
-Average time to finish the assignment: approximately 180 mins
-The exam is open book/open notes
-page limit: approximately 5-7 pages (approximately 1 page per question)
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1. Building on the case study “General Motors and The Chevy Cobalt Ignition
Switch Crisis,” what would be your recommendations to the CEO for an
appropriate communication response (crisis communication)? Please analyze
how the company can try to avoid similar crises in the future?
2. Using a company of your choice, how would you build up and implement a
successful value proposition around ‘reverse innovation,’ building on the article
on “Engineering Reverse Innovations.” Which companies/industries could be less
suitable for reverse innovation and why?
3. Building on the article on “Embracing Agile” (Rigby et al., 2016, Harvard
Business Review), please critically analyze the conditions that are favorable and
unfavorable for agile. Also, please describe and analyze two recent industry
examples, where companies successfully implemented agile approaches.
4. Please analyze some of the key synergies that Hyundai could try to materialize
by acquiring Kia Motors, building on your reading of the case “The Acquisition
and Restructuring of Kia Motors by Hyundai Motors.” Which cultural aspects
need to be evaluated and carefully assessed when acquiring Kia?
5. Please develop and analyze a Business Model canvas (see next page) for one of
the below examples:
-A new food truck on campus (you can choose any food truck you like)
-A company of your choice.
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Strategy
Session 6
Game Theory, Strategic Restructuring,
and Turnarounds
San Diego, CA
AGENDA
§ Game Theory and Strategic Management
§ Strategic Restructuring and Turnarounds
§ Managing Adaptations
§ Strategy Tools
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Game Theory
History and Overview
Overview:
-Decision Making especially
regarding cooperation and
conflict
-Logical Decision Making in
Human Behavior
History:
John von Neumann (1928,
1944) Theories of Games
and Economic Behavior
John Nash (1950) on NonCo-operative Games
Applications:
Economics (11 Nobel
Laureates), Political
Science (Decision Making),
Biology (Signaling Theory)
Simultaneous Games – Matrix
Sequential Games – Game Tree
Repeated Games
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Simultaneous Games – Matrix
Company B
Don’t
Expand
Expand
Don’t
Expand
17, 17
15, 21
Expand
21, 15
16, 16
Company A
-simultaneous and independent decision making
-all decision makers rational decisions
-anticipation of likely actions of competitors
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Simultaneous Games – Matrix
Company B
Don’t
Expand
Expand
Don’t
Expand
17, 17
15, 21
Expand
21, 15
16, 16
Company A
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Simultaneous Games – Dominant Strategy
Company B
Don’t
Expand
Expand
Don’t
Expand
17, 17
15, 21
Expand
21, 15
16, 16
Company A
Dominant Strategy: Expand
-Take the position of company A:
-If company B does not expand, your choice is between 17 and 21, so company A expands
-If company B expands, your choice is between 15 and 16, so company A expands
-so, no matter what company B does, company A expands
-this is a dominant stratregy
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Simultaneous Games – Matrix
Company B
Don’t
Expand
Expand
Don’t
Expand
17, 17
15, 21
Expand
21, 15
16, 16
Company A
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Simultaneous Games – Dominant Strategy
Company B
Don’t
Expand
Expand
Don’t
Expand
17, 17
15, 21
Expand
21, 15
16, 16
Dominant Strategy: Expand
Game Theory
Company A
-Take the position of company B:
-If company A does not expand, your choice is between 17 and 21, so company B expands
-If company B expands, your choice is between 15 and 16, so company B expands
-so, no matter what company A does, company B expands
-this is a dominant strategy
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Simultaneous Games – Nash Equilibrium
Company B
Don’t
Expand
Expand
Don’t
Expand
17, 17
15, 21
Expand
21, 15
Company A
Nash Equilibrium
16, 16
-Nash Equilibrium:
-simultaneous and independent decision, one shot
-no company is able to benefit by changing strategies while the other company keep theirs unchanged
-Company A maximizes profit Counting in company B’s strategy
-Company B maximizes profit Counting in company A’s strategy
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Sequential Games – Game Tree
Company B
Small
Company A
Small
Small
Small
-sequential decision making
-all decision makers rational decisions
-anticipation of likely actions of competitors
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Sequential Games – Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
Company B
(18, 18)
Small
(15, 19)
(9, 18)
(19, 15)
Company A
Small
Small
(16, 16)
(8, 12)
(18, 9)
Small
-backward induction (foldback method)
-each decision node is represented by green squares
-1. What is company B’s optimal decision for each of company A’s choices
(12, 8)
(0, 0)
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Sequential Games – Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
Company B
(18, 18)
Small
(15, 19)
(9, 18)
(19, 15)
Company A
Small
Small
(16, 16)
(8, 12)
(18, 9)
Small
-backward induction (foldback method)
-each decision node is represented by green squares
(12, 8)
(0, 0)
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Sequential Games – Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
Company B
(18, 18)
Small
(15, 19)
(9, 18)
(19, 15)
Company A
Small
Small
(16, 16)
(8, 12)
(18, 9)
Small
(12, 8)
(0, 0)
-backward induction (foldback method)
-each decision node is represented by green squares
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Sequential Games – Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
Company B
(18, 18)
Small
(15, 19)
(9, 18)
(19, 15)
Company A
Small
Small
(16, 16)
(8, 12)
(18, 9)
Small
-backward induction (foldback method)
-each decision node is represented by green squares
-Best outcomes for company B are highlighted in Red Fond
(12, 8)
(0, 0)
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Sequential Games – Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE)
Company B
(18, 18)
Small
(15, 19)
(9, 18)
(19, 15)
Company A
Small
Small
(16, 16)
(8, 12)
(18, 9)
Small
(12, 8)
-backward induction (foldback method)
-each decision node is represented by green squares
-Best outcomes for company B are highlighted in Red Fond
-Company A’s choices are now highlighted in
(0, 0)
-foldback tells us that if company A chooses “Large”, given company B’s optimal reaction, the profit of company A
will be 18
-The SPNE is for company A to choose “Large” and for company B to respond with “Don ’t expand”
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Simultaneous Games – Prisoner’s Dilemma
Prisoner B
Stays Silent
(Cooperate)
Betrays
(Defect)
Stays Silent
(Cooperate)
-1, -1
-3, 0
Betrays
(Defect)
0, -3
Prisoner A
Nash Equilibrium
-2, -2
-Prisoner’s Dilemma:
-simultaneous, independent decision, no later retributions
-Defecting is the dominant strategy for prisoners A and B
-The “Dilemma” is that mutual cooperation would yield a better outcome
-however, the choice to cooperate on an individual level is not rational
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
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Game Theory
Repeated Games – Grim Trigger Strategy
Prisoner B
Stays Silent
(Cooperate)
Betrays
(Defect)
Stays Silent
(Cooperate)
-1, -1
-3, 0
Betrays
(Defect)
0, -3
-2, -2
Prisoner A
-Grim Trigger Strategy:
-repeated game scenario
-grim trigger is a trigger strategy
-Initial choice is co-operate
-as soon as opponent defects (trigger), you defect forever
-most strictly unforgiving strategy in a repeated game
Adapted from Besanko et al. Economics of Strategy. Wiley.
Game Theory
Repeated Games – Discount Rate
Future payoffs are discounted (less valuable)
-interest rates
-value of potential future consumption is