University of Illinois Machiavellis The Prince Analysis Paper Instructions: Read file named “Reading-Nicoló Machiavelli-The Prince” Write 3 paragraphs with

University of Illinois Machiavellis The Prince Analysis Paper Instructions: Read file named “Reading-Nicoló Machiavelli-The Prince” Write 3 paragraphs within 1 page. Paragraph 1: should be your analysis and reflection. Paragraph 2: answer this question “Is Machiavelli evil?” Paragraph 3: answer this question “Do you think Machiavelli speaks the truth about politics?” Remember that all 3 paragraphs should be within 1 page. Instructions:
Read file named “Reading-Nicoló Machiavelli-The Prince” Write 3 paragraphs within 1 page.
Paragraph 1: should be your analysis and reflection.
Paragraph 2: answer this question “Is Machiavelli evil?”
Paragraph 3: answer this question “Do you think Machiavelli speaks the truth about politics?”
Remember that all 3 paragraphs should be within 1 page.
Title: The Prince
Author: Nicoló Machiavelli
The Prince
CHAPTER 1
THE VARIOUS KINDS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE WAYS BY WHICH THEY ARE
ESTABLISHED
All states and dominions which hold or have held sway over mankind are either republics or
monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary ones, in which the rulers have been for many years
of the same family, or else they are those of recent foundation. The newly founded ones are
either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or else they are, as it were, new members
grafted on to the hereditary possessions of the prince that annexes them, as is the kingdom of
Naples to the King of Spain. The dominions thus acquired have either been previously
accustomed to the rule of another prince, or else have been free states, and they are annexed
either by force of arms of the prince, or of others, or else fall to him by good fortune or merit.
CHAPTER 2
OF HEREDITARY MONARCHIES
I will not here speak of republics, having already treated of them fully in another place. I will
deal only with monarchies, and will show how the various kinds described above can be
governed and maintained. In the first place, in hereditary states accustomed to the reigning
family the difficulty of maintaining them is far less than in new monarchies; for it is sufficient
not to exceed the ancestral usages, and to accommodate one’s self to accidental circumstances; in
this way such a prince, if of ordinary ability, will always be able to maintain his position, unless
some very exceptional and excessive force deprives him of it; and even if he be thus deprived of
it, on the slightest misfortune happening to the new occupier, he will be able to regain it.
We have in Italy the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able to withstand the assaults of
the Venetians in the year ’84, and of Pope Julius in the year ’10, for no other reason than because
of the antiquity of his family in that dominion. In as much as the legitimate prince has less cause
and less necessity to give offence, it is only natural that he should be more loved; and, if no
extraordinary vices make him hated, it is only reasonable for his subjects to be naturally attached
to him, the memories and causes of innovations being forgotten in the long period over which his
rule has existed; whereas one change always leaves the way prepared for the introduction of
another.
CHAPTER 3
OF MIXED MONARCHIES
But it is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. Firstly, if it is not entirely new, but a
member as it were of a mixed state, its disorders spring at first from a natural difficulty which
exists in all new dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to better themselves;
and this belief makes them take arms against their rulers, in which they are deceived, as
experience shows them that they have gone from bad to worse. This is the result of another very
natural cause, which is the necessary harm inflicted on those over whom the prince obtains
dominion, both by his soldiers and by an infinite number of other injuries unavoidably caused by
his occupation.
Thus you find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying that dominion, and you
cannot maintain the friendship of those who have helped you to obtain this possession, as you
will not be able to fulfil their expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being
under an obligation to them; for which reason, however strong your armies may be, you will
always need the favour of the inhabitants to take possession of a province. It was from these
causes that Louis XII. of France, though able to occupy Milan without trouble, immediately lost
it, and the forces of Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it from him the first time, for the
inhabitants who had willingly opened their gates to him, finding themselves deluded in the hopes
they had cherished and not obtaining those benefits that they had anticipated, could not bear the
vexatious rule of their new prince.
It is indeed true that, after reconquering the rebel territories they are not so easily lost again, for
the ruler is now, by the fact of the rebellion, less averse to secure his position by punishing
offenders, investigating any suspicious circumstances, and strengthening himself in weak places.
So that although the mere appearance of such a person as Duke Ludovico on the frontier was
sufficient to cause France to lose Milan the first time, to make her lose her grip of it the second
time was only possible when all the world was against her, and after her enemies had been
defeated and driven out of Italy; which was the result of the causes above mentioned.
Nevertheless, it was taken from her both the first and the second time. The general causes of the
first loss have been already discussed; it remains now to be seen what were the causes of the
second loss and by what means France could have avoided it, or what measures might have been
taken by another ruler in that position which were not taken by the King of France. Be it
observed, therefore, that those states which on annexation are united to a previously existing
state may or may not be of the same nationality and language. If they are, it is very easy to hold
them, especially if they are not accustomed to freedom; and to possess them securely it suffices
that the family of the princes which formerly governed them be extinct. For the rest, their old
condition not being disturbed, and there being no dissimilarity of customs, the people settle down
quietly under their new rulers, as is seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and
Normandy, which have been so long united to France; and although there may be some slight
differences of language, the customs of the people are nevertheless similar, and they can get
along well together, and whoever obtains possession of them and wishes to retain them must bear
in mind two things: the one, that the blood of their old rulers is extinct; the other, to make no
alteration either in their laws or in their taxes; in this way they will in a very short space of time
become united with their old possessions and form one state. But when dominions are acquired
in a province differing in language, laws, and customs, the difficulties to be overcome are great,
and it requires good fortune as well as great industry to retain them; one of the best and most
certain means of doing so would be for the new ruler to take up his residence in them. This
would render their possession more secure and durable; it is what the Turk has done in Greece;
in spite of all the other measures taken by him to hold that state, it would not have been possible
to retain it had he not gone to live there. Being on the spot, disorders can be seen as they arise
and can quickly be remedied, but living at a distance, they are only heard of when they get
beyond remedy. Besides which, the province is not despoiled by your officials, the subjects are
pleased with the easy accessibility of their prince; and wishing to be loyal they have more reason
to love him, and should they be otherwise they will have greater cause to fear him.
Any external Power who wishes to assail that state will be less disposed to do so; so that as long
as he resides there, he will be very hard to dispossess. The other and better remedy is to plant
colonies in one or two of those places which form as it were the keys of the land, for it is
necessary either to do this or to maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will cost the
prince little; with little or no expense on his part, he can send and maintain them; he only injures
those whose lands and houses are taken to give to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small
proportion of the state, and those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do
any harm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured and therefore easily
pacified; and, on the other, are fearful of offending lest they should be treated like those who
have been dispossessed of their property. To conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more
faithful, and give less offence; and the injured parties being poor and scattered are unable to do
mischief, as I have shown. For it must be noted, that men must either be caressed or else
annihilated; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the
injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance. But by
maintaining a garrison instead of colonists, one will spend much more, and consume in guarding
it all the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition will result in a loss, besides giving much
greater offence, since it injures everyone in that state with the quartering of the army on it; which
being an inconvenience felt** by all, every one becomes an enemy, and these are enemies which
can do mischief, as, though beaten, they remain in their own homes. In every way, therefore, a
garrison is as useless as colonies are useful. Further, the ruler of a foreign province as described,
should make himself the leader and defender of his less powerful neighbors, and endeavor to
weaken the stronger ones, and take care that his possessions are not entered by some foreigner
not less powerful than himself, who will always intervene at the request of those who are
discontented either through ambition or fear, as was seen when the Ætoli invited the Romans into
Greece; and in whatever province they entered, it was always at the request of the inhabitants.
And the rule is that when a powerful foreigner enters a province, all the less powerful inhabitants
become his adherents, moved by the envy they bear to those ruling over them; so much so that
with regard to these minor potentates he has no trouble whatever in winning them over, for they
willingly join forces with the state that he has acquired. He has merely to be careful that they do
not assume too much power and authority, and he can easily with his own forces and their favor
put down those that are powerful and remain in everything the arbiter of that province. And he
who does not govern well in this way will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it
will meet with infinite difficulty and trouble.
The Romans in the provinces they took, always followed this policy; they established colonies,
flattered the less powerful without increasing their strength, put down the most powerful and did
not allow foreign rulers to obtain influence in them. I will let the single province of Greece
suffice as an example. They made friends with the Achæi and the Ætoli, the kingdom of
Macedonia was cast down, and Antiochus driven out, nor did they allow the merits of the Achæi
or the Ætoli to gain them any increase of territory, nor did the persuasions of Philip induce them
to befriend him without lowering him, nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to
allow him to hold any state in that province.
For the Romans did in this case what all wise princes should do, who look not only at present
dangers but also at future ones and diligently guard against them; for being foreseen they can
easily be remedied, but if one waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the
malady has become incurable; it happening with this as with those hectic fevers spoken of by
doctors, which at their beginning are easy to cure but difficult to recognize, but in course of time
when they have not at first been recognized and treated, become easy to recognize and difficult
to cure. Thus, it happens in matters of state; for knowing afar off (which it is only given to a
prudent man to do) the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But when, for want of such
knowledge, they are allowed to grow so that everyone can recognize them, there is no longer any
remedy to be found. However, the Romans, observing these disorders while yet remote, were
always able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to proceed in order to avoid a war; for
they knew that war was not to be avoided, and could be deferred only to the advantage of the
other side; they therefore declared war against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have
to fight them in Italy, though they might at the time have avoided either; this they did not choose
to do, never caring to do that which is now every day to be heard in the mouths of our wise men,
to enjoy the benefits of time, but preferring those of their own virtue and prudence, for time
brings with it all things, and may produce indifferently either good or evil. But let us return to
France and examine whether she did any of these things; and I will speak not of Charles, but of
Louis as the one whose proceedings can be better seen, as he held possession in Italy for a longer
time; you will then see that he did the opposite of all those things which must be done to keep
possession of a foreign state. King Louis was called into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians,
who wished by his coming to gain half of Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming nor
for the part he took, because wishing to plant his foot in Italy, and not having friends in the
country, on the contrary the conduct of King Charles having caused all doors to be closed to him,
he was forced to accept what friendships he could find, and his schemes would have quickly
been successful if he had made no mistakes in his other proceedings.
The king then having acquired Lombardy regained immediately the reputation lost by Charles.
Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara
and Bentivogli, the Lady of Furlì, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino,
the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Sienna, all approached him with offers of friendship.
The Venetians might then have seen the effects of their temerity, how to gain a few lands in
Lombardy they had made the king ruler over two-thirds of Italy. Consider how little difficulty
the king would have had in maintaining his reputation in Italy if he had observed the rules above
given, and kept a firm and sure hold over all those friends of his, who being many in number,
and weak, and fearful one of the Church, another of the Venetians, were always obliged to hold
fast to him, and by whose aid he could easily make sure of any who were still great. But he was
hardly in Milan before he did exactly the opposite, by giving aid to Pope Alexander to occupy
the Romagna. Nor did he perceive that, in taking this course, he weakened himself, by casting off
his friends and those who had placed themselves at his disposal, and strengthened the Church by
adding to the spiritual power, which gives it such authority, further temporal powers. And having
made the first mistake, he was obliged to follow it up, whilst, to put a stop to the ambition of
Alexander and prevent him becoming ruler of Tuscany, he was forced to come to Italy. And not
content with having increased the power of the Church and lost his friends, he now desiring the
kingdom of Naples, divided it with the king of Spain; and where he alone was the arbiter of Italy,
he now brought in a companion, so that the ambitious of that province who were dissatisfied
with him might have someone else to appeal to; and where he might have left in that kingdom a
king tributary to him, he dispossessed him in order to bring in another who was capable of
driving him out. The desire to acquire possessions is a very natural and ordinary thing, and when
those men do it who can do so successfully, they are always praised and not blamed, but when
they cannot and yet want to do so at all costs, they make a mistake deserving of great blame. If
France, therefore, with her own forces could have taken Naples, she ought to have done so; if she
could not, she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition of Lombardy with the Venetians
is to be excused, as having been the means of allowing the French king to set foot in Italy, this
other partition deserves blame, not having the excuse of necessity. Louis had thus made these
five mistakes: he had crushed the smaller Powers, increased the power in Italy of one ruler,
brought into the land a very powerful foreigner, and he had not come to live there himself, nor
had he established any colonies. Still these mistakes might, if he had lived, not have injured him,
had he not made the sixth, that of taking the state from the Venetians; for, if he had not
strengthened the Church and brought the Spaniards into Italy, it would have been right and
necessary to humble them; having once taken those measures, he ought never to have consented
to their ruin; because, had the Venetians been strong, it would have kept the others from making
attempts on Lombardy, partly because the Venetians would not have consented to any measures
by which they did not get it for themselves, and partly because the others would not have wanted
to take it from France to give it to Venice, and would not have had the courage to attack both.
If anyone urges that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain in
order to avoid war, I reply, with the reasons already given, that one ought never to allow a
disorder to take place in order to avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only deferred to
your disadvantage. And if others allege the promise given by the king to the pope to undertake
that enterprise for him, in return for the dissolution of his marriage and for the cardinalship of
Rohan, I reply with what I shall say later on about the faith of princes and how it is to be
observed. Thus, King Louis lost Lombardy through not observing any of those conditions which
have been observed by others who have taken provinces and wished to retain them. Nor is this
any miracle, but very reasonable and natural. I spoke of this matter with Cardinal Rohan at
Nantes when Valentine, as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called, was
occupying the Romagna, for on Cardinal Rohan saying to me that the Italians did not understand
war, I replied that the French did not understand politics, for if they did they would never allow
the Church to become so great. And experience shows us that the greatness in Italy of the Church
and also of Spain have been caused by France, and her ruin has proceeded from them. From
which may be drawn a general rule, which never or very rarely fails, that whoever is the cause of
another becoming powerful, is ruined himself; for that power is produced by him either through
craft or force; and both of these are suspected by the one that has become powerful.
CHAPTER 4
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, OCCUPIED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL
AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF THE LATTER AFTER HIS DEATH.
Considering the difficulties there are in holding a newly acquired state, some may wonder how it
came to pass that Alexander the Great became master of Asia in a few years, and had hardly
occupied it when he died, from which it might be supposed that the whole state would have
rebelled. However, his successors maintained themselves in possession, and had no further
difficulty in doing so than those which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.
I reply that the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two ways: either by a prince
and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or
by a prince and by barons, who hold their positions not by favor of the ruler but by antiquity of
blood. Such barons have states and subjects of their own, who recognize th…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment