Northeastern University Hawkley & Cacioppos Study Research These will each be ~3 pages, single-spaced, 12-pt font. The general format for these position pa

Northeastern University Hawkley & Cacioppos Study Research These will each be ~3 pages, single-spaced, 12-pt font. The general format for these position papers should be:(a) ~2 pages reviewing the core material of the readings (two assigned readings + one reading of your choice related to the topic).(b) ~1 page introducing some novel study that includes your empirical question(s), hypotheses, ways you might test the hypotheses, & possible implications that relate back to the bigger topic you reviewed. Copyright 2001 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0033-2909/01/S5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0033-2909.127.2.187
Psychological Bulletin
2001, Vol. 127, No. 2, 187-208
Evolutionary Origins of Stigmatization: The Functions of Social Exclusion
Mark R. Leary
Robert Kurzban
Wake Forest University
University of Arizona
A reconceptualization of stigma is presented that changes the emphasis from the devaluation of an
individual’s identity to the process by which individuals who satisfy certain criteria come to be excluded
from various kinds of social interactions. The authors propose that phenomena currently placed under the
general rubric of stigma involve a set of distinct psychological systems designed by natural selection to
solve specific problems associated with sociality. In particular, the authors suggest that human beings
possess cognitive adaptations designed to cause them to avoid poor social exchange partners, join
cooperative groups (for purposes of between-group competition and exploitation), and avoid contact with
those who are differentially likely to carry communicable pathogens. The evolutionary view contributes
to the current conceptualization of stigma by providing an account of the ultimate function of Stigmatization and helping to explain its consensual nature.
Positive social contact is essential for psychological and physiological health. People who feel socially alienated or rejected are
susceptible to a host of behavioral, emotional, and physical problems, suggesting that human beings may possess a fundamental
need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Despite people’s best
efforts to be accepted, however, social rejection is a pervasive
feature of social life. Of course, many rejections result from
idiosyncratic preferences, inclinations, and goals of one individual
vis-a-vis another. However, other instances of social rejection
appear to be based on the shared values or preferences of groups
of individuals. Through the process of Stigmatization, certain individuals are systematically excluded from particular sorts of
social interactions because they possess a particular characteristic
or are a member of a particular group. Pronounced risk of social
exclusion exists for members of diverse groups, such as the mentally ill {Farina & Ring, 1965; Shears & Jensema, 1969), mentally
retarded persons (Shears & Jensema, 1969), obese people (Cahnman, 1968; Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993; DeJong, 1980),
homosexuals (Shears & Jensema, 1969), psoriasis patients (Ginsburg & Link, 1993; Ramsey & O’Reagan, 1988), epileptics (E.
Rodin, Shapiro, & Lennox, 1977), HIV/AIDS patients (Bennett,
1990; Weitz, 1990), cancer patients (Bloom & Kessler, 1994;
Stahly, 1988; Wortman & Dunkel-Schetter, 1979), as well as
members of a variety of racial, ethnic, and religious groups
(Sigelman & Singleton, 1986; Steele & Aronson, 1995).
Definitions and Assumptions
Our goal in this article is to offer a new perspective on the
process of Stigmatization and the important question of why an
inherently social species with a strong need for social acceptance
should be so inclined to reject members of its own kind. Most
theory and research on the Stigmatization process can be traced to
Goffman (1963), who defined stigma as “an attribute that is deeply
discrediting” (p. 3). According to Goffman, Stigmatization is a
process of global devaluation of an individual who possesses a
deviant attribute. Stigma arises during a social interaction when an
individual’s actual social identity (the attributes he or she can be
proved to possess) does not meet society’s normative expectations
of the attributes the individual should possess (his or her virtual
social identity). Thus, the individual’s social identity is spoiled,
and he or she is assumed to be incapable of fulfilling the role
requirements of social interaction.
Since Goffman’s seminal work, three other major perspectives
on stigma have been offered. Jones et al. (1984) proposed that a
person is stigmatized when a mark (a deviation from a prototype or
norm) has been linked to dispositions that discredit the bearer of
the mark. Thus, the mark of deviance initiates an attributional
process through which people interpret other aspects of a person in
terms of the mark and respond to stigmatized individuals on the
basis of their stigma at the expense of their individuality. In
contrast, Elliott, Ziegler, Altman, and Scott (1982) suggested that
stigma is a form of deviance that leads others to judge individuals
as illegitimate for participation in an interaction. People may be
considered illegitimate interactants because they lack the abilities
or skills to carry on an interaction, behave unpredictably or inconsistently, or are a threat to others or to the interaction itself.
According to Elliott et al., once a person has been classified as
illegitimate for participation in an interaction, he or she is beyond
the protection of social norms and, as such, may be excluded or
ignored altogether. Most recently, Crocker, Major, and Steele
(1998) acknowledged the difficulty of identifying a single defining
feature of stigma but suggested that stigmatized people are believed to possess “some attribute, or characteristic, that conveys a
Robert Kurzban, Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona;
Mark R. Leary, Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University.
The writing of this article was supported by a fellowship from the
International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics to Robert Kurzban. We would like to thank Toni Schmader, Brenda Major, and
Crystal Wright for their extremely valuable comments on drafts of this
article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Robert
Kurzban, who is now at the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences,
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125. Electronic
mail may be sent to rkurzban@hss.caltech.edu.
187
188
KURZBAN AND LEARY
social identity that is devalued in a particular social context” (p.
505). In their view, stigma arises from one’s membership in a
group or category that is negatively valued in a specific situation.
A comparison of these conceptualizations reveals an important
similarity: Each suggests that stigmatization occurs when an individual is negatively evaluated, be it conceptualized in terms of
discrediting, negative attributions; perceived illegitimacy; or a
devalued social identity. However, negative evaluations are an
inevitable part of social life, and few would argue that situations
involving mere negative evaluation are necessarily instances of
stigmatization. What, then, transforms negative evaluations, even
highly prejudicial ones, into stigmatization?
Assumptions Underlying the Evolutionary Approach
to Stigma
To begin to answer this question, we propose a conceptualization of social stigma based on evolutionary considerations that
differs in certain respects from previous formulations. Our analysis
is predicated on the notion that the process of natural selection
leads to adaptations designed to solve the recurrent adaptive problems faced by a particular species during its evolutionary history
(Darwin, 1859; Williams, 1966). Furthermore, we assume that the
mechanisms that solve these adaptive problems are likely to be
extremely specific in their functioning, as specificity of design is
necessary for any system that is capable of generating adaptive
behavior (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Thus, the evolutionary approach suggests that instead of expecting
the human mind to be a relatively domain-general learning machine (the overarching and often implicit view of many psychologists), we should expect rather that the mind consists of a large
number of distinct information-processing systems, each designed
to solve a particular adaptive problem (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
We also assume that the social world composed of other members of one’s species represents an intricate and complex web of
interactions that generates a vast array of potential fitness costs and
benefits, requiring extremely sophisticated computational machinery to navigate it successfully (e.g., Whiten & Byrne, 1988, 1997).
Because our hominid ancestors lived in social groups during at
least the last several million years, we should expect that the
human mind contains cognitive systems designed to solve the
adaptive problems associated with human beings’ social life history (Caporael & Baron, 1997; Caporael & Brewer, 1991, 1995;
Cosmides & Tooby, 1989, 1992; Gigerenzer, 1997; Humphrey,
1976).
Taken together, these considerations suggest that there exists a
collection of distinct, domain-specific psychological mechanisms
that have evolved to solve adaptive problems associated with
sociality. We argue that there are a number of systems that are
designed to exclude others from social interactions and that they
differ from one another in important ways. Together, the behavioral manifestations of these exclusionary mechanisms generate
the phenomena that have fallen under the rubric of stigmatization.
(See also Archer, 1985.)
These assumptions lead us to shift the analysis of stigma from
negative evaluation or discrediting to interpersonal disassbciation.
Thus, stigmatization occurs
when a shared characteristic of a category of people becomes consensually regarded as a basis for disassociating from (that is, avoiding,
excluding, ostracizing, or otherwise minimizing interaction with) individuals who are perceived to be members of that category. (Leary &
Schreindorfer, 1998, p. 15)
On this view, people are stigmatized not simply because they are
evaluated negatively or possess a spoiled identity, but rather because they possess a characteristic viewed by society or a subgroup
as constituting a basis for avoiding or excluding other people.
Thus, stigmatization is based on the shared values and preferences
of members of a particular group. Personal rejections based on
idiosyncratic preferences would not be considered stigmatization.
We argue that many of the characteristics that lead to stigma-based
social exclusion are nonarbitrary and derive from evolved adaptations designed to cause people to avoid interactions that are differentially likely to impose fitness costs. Furthermore, because
humans everywhere are endowed with the same psychological
systems, we should expect cross-cultural similarities in behavior
driven by the similarities in underlying psychological architecture.
To integrate the evolutionary approach advanced here with
current theorizing, we find it necessary to revisit the often misunderstood issue of the relationship between evolutionary analyses
and the information-processing description of human psychology.
The ultimate level of explanation in evolutionary terms requires a
description of the selection pressures faced by a species during its
evolutionary history and the recurrent structure of the environment
(physical, social, and so forth) against which natural selection
could act to build systems that solved the adaptive problem. The
proximate level of explanation includes a description of the adaptations—the specialized functional mechanisms—that evolved to
solve these problems, including a description of the operations that
a mechanism performs and the elements of the organisms’ environment with which the mechanism interacts (Tooby & Cosmides,
1992). Because evolution by natural selection is the only known
force by which complex functional biological machinery can come
to exist, any nonaccidental functional aspects of a phenotype must
ultimately be explained in terms of natural selection (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1992). This is not to say every hypothesis in psychology must be about the specific solution to an adaptive problem per
se. Even so, general psychological processes should eventually be
able to be explained in terms of the operation of mechanisms
designed to solve adaptive problems.
Functional Explanations
Because the evolutionary approach uses the word function in a
way that differs from certain other approaches in psychology, we
wish to be clear in the way that we are using the term. From an
evolutionary perspective, function is defined only with respect to
contribution to reproductive success. So, when we refer to the
function of an adaptation, we mean the specific way in which the
operation of the trait in question contributed to the reproductive
success of the bearers of the trait (or the bearer’s kin) over the
course of evolution, no matter how distal this contribution might
have been or what its contribution to reproductive fitness is now
(Symons, 1989, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Note that this usage of the word function differs from the folk
meaning as well as the meaning used by the majority of psychologists, who use it to refer to the attainment of more proximate
psychological goals. For example, the possible functions of stig-
EVOLUTION AND STIGMATIZATION
matization discussed below—self-enhancement and system justification—are not functions in an evolutionary sense. Although it is
likely (perhaps certain; see Cosmides & Tooby, 1987) that psychological mechanisms function (in our sense) by embodying a
design that attempts to accomplish particular proximate goals, a
complete biological functional analysis must account for how the
attainment of these goals contributed to reproductive success over
evolutionary time. It is important to bear in mind that a claim that
a psychological system has a particular ultimate function does not
necessarily yield any predictions about the current effect of that
system on reproduction in modern environments (see Symons,
1987, for a discussion). Instead, it generates predictions about the
design features that such a mechanism should possess.
Starting from these assumptions, our plan for this article is as
follows. First, we look at the current literature on the functions of
stigmatization and social exclusion. Second, we consider some
examples from nonhuman animals to give a sense of selection
pressures that might lead to adaptations for social exclusion. Third,
we propose that human adaptations for sociality include cognitive
mechanisms that cause people to be selective in their social interactions. In particular, we argue that human beings possess adaptations that have the function of (a) decreasing the probability of
being cheated in a social exchange and avoiding interactions with
partners who have little to offer in terms of social gain, (b)
maintaining one’s group’s integrity and exploiting those in subordinate groups, and (c) decreasing the probability of parasitic infection. During this discussion, we attempt to show that stigmatization is, in large part, based on these adaptations, and we point to
ways in which different types of stigmatization might be distinguished from one another. Fourth, we highlight predictions of the
model and suggest some directions for future empirical work.
Throughout, we focus on the manifestation of differences from the
point of view of the stigmatizer. Although we believe that there are
also specific adaptations designed to respond adaptively to being
socially excluded (see Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Leary & Downs,
1995), our central concern is the process of stigmatization per se.
Previous Perspectives on the Function of Stigmatization
Because Crocker et al. (1998) recently presented an excellent
and thorough review of this literature, we give here only a brief
overview of the most prominent accounts that address the psychological functions of stigmatization. In particular, the most developed theories in this area suggest that people stigmatize others to
(a) enhance their self-esteem, (b) enhance their social identity, or
(c) justify a particular social, economic, or political structure
(Crocker et al., 1998).
Proximate Functions of Stigma
Self-esteem and social identity. Two models focus on the
benefits of stigmatization for the identity and self-esteem of the
stigmatizer. These approaches suggest that stigmatization is a
process of denigrating others in order to put oneself (or one’s
group) in a psychologically superior position (e.g., Turner, 1982).
Viewed from these perspectives, stigmatization is akin to other
forms of social comparison and other-derogation that have been
attributed to the desire to maintain high self-esteem or a positive
189
social identity (e.g., Cialdini & Richardson, 1980; Crocker,
Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1980;
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tesser, 1988; Wills, 1981;
Wood, 1989).
Self-esteem based theories of stigmatization can be broken
down into two corollaries: that (a) discrimination enhances selfesteem, and (b) threatened self-esteem motivates discrimination
(Abrams & Hogg, 1988). However, after decades of research on
the relationship between self-esteem and discrimination, numerous
studies have failed to find evidence for one or both of these
corollaries (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Hogg
& Sunderland, 1991; Hogg & Turner, 1987; but see Lemyre &
Smith, 1985). In particular, the second corollary, that self-esteem
acts as a causal variable in discrimination, has received little
support (see Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, for a recent review).
Self-esteem does seem to play some role in stigmatization from the
point of view of both the stigmatizer and the stigmatized, but the
link is not a straightforward one (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989;
Crocker & Quinn, 1998; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991;
Fein & Spencer, 1997; Long & Spears, 1997; Major & Schmader,
1998). Indeed, Hogg and Sunderland (1991) noted that there was
“little support for either corollary of the self-esteem hypothesis”
but that “the assumption that strategies of intergroup behavior are
psychologically guided by a self-enhancement motive remains in
place” (p. 52).’
Most important, viewing stigmatization as a means of maintaining self-esteem or social identity does not easily explain why
members of certain groups are stigmatized whereas others are not.
People have a broad array of individuals and groups from which to
derive their own identity and self-esteem. Social comparison models do not provide a clear account of why particular kinds of
groups are prone to stigmatization either within a specific cultural
context or cross-culturally and historically. Our view is that although self-esteem and stigma are intertwined in some fashion,
these theoretical perspectives do not provide a satisfying account
of why individuals discriminate against particular others.
Justification of social structure. The system justification approach of lost and Banaji (1994) and the social dominance perspective of Sidanius and Pratto (1993) begin with the assumption
that people are motivated to justify the social, economic, and
political systems in which they live. To do this, members of a
society make attributions about deservingness, positive and negative traits, and the worthiness of the members of various social
groups on the basis of the current social structure, even when this
structure is the result of arbitrary historical processes (Jost &
Banaji, 1994). Thus, the roles that members of different groups
play are justified by assumptions regarding differences in the
characteristics of members of each group that make these role
differences reasonable (e.g., Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman &
Hurst, 1990). This view suggests, for example, that people in a
particular culture might come to believe that members of a subordinate group are lazy and lack initiative because this belief
1
See Dawes (1994) for a parallel case in the clinical literature of a
tenacious adherence to self-esteem as a causal variable despite a paucity of
empirical evidence.
190
KURZBAN AND LEARY
justifies the subordinate group’s role as servants or slaves. In this
way, intergroup status differences are naturalized and legitimized.
The system justification approaches are appeali…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment