Leibniz Clarke Correspondence Liebniz Letter to Bosnage De Beauval HW (Great English is a must!! No grammar errors!) (Everything is attached) (Min 4 Page

Leibniz Clarke Correspondence Liebniz Letter to Bosnage De Beauval HW (Great English is a must!! No grammar errors!)

(Everything is attached)

(Min 4 Pages/ Maximum 5 Pages , APA Format)

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Subject of the paper: Liebniz letter to bosnage de beauval

Requirement: All the information is presented in the Request attachment (there is a screenshot) . As stated, you need to have a good understanding of what Leibniz and Berkeley are saying. DO NOT SUMMARIZE the work, focus on critical thinking.

Other information: APA Format

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APA Format
No plagiarism is accepted

*** The work will be checked for plagiarism through Turnitin by the professor. It is essential for everything to be free of plagiarism otherwise sanctions will be imposed***

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Thank you for your support POSTSCRIPT TO BASNAGE DE BEAUVAL
149
some people have found paradoxical, have led to an exchange of letters with
several famous people; I could publish a collection of letters sometime later,
in which my correspondence with Arnauld of which I have spoken in my
previous letter, could appear. It would contain a curious mix of philosophical
and mathematical thoughts which would perhaps have the charm of novelty.
I let you judge whether these explanations I have just given would be suitable
for sounding the opinions of enlightened persons through the medium of your
Journal; however, I wish the work to remain anonymous, as was the item in
the Journal de Paris.211
On the Ultimate Origination of Things
(23 November 1697)212
BEYOND
EYOND THE WORLD, that is, beyond the collection of finite things,
there is some One Being who rules, not only as the soul is the ruler in me,
or, better, as the self is the ruler in my body, but also in a much higher sense.
For the One Being who rules the universe not only rules the world, but also
fashions or creates it; he is above the world, and, so to speak, extramundane,
and therefore he is the ultimate reason for things. For we cannot find in any
of the individual things, or even in the entire collection and series of things,
a sufficient reason for why they exist. Let us suppose that a book on the
elements of geometry has always existed, one copy always made from another.
It is obvious that although we can explain a present copy of the book from
the previous book from which it was copied, this will never lead us to a
complete explanation, no matter how many books back we go, since we can
always wonder why there have always been such books, why these books were
written, and why they were written the way they were. What is true of these
books is also true of the different states of the world, for the state which
follows is, in a sense, copied from the preceding state, though in accordance
with certain laws of change. And so, however far back we might go into
previous states, we will never find in those states a complete explanation (ratio)
for why, indeed, there is any world at all, and why it is the way it is.
I certainly grant that you can imagine that the world is eternal. However,
since you assume only a succession of states, and since no reason for the world
can be found in any one of them whatsoever (indeed, assuming as many of
them as you like won’t in any way help you to find a reason), it is obvious
that the reason must be found elsewhere. For in eternal things, even if there
is no cause, we must still understand there to be a reason. In things that
persist, the reason is the nature or essence itself, and in a series of changeable
things (if, a priori, we imagine it to be eternal), the reason would be the
211. The Journal de Paris is the Journal des Savants, in which the New System was first published.
Basnage de Beauval was editor of the Histoire des Ouvrages des sçavans, which was the title he
gave the Nouvelles de la République des Lettres, when he took it over from Pierre Bayle in 1687.
212 VII 302-8. Latin
Note: on FOUCHER’S OHJECTION
147
are relations that contain eternal truths, by which the phenomena of nature are
ruled. In this way one can say that and 1/4 taken abstractly are independent of
one another, or rather that the total ratio 1/2 is prior (in the sign of reason, as
the Scholastics say) to the partial ratio 1/4, since it is by the subdivision of the
half that we come to the fourth, when considering the ideal order; and it is
the same for the line, in which the whole is prior to the part because the part
is only possible and ideal. But in realities in which only divisions actually
made enter into consideration, the whole is only a result or coming together,
like a flock of sheep. It is true that the number of simple substances which
enter into a mass, however small, is infinite, since besides the soul, which
brings about the real unity of the animal, the body of the sheep (for example)
is actually subdivided that is, it is, again, an assemblage of invisible animals
or plants which are in the same way composites, outside of that which also
brings about their real unity. Although this goes on to infinity, it is evident
that, in the end, everything reduces (revenir à] to these unities, the rest or the
results being nothing but well-founded phenomena.
Postscript of a Letter to
Basnage de Beauval (1696)206
148
LEIBNIZ: BASIC WORKS
experienced, to his great surprise. 208 He had suspended two pendula from the
same piece of wood, and the constant swinging of the pendula transmitted
similar vibrations to the particles of wood. But since these vibrations could
not continue in an orderly way without interfering with each other, at least
while the two pendula were not in accord with one another, it happened in a
marvelous way that even when the swings of the pendula had been intention-
ally disturbed, they came to swing together again, almost as if they were two
strings in unison. The second way to make two faulty clocks always agree
would be to have them watched over by a competent workman, who would
adjust them and get them to agree at every moment. The third way is to
construct these two clocks 209 from the start with so much skill and accuracy
that one can be certain of their subsequent agreement.
Let us now put the soul and the body in place of these two watches; their
agreement or sympathy will also come about in one of these three ways. The
way of influence is that of the common philosophy; but since we can conceive
neither material particles nor immaterial qualities or species that can pass
from one of these substances to the other, we must reject this opinion. The
way of assistance is that of the system of occasional causes. But, I hold, that
is to appeal to a Deus ex machina in a natural and ordinary matter, where,
according to reason, God should intervene only in the sense that he concurs
with all other natural things. Thus there remains only my hypothesis, that is,
the way of pre-established harmony, through a prior divine artifice, which has
formed each of these substances from the beginning in such a way that by
following only its own laws, laws which it received with its being, it neverthe-
less agrees with the other, as if there were a mutual influence, or as if God
always meddled with it, over and above his general concourse. Beyond this I
do not think that I need to prove anything else, unless someone wishes me to
prove that God is skillful enough to be able to make use of this prior artifice;
we even see some examples of this among humans, in proportion to their
ability. And assuming that God can do it, one sees clearly that it is the finest
way, the way most worthy of him. You had some worry that my explanation
would be in contradiction with the different ideas we have of the mind and
of the body. But you now see clearly that nobody has better established their
independence. For as long as their communication needed to be explained by
way of miracle, it always gave some people the opportunity to fear that the
distinction was not as great as it was thought to be, since we are forced to go
to such lengths in order to maintain it. Now all these qualms will cease. My
essays on dynamics are related to this.210 There I had to fathom the notion of
corporeal substance, which I placed in the force to act or resist, rather than
in extension, which is merely the repetition or diffusion of something prior,
that is, the repetition or diffusion of this force. And these thoughts, which
One of Foucher’s comments on the “New System of Nature” was that “it can
be granted that God, the great Maker of the universe, can so well adjust all the
organic parts of a man’s body that they may be capable of all the motions that
the soul joined to that body would have produced in the course of its life,
without the soul having had the power to change these motions or to modify
them in any manner [. . . and similarly for the soul]—that is no more
impossible than making two clocks agree so well and act so uniformly that at
the moment clock A strikes twelve, clock B strikes twelve also, so that we
imagine the two clocks being made to work by the same weight or the same
spring” (G IV, 488–89). Leibniz turned to the image a year later, in a
postscript to a letter to Basnage de Beauval. See also the “Response to Father
Tournemine, on Harmony.”
I SEE CLEARLY by your reflections that my thoughts inserted by a friend
in the Journal de Paris require clarification.cº7 You can say that you do not
understand how I can prove what I have advanced about the communication
or harmony of two substances as different as the soul and the body. It is true
that I thought that I had given the way to do this. And here is how I hope to
satisfy you.
Consider two clocks or watches in perfect agreement. Now this can happen
in three ways: the first is that of a natural influence. This is what Huygens
208. One of Huygens’s major works was the Horologium Oscillatorium, sive de motu pendulorum
ad horologia adapto (1673) about pendulum clocks.
209. The text reads ‘pendules,’ which can mean clock, but Leibniz may have intended to write
montre’ or ‘horloge.’
210. See, e.g., the “Specimen of Dynamics.” above.
206. G IV 498-500. French.
207. The reference is to the “New System of Nature.”
Leibniz
1. In the postscript of a Letter to Basnage de Beauval concerning the “New System”
(pp. 147-149 of Ariew and Garber, in the “Leibniz Part 1” readings on the course website)
Leibniz argues for the superiority of his system of pre-established harmony over what he
takes to be the two main rival theories. His argument depends on an analogy with the
workings of clocks. Focus on the comparison Leibniz makes between his theory and “the
system of occasional causes”: how exactly is the analogy supposed to show his theory is
superior? (For a good, brief account of occasionalism, you may wish to consult pp. xviii and
xix of the editor’s introduction (which can be found at the end prompt] to the edition of
Berkeley’s Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous ordered for the course.) Does the
analogy point to some genuine philosophical advantage(s) that Leibniz’s theory enjoys over
occasionalism? Explain fully.
As before, whichever topic you choose, you should divide your paper into two parts, and label
them “Part A” and “Part B.”
Part A should be your explanation of the specific text cited in the prompt. It will be evaluated
on how well you explain Leibniz’s or Berkeley’s position in an intuitive way (concrete
illustrations often help). Close paraphrases are safe but often don’t make clear what is going
on. To do well on this part, you must ground your interpretation in the text, but you should
also take us beyond the text, explaining its main idea, pointing out possible ambiguities and
difficulties, etc. The text is difficult, and it is sometimes not clear exactly what Leibniz or
Berkeley’s argument is. You should do your best to make clear what you think the argument is
and why you think this. (Please be sure to keep Part A limited to the task at hand-in
particular, don’t take it as an invitation to tell us everything you know about Leibniz or
Berkeley.)
In Part B you should critically analyze what Leibniz or Berkeley is saying. How compelling is
his argument? Is the argument unsatisfying in some way? Why? How might someone argue
against his position?
Give equal attention (not necessarily equal space) to both parts. To do well on the paper, you
will need to have both a good, clear explanation of what Leibniz or Berkeley is saying and an
original, interesting analysis of his discussion.

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