HUM 5300 Ashford University Wk3 Healthcare Cost Crisis Essay You will have ten hours to do 300 words,and I will give you all the help I can if you need any

HUM 5300 Ashford University Wk3 Healthcare Cost Crisis Essay You will have ten hours to do 300 words,and I will give you all the help I can if you need any QUESTION 91
The Different Kinds of Law
We next have to consider the different kinds of law. On this topic there are six questions: (1) Is
there such a thing as eternal law? (2) Is there such a thing as natural law? (3) Is there such a thing as
human law? (4) Is there a such a thing as divine law? (5) Is there just a single [divine] law, or more than
one? (6) Is there such a thing as ‘the law of sin’?
Article 1
Is there such a thing as eternal law?
It seems that there is no such thing as eternal law:
Objection 1: Every law is imposed on someone. But there was no one on whom law could have
been imposed from eternity, since God alone existed from eternity. Therefore, there is no such thing as
eternal law.
Objection 2: Promulgation is part of the nature of law. But there could not have been a
promulgation from eternity, since nothing existed from eternity to which the law might have been
promulgated. Therefore, there cannot be any such thing as eternal law.
Objection 3: Law implies an ordering to an end. But there is nothing eternal that might be ordered
to an end, since the ultimate end alone is eternal. Therefore, there is no such thing as eternal law.
But contrary to this: In De Libero Arbitrio 1 Augustine says, “The law that is called the ‘highest
ideal plan’ (summa ratio) cannot but seem unchangeable and eternal to anyone who understands it.”
I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), law is nothing other than a certain dictate
(dictamen) of practical reason on the part of a ruler who governs some complete community. But once
we assume, as was established in the first part (ST 1, q. 22, a. 1), that the world is governed by divine
providence, it is obvious that the entire community of the universe is governed by divine reason.
Therefore, the very nature of the governance of things that exists in God as the ruler of the universe has
the character of law. And since, as Proverbs 8:23 puts it, God’s reason does not conceive of anything
temporally but instead has an eternal conception, it follows that a law of this kind must be called eternal
law.
Reply to objection 1: Those things that do not exist in themselves exist in God’s presence (apud
Deum) insofar as they are foreknown and preordained by Him—this according to Romans 4:17 (“He calls
the things that are not in the same way as those that are”). So, then, the eternal conception of God’s law
has the character of an eternal law, since it is ordered by God toward the governance of the things
foreknown by Him.
Reply to objection 2: Promulgation is accomplished by both the spoken word (verbum) and the
written word (scriptum), and the eternal law has both sorts of promulgation on the part of God who
promulgates it. For God’s Word is eternal (see ST 1, q. 34), and the writing in the book of life is eternal
(see ST 1, q. 24).
On the other hand, as far as the creature who hears or reads is concerned, the promulgation cannot
be eternal.
Reply to objection 3: Law implies an ordering to an end in the active sense—viz., in the sense that
certain things are ordered to the end through law.
However, law does not imply an ordering to an end in the passive sense, i.e., in the sense that the
law itself is ordered to an end—except, incidentally, in the case of a governor whose end lies outside
himself and is such that his law, too, must be ordered to it. By contrast, the end of divine governance is
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God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Hence, the eternal law is not ordered toward any
further end.
Article 2
Is there any such thing as natural law in us?
It seems that there is no such thing as natural law in us:
Objection 1: Man is sufficiently governed by eternal law, since, as Augustine says in De Libero
Arbitrio 1, “Eternal law is the law by which it is just that all things should be well ordered.” But nature
does not abound in what is superfluous, just as it is not deficient in what is necessary. Therefore, there is
no such thing as natural law for man.
Objection 2: As was established above (q. 90, a.1), it is through law that man is ordered to the end
in his acts. But the ordering of human acts to their end does not stem from nature in the way that this
occurs in non-rational creatures, which act for the sake of an end by natural appetite alone; instead, man
acts for the sake of an end through his reason and will. Therefore, there is no law that is natural to man.
Objection 3: The more free someone is, the less subject he is to law. But man is more free than all
the [other] animals because of the power of free choice (liberum arbitrium), which he has in contrast to
all the other animals. Therefore, since the other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man
subject to any natural law.
But contrary to this: A Gloss on Romans 2:14 (“For when the Gentiles, who do not have the
Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law …..”) says, “Even if they do not have the written Law,
they nonetheless have the natural law, by which everyone understands and knows within himself what is
good and what is evil.”
I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), since law is a rule and a measure, there are two
senses in which it can exist in something: first, in the sense of existing in that which regulates and
measures and, second, in the sense of existing in that which is regulated and measured. For a thing is
measured and regulated to the extent that it has some participation in the rule and measure. So since, as
is clear from what was said above (a. 1), all the things subject to divine providence are regulated and
measured by eternal law, it is clear that all things in some way participate in eternal law. More precisely,
because eternal law is imprinted on them, they have inclinations toward their own proper acts and ends.
Now among all creatures, the rational creature is subject to divine providence in a more excellent
manner, because he himself participates in providence, providing for himself and for others. Hence, in
him, too, there is a participation in eternal reason through which he has a natural inclination to his due act
and end. And the rational creature’s mode of participation in the eternal law is called natural law.
Hence, after the Psalmist (Psalm 4:6) has said, “Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” he adds, as if
someone were asking what the works of justice are, “Many say, ‘Who is there to show us good works?’”
In reply to this question he says, “The light of Your countenance, Lord, is imprinted on us”—as if to say,
the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil. This has to do with
natural law, which is nothing other than the imprint of God’s light within us.
Hence, it is clear that natural law is nothing other than a participation in eternal law on the part of a
rational creature.
Reply to objection 1: This argument assumes that natural law is something different from eternal
law. However, as has been explained, natural law is nothing other than a certain kind of participation in
eternal law.
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Reply to objection 2: As was established above (q. 10, a. 1), every operation of reason and will in
us is derived from what is in accord with nature. For every instance of discursive reasoning stems from
principles that are naturally known to us, and every desire for things that are ordered to an end stems
from a natural desire for the ultimate end. And so, likewise, the initial ordering of our acts to their end
(prima directio actuum nostrorum ad finem) must be brought about through natural law.
Reply to objection 3: Non-rational animals participate in the eternal law in their own way, just as
rational creatures do. However, since a rational creature participates in natural law in an intellectual and
rational way, a rational creature’s participation in the eternal law is itself properly called a law. For as
was explained above (q. 90, a. 1), law belongs to reason. By contrast, a non-rational creature does not
participate in the eternal law in a rational way, and so its participation cannot be called law except by
way of a likeness (per similitudinem).
Article 3
Is there any such thing as human law?
It seems that there is no such thing as human law:
Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 2), natural law is a participation in eternal law. But as
Augustine says in De Libero Arbitrio 1, all things are completely ordered through eternal law. Therefore,
natural law is sufficient for ordering all human affairs. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there to be any
such thing as human law.
Objection 2: As has been explained (q. 90, a. 1), law has the character of a measure. But human
reason is not the measure of things; just the opposite, as Metaphysics 10 insists. Therefore, there cannot
be a law that proceeds from human reason.
Objection 3: As Metaphysics 10 says, a measure should be absolutely fixed (certissima). But
human reason’s dictates about things to be done are not fixed, since according to Wisdom 9:14, “The
thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain.” Therefore, there cannot be a law that
proceeds from human reason.
But contrary to this: In De Libero Arbitrio 1 Augustine posits two kinds of law, one eternal and
the other temporal, and the latter he calls ‘human law’.
I respond: As was explained above (q. 90, a. 4), law is a dictate of practical reason. Now practical
reason and speculative reason proceed in similar ways, since, as was established above (q. 90, a. 1), both
proceed from given principles to given conclusions. Accordingly, then, just as, in the case of speculative
reason, conclusions in the diverse sciences, which are not naturally known to us but are instead
discovered by the activity of reason, are brought forth from naturally known indemonstrable principles,
so too from the precepts of natural law, which are, as it were, common and indemonstrable principles,
human reason must proceed to determine certain matters in a more particular way. And these particular
determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws—assuming the preservation of all the
other conditions, described above (q. 90, a. 4), that are relevant to the nature of law.
Thus, in his Rhetorica Tully says, “The beginnings of justice came from nature; next, certain things
came to be customs because of their advantageous nature; afterwards, fear and reverence sanctioned both
what had come from nature and what had been approved by custom.”
Reply to objection 1: Human reason is incapable of participating fully in the dictates of divine
reason (non potest participare plenum dictamen rationis divinae); rather, it participates in its own way
and incompletely. And so just as, in the case of speculative reason, there exists in us, through our natural
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participation in God’s wisdom, a cognition of certain common principles, but not a proper cognition of
every truth as there is in God’s wisdom, so too, in the case of practical reason, man naturally participates
in eternal law with respect to certain general principles, but not with respect to the particular
determination of singular acts, even though the latter are contained within the eternal law. This is why it
is necessary for human reason to proceed further to the particular sanctions contained in laws.
Reply to objection 2: Human reason is not in its own right (secundum se) a rule with respect to
things; instead, it is the principles naturally instilled in human reason that are general rules and measures
of all the things which are to be done by man and with respect to which natural reason is the rule and
measure—even though it is not a measure of what stems from nature.
Reply to objection 3: Practical reason is concerned with actions (operabilia), which are singular
and contingent, and not with necessary things like those which speculative reason is concerned with.
And so human laws cannot have the sort of infallibility that the demonstrated conclusions of the sciences
do. Nor is it necessary that every measure should be in every way infallible and fixed; rather, it should
be as fixed as is possible within its own genus.
Article 4
Was it necessary for there to be such a thing as divine law?
It seems to have been unnecessary for there to be such a thing as divine law:
Objection 1: As has been explained (a. 2), natural law is within us a kind of participation in
eternal law. But as has been said (a. 1), eternal law is a divine law. Therefore, it is unnecessary for there
to be a divine law in addition to natural law and the human laws that stem from it.
Objection 2: Ecclesiasticus 15:14 says, “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” But as
was established above (q., 14, a. 1), counsel is an act of reason. Therefore, man was left to the
governance provided by his own reason. But as has been explained (a. 3), a dictate of human reason is
human law. Therefore, it is unnecessary for man to be governed by some other divine law.
Objection 3: Human nature is more self-sufficient than non-rational creatures. But a non-rational
creature does not have any divine law in addition to the natural inclination that has been instilled in it.
Therefore, a fortiori, a rational creature should not have any divine law in addition to natural law.
But contrary to this: David asked God for a law to be imposed on him, saying, “Set before me for
a law the way of Your justifications, O Lord” (Psalm 118:33).
I respond: In addition to natural law and human law, it was necessary for us to have divine law in
order to direct human life—and this for four reasons:
First, through law man is directed to his own proper acts in relation to the ultimate end. And if man
were ordered just to an end that is not disproportionate to man’s natural power, then it would not be
necessary for man to have any directive from reason in addition to natural law and the humanly posited
law that stems from it. However, since, as was established above (q. 5, a. 5), man is ordered to the end of
eternal beatitude, which is disproportionate to natural human power, it was necessary that, in addition to
natural law and human law, he should also be directed to his end by a law that is divinely given.
Second, due to the uncertainty of human judgment, especially about contingent and particular
matters, different people can make diverse judgments about human acts, and these diverse judgments
lead to diverse and contrary laws. Therefore, in order that man might be able to know without any
hesitation what he should do and what he should avoid doing, it was necessary that he be directed in his
proper acts by a law that is divinely given and is clearly such that it cannot be mistaken.
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Third, man is able to make law with respect to those things which he is in a position to make
judgments about. However, human judgments cannot encompass interior movements, which are hidden,
but can encompass only exterior acts, which are observable. Yet for the perfection of virtue it is required
that a man be upright with respect to both sorts of acts. So human law could not adequately restrain and
order interior acts, and divine law had to be added for this purpose.
Fourth, as Augustine says in De Libero Arbitrio 1, human law is incapable of prohibiting or
punishing all evil deeds. For if it tried to do away with all evils, many goods would also be destroyed as
a result, and the promotion of the common good, which is necessary for human living, would be impeded.
Therefore, in order that no evil remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary that there should
be, in addition, a divine law by which all sins are prohibited.
These four reasons are touched on in Psalm 18:8, where it says, “The law of the Lord is unspotted
….,” i.e., does not permit any foulness of sin; “….. converting souls ….,” since it directs not just exterior
acts, but interior acts as well; “….. the testimony of the Lord is faithful …..,” because of the certitude of
what is true and upright; “….. giving wisdom to the little ones,” because it orders man to his supernatural
and divine end.
Reply to objection 1: Natural law participates in eternal law in a way proportioned to the power of
human nature. But man has to be directed in a deeper way to his ultimate supernatural end. And so there
is, in addition, a divinely given law, through which eternal law is participated in more deeply.
Reply to objection 2: Counsel is a certain sort of inquiry, and so it must proceed from given
principles. But it is not enough that it should proceed from naturally instilled principles, i.e., from the
precepts of the natural law—and this for the [four] reasons explained above. Rather, certain other
principles must be added, viz., the precepts of divine law.
Reply to objection 3: Non-rational creatures are not ordered to an end higher than the end that is
proportioned to their natural power. And so the arguments are not parallel.
Article 5
Is there just a single divine law?
It seems that there is just a single divine law:
Objection 1: A single king in a single kingdom has a single law. But the whole human race is
related to God as to a single king—this according to Psalm 46:8 (“God is king of all the earth”).
Therefore, there is just a single divine law.
Objection 2: Every law is ordered toward the end that the lawmaker intends in those for whom he
makes the law. But what God intends in all men is one and the same thing—this according to 1 Timothy
2:4 (“He wills that all men be saved and come to knowledge of the truth”). Therefore, there is just a
single divine law.
Objection 3: To the extent that the revelation of grace is higher than natural cognition, divine law
seems to be closer to eternal law, which is a single law, than is natural law. But natural law is a single
law for all men. Therefore, a fortiori, so is divine law.
But contrary to this: In Hebrews 7:12 the Apostle says, “For the priesthood having been changed,
it is necessary for the law to be changed.” But as is explained in the same place, there are two kinds of
priesthood, the Levitical priesthood and Christ’s priesthood. Therefore, there are two laws, viz., the Old
Law and the New Law.
I respond: As was explained in the first part (ST 1, q. 30, a. 3), distinction is a cause of number.
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Now there are two ways in which things can be distinct from one another. First, they are distinct in the
sense of being altogether diverse in species, e.g., a horse and an ox. Second, they are distinct in the sense
that the one is perfect and the other imperfect within the same species, e.g., a man and a boy. It is in this
latter sense that the divine law is divided into the Old Law and the New Law. Hence, in Galatians
3:24-25, the Apostle compares the status of the Old Law to the status of a child under the tutelage of a
pedagogue, while he compares the status of the New Law to a full-grown man who is no longer under the
tutelage of a pedagogue.
Now perfection and imperfection apply to these laws relative to three of those elements pertaining
to law that were noted above.
First, as was noted above (q. 90, a. 2), law is ordered toward the common good as its end. But there
are two kinds of common good. The first is a sensible and earthly good (bonum sensibile et terrenum),
and it is to this sort of good that the Old Law directly ordered [the people]; hence, in Exodus 3:8-17, at
the very initiation of the Old Law, the people are invited into the earthly kingdom of the Canaanites. The
second is an intelligible and heavenly good (bonum intelligibile et caeleste), and it is to this sort of good
that the New Law orders [the people]; hence, at the very beginning of His teaching Christ issued an
invitation to the kingdom of heaven, saying, “Repent, for the kingdom…
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