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Thesis Proposal Assignment | Custom Essay Services

Hi, you can call me Rashi. Short about me, i am a master student, did my bachelor in law, and doing a master in Social Science now. Here is a short infos about my Master program to have a look what’s about “ it is an interdisciplinary two-year program taught in English. It focuses on current debates in social sciences such as modernization and democratization, Europeanization and migration. Looking at the cases of Germany, Turkey and other countries allows students to deepen their empirical knowledge of actual political processes in Europe and its neighboring regions. After graduation students are able to pursue international careers in government agencies, diplomacy, public policy, NGOs, administration, consulting, journalism, teaching or research.” The thesis topic isn’t yet confirmed, the deadline is still not fixed. I need something unique, and kinda high profile and for sure it has to comprehensive topic. Please nothing pretty complicated, something manageable within 50-60 pages … qualitative kinda of research, cuz i don’t wanna get stuck in quantitative thing such as statistics or or etc. Therefore, if you have any suggestions regarding a topic, a title, methodology please be my guest. Further more, on the methodology, something using Process tracing or constructivism?!. I will send you 2 files,thesis, you can have a look at then, they have a very good review and i would be happy if i get such a quality type of research as i already know my professor opinion on them how good they are. Following are the guidelines for the thesis proposal as requested by my university, It has to include the following elements, doesn’t have to be in the same order as mentioned down: -introduction to the topic, -problem statement, -detailed methodology on approaches / theories, -research questions, -literature review of the topic, -a structure/outline -finally a bibliography list of all the references has been cited in in the doc and literature review etc. On the format, i have a attached a file “guidelines on how to write a paper” published by my university that has all the infos regard everything almost. Shortly, 4-5 pages, 1,5 spacing, APA style, 3cm margin. Font (Time, or Arial), Page number right- bottom. I would be grateful to have everything in Doc/word file so that i can add the cover page with name and stuff. finally, i would be happy to get some explanations on the whole topic, methodology part especially, in case if i got asked about anything during my presentation. Lastly, i would like to thank you for taking all of those wishes into consideration and doing it for sure

2. On Strategic Culture
2.1 What is strategic culture?
In the last decades of the Cold War the dominant (neo)realist views on international
relations were increasingly challenged by theorists who were focusing on matters such
as identity, culture, language etc. In the 1990s this direction in International Relations
became well known as constructivism, a name invented by Nicholas Onuf in 1989.15
However, the rise of strategic culture as a school of thought in security studies started
slightly earlier, in the late 1970s, before constructivism had gathered broad following
through scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein.16 Like
constructivists, the strategic culture theorists challenged realism’s characterisation of
actors as ‘black boxes’, identical entities whose behaviour is determined by the
constraints of the system they are manoeuvring in.
According to strategic culture theorists the behaviour of a security actor is led by its
view of security. Notice here that strategic culture theorists, like constructivists, regard
reality as a social construction, in which the behaviour of an actor is formed by its
particular view of reality. This reality builds on the early or formative experiences of a
state, and is to some degree influenced by the philosophical, political, cultural and
cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.17 The particular construction of an
actor’s view on security then, its strategic culture, encompasses different questions
such as “when is it appropriate to use force?” or “what is the preferred context to solve
security issues: alone or multilateral?”. The actor’s point of view in these issues helps
to explain its perception of threats, its policies etc. Of course, because different actors
have different strategic cultures their interaction can by no means be calculated in a
(neo-)realist way, with rationally acting, undifferentiated units.
The definition of strategic culture that I shall follow in this thesis is the one formulated
by Kerry Longhurst. According to Longhurst strategic culture is “a distinctive body of
beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a
collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process.
15 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia, 1989).
16 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes’, SAGE Publications, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2005),
339–59 (p. 341).
17 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), 32–64 (p. 34).
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A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original
conception. It is not a permanent or static feature. Rather, a strategic culture is
shaped by formative experiences and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at
critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.”18 I will discuss some of the aspects
of her definition below, and will also elaborate on the history of strategic culture and
its advantages and disadvantages.
The first to come up with the term strategic culture was Jack Snyder, in his 1977 study
on the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapon strategy. As American realists failed to explain
the behaviour of the Soviets with generalised game theory, Snyder’s alternative
approach showed that there was a Soviet strategy which was influenced by “a number
of factors unique to the Soviet historical experience”19. He stressed that the Soviet
leaders should not be looked upon as “generic strategists who happen to be playing for
the Red team, but as politicians and bureaucrats who have developed and been
socialized into a strategic culture that is in many ways unique.”20 This exactly shows
how a strategic culture approach can be valuable, and how over the last decades
scientists such as Colin Gray and David Jones could made use of it.
Another example of the successful use of strategic culture is Sophia Becker’s study on
German security politics after its reunification in 1990. Whereas neorealists such as
John Mearsheimer suggested that a unified Germany would bring back the old balance
of power politics to Europe21, Germany’s strategic culture, now firmly cemented in antimilitarism,
multilateralism and an aversion to leadership, defied these expectations.
Again, strategic culture was able to explain something which was a puzzling outcome
for neorealist theory.22
Unfortunately, the concept of strategic culture has its weaknesses as well. Colin Gray
pointed out that although strategic culture is strong at spotting and explaining
tendencies after an event, it fails to predict behaviour (as opposite to game theory or
18 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force (Manchester, 2004), p. 200.
19 Jack L. Snyder, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, 1977, 1–41 (pp. 8–9).
20 Snyder, p. 4.
21 John T. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990), 5–56.
22 Sophia Becker, ‘Germany and War: Understanding Strategic Culture under the Merkel Government’, Paris Papers, No. 9 (2013), 1–80. See also:
John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification (Redwood
City, 1998).
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rational choice theory). Moreover, there is a risk to use an actor’s strategic culture not
as a framework for behaviour, but to see it as too deterministic, explaining anything
and everything.23
Scholars have tried to counter this last point by stating that strategic culture is not
mechanically deterministic, but that it rather creates tendencies to a particular
strategic behaviour. Insights in an actor’s strategic culture can thus rule out certain
types of behaviour as very unlikely and others as possible and this way “map a
corridor of ‘normal’ and ‘probable’ behaviour of states” which can be integrated into
more comprehensive analyses of strategic choice.24 Johnston observed that in that
case the literature insufficiently explains through what logic the status or probability of
these tendencies is decided.25
He is right about this: when assigning different levels of probability to behaviours for
an actor, it is up to researchers to categorise these behaviours on the basis of criteria
which are not standardised and which still fully depend on the creativity of the scholar.
This is not to say that this stands in the way of good research; however, the lack of
method makes it hard to compare studies and fully estimate the objective value of
claims about strategic culture. For the time being the debates on many aspects of
strategic culture continue.
2.2 The relation between strategic culture and behaviour
One of the prominent strategic culture debates is about the relation between culture
and behaviour. For first generation scholars such as Colin Gray the two are
inseparable, as the culture functions as context for the behaviour. This was later
challenged by Alistair Johnston, who sought to formulate a falsifiable theory of
strategic culture. Johnston noted that if behaviour is an expression of the culture,
there is no longer anything valuable to say about strategic culture: everything can be
explained by and brought back to culture, which in itself does not explain anything.
One can, for example, explain away a defensive posture of a militarily weak European
23 Longhurst, p. 9; Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33,
No. 3 (2012), 437–61 (p. 441).
24 Christoph O. Meyer, ‘Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, European
Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), 523–49 (p. 8).
25 Johnston, p. 38.
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Union and a more offensive, strong United States, by producing a near-mystical
connection under the label of strategic culture. According to Johnston, if strategic
culture becomes an all-encompassing concept, it cannot be used as an independent
variable on strategic behaviour and cannot lead to meaningful research.26
Although Johnston was correct when he pointed out that falsification is being hindered
by the indivisibility of culture and behaviour, I see this as an inevitability. Gray
convincingly argued that behaviour cannot be seen free from the influences under
which it comes into existence.
“Everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at
least an example of behaviour effected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people,
organisations, procedures and weapons. […] Although each dimension of strategy can
be discussed in isolation, all dimensions function synergistically to constitute the
whole. […] Even when a security community is performing missions that traditionally it
has not much favoured, if not actually alien, it must behave in a culturally shaped
manner.”27
The debate between Gray and Johnston has never been solved and was more recently
picked up again by Alan Bloomfield. Bloomfield attacked the work of Carnes Lord, who
is regarded, like Gray, as a strategic culture scholar of the first generation. Bloomfield
noted that Lord in his work, confusingly, first found the United States’ strategic culture
an outcome of “all things strategic”, while later describing it is as a cause of strategic
policy and behaviour. Bloomfield thus concluded that Lord failed “to untangle the lines
of causation” between his variables. This way strategic culture had become a
tautology, being both cause and effect.28
I would argue, however, that the relation between strategic culture and many of the
things strategic is one of mutual influence. It is true that strategic culture is formed by
strategic factors, but this in turn causes behaviour by actors that shapes the strategic
variables by which it was first formed. The feedback loop this creates is sometimes
neglected by scholars, which overly or solely focus on strategic culture as an outcome.
26 Toje Asle, ‘Strategic Culture as an Analytical Tool History, Capabilities, Geopolitics and Values: The EU Example’, No. 14 (2009), 3–23 (p. 7).
27 Collin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1999), pp. 132–35.
28 Bloomfield, pp. 439–41.
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In this thesis I will try to consider both the elements that formed a strategic culture
and their consequential behaviour, and especially the dialogue between the culture and
the behaviour.
The issue Bloomfield raised, points basically at the same problem Gray and Johnston
argued about. The inability to falsify strategic culture and to describe how it relates to
strategic actors is an important unresolved issue, that will keep dividing strategic
culture scholars. However, there are more questions to ask when dealing with strategic
culture and trying to characterise it.
2.3 Measuring strategic culture
Once a strategic culture is defined, it is important to keep in mind that it is not static.
Strategic cultures change, causing security actors to opt for different solutions in
different points in time. The difficulty is how to determine the process that drives
change in strategic culture. Scholars have not yet decided on a standard procedure to
map this and have come up with different methods.
Longhurst, for example, identifies two ways in which strategic culture can change:
fine-tuning and fundamental change. The first form manifests itself as behaviour of a
security actor reacting to external or internal events which challenge the security
culture as it is established at that moment. Challenges press the actor to fine-tune
security policies in such a way that its ‘core values’ suit the new situation.
Fundamental change, on the other hand, is a rarely occurring, radical change in
security culture which can take place when a severe or traumatic event obsoletes the
existing strategic culture. The subsequent quick acceptance of new core beliefs, can in
a short period of time lead to the establishment of fundamentally new practices and
policies.29
Alternatively, the workings of strategic culture can be approached in terms of long and
short-term changes. This is not the same as Longhurst’s method, for she was rather
looking at the pervasiveness of changes in strategic culture (gradual change by slight
fine-tuning or thorough change through milestone events). Thus, for example, the
process of change in strategic culture can be described with a focus on slow
29 Longhurst, p. 18.
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movements such as demographic changes or long term economic tendencies.30 Such
approaches remind of Fernand Braudel’s view of history as a series of stacked time
layers. “Event history” happens only within the structures of the long-term frame of
the longue dureé.31 Although there are different factors to highlight in these time
structure views on strategic culture, they all have in common that they stress the stern
resistance of strategic culture against change. In doing so they play down the power of
agency in strategic culture, as they suggest actors have a limited ability to try to
establish changes in strategic culture as they will always to some extent have to rely
on the (external) movements of the larger structures.
The issue of agency comes with its own problems. Apart from the question how much
strategic culture is externally driven (by external processes or actions of other actors),
it is not clear who is responsible for the formation of a strategic culture. Although it
seems generally accepted that strategic culture is “an aggregate level of the most
influential voices in terms of attitudes and behaviours”32, and thus consists of some
interplay between elites, its precise realisation is an unclear process. Sometimes
scholars also try to include other factors such as the role of the media and mass
movements into the mixture.33
Bloomfield advocates the use of “strategic cognitive schemas”, or subcultures, for the
analysis for strategic culture. According to him an emphasis on the subcultures, which
coexist and compete for influence, would clarify many current problems about the
interpretation of strategic cultures. Changes in what strategic subculture is dominant
could explain changes in strategic policies of state actors.34 This is an important aspect
to take into consideration – also in the Turkish case, which has a strong ideological
divide between the ruling Islamist AKP and the strongly secular Kemalists.
However, I would contest the idea suggested by Bloomberg that a state’s security
policy is fully dictated by the subculture that is dominating the strategic culture. The
30 For example: Jeannie L. Johnson, ‘Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct’, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 2006, p.
25; Rodney W. Jones, ‘India’s Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 2006, p. 6; Thomas Gomart, ‘Russia Alone Forever?
The Kremlin’s Strategic Solitude’, Politique Étrangère, 2008, 23–33.
31 Fernand Braudel, ‘Histoire et Sciences Sociales: La Longue Durée’, Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, Vol. 13, No 4 (1958), 725–53.
32 Asle, p. 4.
33 Meyer, pp. 22–23, 27.
34 Bloomfield, pp. 451–56.
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way the dominant subculture manifests itself and which of its characteristics are
highlighted should be related to the subcultures it is competing with. It is not as simple
as saying a state is from that period to that period ‘possessed’ by one subculture, while
the next is “waiting in the wings”35, ready to take over. Rather, a dominant subculture
might be reacting against of being influenced by other subcultures. It might anticipate
on its competitors by ‘lending’ certain characteristics, or it might be highlighting
attributes especially contrasting with the preferences of its competitors. This in turn
might move the state’s strategic culture in one or another direction. Therefore the
interplay between the subcultures and the way they ultimately reflect on the strategic
culture should not be neglected.
The analysis of subcultures is a complicated matter. Although one subculture can be
dominant, it is hard to nail down what groups or what actors are part of this subculture
and are driving it, beyond the obvious leading party officials. In the case of the AKP
single-party government, for example, we could confidently include the party’s local
officials and members and the government aligned press as part of the subculture. But
as we draw the circle broader, including NGOs with ties to the government or the civil
servant apparatus, it becomes increasingly precarious to understand the mechanics of
the AKP government as dominant subculture. These actors, which stand further from
the subcultures elite, influence the workings of the subculture through indirect
processes. The composition of the AKP subculture forms a worthy topic for analysis in
itself, from which I unfortunately will have to refrain. In this thesis I will therefore have
to refer to the AKP elite without further investigation of subculture mechanics.
Likewise, for the sake of attainability, I will in paragraph 3 on Turkey’s strategic culture
not get into a detailed account of all the Turkish governments and their specific
subcultures and counter-cultures. Instead, a general outline of the developments in
Turkey’s strategic culture will have to do. The later paragraphs will focus on the AKP
subculture, for I regard it as vastly influential in Turkey’s contemporary strategic
culture. Additionally there will be references to the Kemalist subculture, which forms
an important opposition force.
35 Bloomfield, p. 452.
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The way I will be handling the characteristics which a strategic culture consists of, is by
referring to ‘narratives’. Margaret Somers explained that narratives can present
different versions of the past, the present or the future of a social group to depict a
coherent version of what a group is. These narratives have a strong forming influence
on social relations between individuals and in constructing social organisations.
Eventually they can shape social life itself.36
In the next chapter I will present two narratives which give two very opposite
interpretations of security. Different subcultures can adopt these narratives, or parts of
them and to varying degrees. Although not usual in strategic culture analysis, I regard
it necessary to add this extra layer on top of the previously described contest of
subcultures: different subcultures can by times borrow from the same narratives,
sharing certain believes with some subcultures, while differing on other points.
Moreover, we can point out in this way that subcultures, like global strategic culture,
are not static either: the importance of certain narratives within subcultures can grow
and diminish over time.
Figure 1. depicts how the strategic culture mechanism works. Different subcultures
hold different ideas on security. The beliefs of a subgroup is a particular composition of
narratives, which have different degrees of influence. The country’s strategic culture is
shaped by the subgroups, one of which might be dominant. The strategic culture, then,
provides a certain range of possible behaviours which we can expect from a country.
36 Margaret R. Somers, ‘The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach’, Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 5 (1994),
605–49.
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Figure 1. How strategic culture, subcultures and narratives relate (figure by author)
3. Turkey and Strategic Culture
Now we have studied the theory of strategic culture, let us look at the case of Turkey.
As we examined in the previous paragraph, strategic culture is an amalgam of the
preferences of different groups that possess power in Turkey, where any dominant
group will be especially conclusive. While the groups can refer to different narratives,
constructions of the world which contain a set of preferences, they might never fully
align with the ‘ideal type’ version of the narrative. In our discussion of Turkey I will
bring forward two different narratives.
We will first see how Atatürk’s idea of “peace at home and peace in the world”
connected the ideas of national state security at the domestic front with Turkey’s
foreign policy behaviour through the national unity narrative. We will then see how the
strategic culture under this national unity narrative, which was held up by the
Kemalists (those inspired by Kemal Atatürk), has increasingly been challenged by a
narrative that presents Turkey as an assertive regional power. Especially under the
rule of the AKP, which came into power in 2002, this narrative gained strength. Once
we understand this shift in strategic culture we can see how this reflected on Turkey’s
role in NATO.
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3.1 National unity narrative
The Ottoman defeat in the First World War, the collapse of the empire and the
subsequent establishment of the Kemalist Turkish state led to a sudden change of
course for Turkey’s strategic culture. It was a rare instance of fundamental change, as
we saw described by Longhurst, in which Turkey’s core values were reshaped. The new
republic opted for a strong state and a weak civil society37, and composed a strategic
culture which was obsessed with the territorial integrity of the state and which followed
what I will call the national unity narrative.
An important determinant for this was the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), in which Western
powers partitioned the lands of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty caused a deep
suspicion towards the intentions of foreign powers about Turkey up to the point that it
has been described by scholars as the Sèvres Syndrome. Sèvres fuelled a narrative
among the Turkish elites that foreign powers were trying to undermine Turkey and
were tirelessly attempting to further interfere with its domestic politics through
aggregating internal (ethnical) conflicts. In fact, causes of Turkey’s internal problems
were often sought and found in external factors, such as plotting foreign countries.38
Therefore Sèvres is of great importance to understand Turkey’s strategic culture. The
focus on national unity and territorial integrity kept a firm control on any possible
domestic disturbances. In the early years of the republic several Kurdish rebellions
were harshly suppressed. In addition, the Kemalists continuously tried to curb what
they perceived as political extremism from both the communist and socialist Left and
the religious Right. The sceptic attitude towards Western powers stemming from
Sèvres is something that we will encounter later in the context of Turkey’s NATO
membership as well. Thus Sèvres links the Kemalist strong state with Turkey’s foreign
policy behaviour and general strategic culture.39
Another characteristic of the national unity narrative which was dominating Turkey’s
strategic culture in this phase was a reluctance to get involved in the conflicts of
others. We can trace a long period in which Turkey tried to stay unaligned, as was the
37 Metin

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