FIU Internet Governance and The Notion of Digital Sovereignty Discussion topic Internet Governance and the Notion of Digital SovereigntyStudents are requir

FIU Internet Governance and The Notion of Digital Sovereignty Discussion topic Internet Governance and the Notion of Digital SovereigntyStudents are required to write a three page paper outlining a key topic related to the week’s discussion.Students are required to then respond to two (2) classmates’ posts by adding to knowledge. This is not a critique but rather a dialogue that you have with your classmates. These posts should be a minimum of 250 words.Students will be graded on originality and analysis. Responses should add to the discussion, not just repeat what has already been said.must mention attcahed book as refernce J U LY 2 0 1 5
Converging on the Future of
Global Internet Governance
The United States and Brazil
HAROLD TRINKUNAS
IAN WALLACE
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank those who supported the research and production of this
report. In particular, we benefited from the advice and insights of experts on internet governance from around the globe, but we are particularly grateful for the
candid conversations we had with our colleagues during field research in Brazil. We
also appreciate the thorough and substantive comments made by peer reviewers on
earlier drafts of this report. In addition, we would not have been able to complete
this project without support of our wonderful research assistant, Emily Miller at
Brookings, and Ph.D. candidate Stan Oklobdzija at the University of California,
San Diego, whose knowledge of Brazil proved to be invaluable. In addition, we
thank Michael O’Hanlon from the Brookings Institution and Peter Singer from the
New America Foundation for their advice and support during this project. Any
remaining errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors alone.
Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its absolute commitment to quality, independence, and impact. Activities supported
by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by any donation.
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Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Structure of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
part one: The Emergence of a “U.S.- Centric” Internet and the
Origins of the Global Internet Governance Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Development of Internet Technologies and the “Triumph” of TCP/IP . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The First Contest Over Internet Governance and the Birth of ICANN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
WSIS: The UN Strikes Back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
part two: Contrasting Domestic and International Approaches to
Internet Governance in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
The Internet in Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
part three: From Edward Snowden to NETmundial: Brazil’s Journey Toward
Reconciling Multi-Stakeholderism and Multilateralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Initial Shifts in Brazil’s Position on Internet Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Two Tracks for Global Internet Governance After NETmundial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
part four: The Future: What is at Stake? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Policy Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
The Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
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Executive Summary
ly and highly successful adopter of the internet,
able to consider and incorporate lessons learned
from other countries’ experiences in developing
its own domestic multi-stakeholder model for
addressing technical operations (the CGI.br) and
domestic legislation for addressing internet public
policy (the Marco Civil da Internet). The process
of developing successful domestic internet governance fostered an active and engaged civil society and private sector in Brazil that preferred the
NETmundial agenda for the global internet over
the Rousseff administration’s initial top-down
state-centered response.
Key Findings
The crisis in U.S.-Brazilian relations provoked by
Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations of U.S. espionage via the global internet, and Brazil’s initial
threat to respond in ways that were detrimental
to the integrity of the internet, serve to highlight
the increasing intersection of foreign policy and
internet governance.
U.S. preeminence in the global internet governance regime, which rests on its pioneering role
and status as host of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), has
drawn criticism from other major powers. Critics—including Brazil, India, Russia, and China
—have traditionally advocated for multilateral
governance through existing international institutions such as the International Telecommunications Union and processes such as the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). This
approach allows all states to participate on an
equal basis, but privileges the role of governments
over other important stakeholders such as civil
society and the private sector.
The subsequent NETmundial Initiative, which
builds on the success of the conference, has the
potential to reframe the global internet governance debate. Instead of supporting the actions
of authoritarian powers such as China and Russia post-Snowden, Brazil’s actions around the Initiative have opened up space for other emerging
global powers, such as India, to someday move
toward supporting a public policy agenda that
preserves internet freedom and innovation, even
while they remain critical of Western dominance
of the internet’s technical infrastructure.
Brazil’s decision to host the NETmundial conference in April 2014, which produced an agenda focused on furthering a free, diverse, neutral, and
universal internet, signaled a change in course on
internet governance. That the NETmundial conference, organized by Brazil’s domestic internet
steering committee, the Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil (CGI.br), included government,
private sector, and civil society actors on an equal
footing (often referred to as the multi-stakeholder
model), was a second notable departure from Brazil’s traditional internet diplomacy.
The NETmundial Initiative, which is intended to
build internet governance capacity around the
world, could provide a further avenue for developing countries to access advice and assistance in
solving difficult internet public policy issues and
advance the international internet freedom agenda.
However, the Initiative has become contentious, in
part due to the involvement of the CGI.br’s partners: ICANN and the World Economic Forum.
How Brazil plays its hand going forward could
therefore have an important impact on the course
of internet governance discussions in the months
and years ahead, with significant implications for
the United States and the rest of the world.
The apparent shift in Brazil’s emphasis on global internet governance revealed at NETmundial
is rooted in domestic politics. Brazil was an ear-
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converging on the future of global internet governance
Policy Recommendations
United States
•
•
•
•
The Obama administration should stand
firm on its current policy toward the transition of the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority (IANA), and it should not give
in to congressional voices that want the
U.S. government to retain oversight of the
IANA function.
Embedding the multi-stakeholder governance approach preferred by the United
States in international institutions offers
the best prospects for preserving an innovative and flexible internet.
The United States should discourage the
convening of a new WSIS in the near future. The WSIS process has been useful
in so far as it has outlined (repeatedly)
the fractures among states on the issue of
global internet governance, but it is time to
move beyond the present stalemate.
The United States should do what it can
to support and encourage the success of
the NETmundial Initiative or a similar
multi-stakeholder mechanism to build capacity around solving global internet public policy issues that have not yet been successfully addressed by existing institutions
or the WSIS process.
•
Global Internet Community
•
•
Brazil
•
•
the NETmundial Initiative embody the
preferred Brazilian approach to internet
governance as it is practiced at home, but
it also offers a concrete example to other
countries struggling with internet governance issues—whether technical or public
policy.
Brazil should ensure that the WSIS+10
review process complements rather than
contradicts the successes that Brazil has
already achieved with the NETmundial
conference and Initiative. This does not
mean abandoning Brazil’s traditional commitment to multilateralism in general, but
recognizing that Brazil is more likely to
achieve its objectives by other means in the
global internet governance arena.
Brazil should support the completion of
the IANA transition by which ICANN can
assume these duties independently from
any contractual relationship with the United States government.
Brazil should continue to support the
multi-stakeholder model as embodied in
the NETmundial conference and the subsequent Initiative rather than revert back
to its traditional preference for multilateralism. Not only does the concept behind
•
We recommend supporting the completion of the IANA transition and the internationalization of this function as soon as
possible as this offers the best opportunity to sustain the legitimacy of the present
multi-stakeholder model for governing
technical operations. If it is not possible to
complete the transition by the end of the
year, ICANN should make its proposal for
the transition before the conclusion of the
WSIS+10 review in December 2015.
We also recommend that the stakeholders
in the global internet community consider
the NETmundial Initiative as a constructive addition to the organizations and institutions addressing internet public policy
issues. Changes may be required, however,
in particular to encourage greater transparency and bottom-up participation.
If the NETmundial Initiative does not succeed, there remains a need for an organic
multi-stakeholder process, led by civil society and the private sector together with
government representatives, to assist developing countries in resolving salient internet public policy issues.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
ANATEL
National Telecommunications Agency (Brazil)
ARPANET
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
CCITT
International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee
ccTLD
Country code top-level domain
CGI.br
Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil
DNS
Domain name system
gTLD
Generic top-level domain
FCC
Federal Communications Commission
GAC
Governmental Advisory Committee
IANA
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
ICANN
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
IETF
Internet Engineering Task Force
IGF
Internet Governance Forum
ISOC
Internet Society
ITR
International Telecommunications Regulation
ITU
International Telecommunication Union
Marco Civil
Marco Civil da Internet (Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet)
NCSA
National Center for Supercomputing Applications
NSA
National Security Agency
NSFNET
National Science Foundation Network
NSI
Network Solutions, Inc.
NTIA
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
NWG
Network Working Group
OSI
Open Systems Interconnection
RFC
Request for Comments
TCP/IP
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
UCLA
University of California, Los Angeles
UN
United Nations
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
W3C
World Wide Web Consortium
WCIT
World Conference on International Telecommunications
WEF
World Economic Forum
WGIG
Working Group on Internet Governance
WSIS
World Summit on the Information Society
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Introduction
I
n the summer of 2013, National Security
Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden
revealed details of efforts by U.S. intelligence
to conduct mass electronic surveillance on a global scale, including intercepting the communications of foreign leaders such as Angela Merkel of
Germany and Dilma Rousseff of Brazil. The true
impact of the Snowden revelations from mid2013 on will be debated for years. One point on
which both Snowden’s detractors and supporters
can agree is that his actions served to highlight a
major new strand in international relations: the
increasing convergence of foreign policy and internet governance.
the internet, the United States’ preeminent position has come under suspicion, both by those who
want to challenge the United States commercially, and also by those who want to challenge the
United States politically. More widely, U.S. preeminence provides opportunities for those who
want to challenge the assumptions and values on
which the current internet governance regime
rests. Some of these critics have instead advocated for “multilateral” governance of the global internet through existing international institutions
such as the United Nations (UN), which they believe allows for all states to participate on an equal
and democratic basis. As a result of the debate
between these two positions—multi-stakeholder
and multilateral—foreign policy and technology
policy have become increasingly intertwined in
the United States and around the world.
The purpose of this report is to look at the past
and present of internet governance as a foreign
policy issue with a view to informing future policy.
To better understand where we have come from,
where we are now, and where we might be heading post-Snowden, we have chosen to highlight
the improbable convergence among two countries
that have been central to internet governance: the
United States and Brazil.
The choice of Brazil is less obvious, but it is very
deliberate. While other nations have and will have
major roles to play in the evolution of the internet,
Brazil will be a critical player for four reasons:
First, Brazil has long been a vocal participant in
international internet governance debates, beginning with its outspoken participation in the process leading to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003. In addition, Brazil has
played a particularly important and unique role in
course of events post-Snowden. By hosting the
NETmundial conference in April 2014 and then
taking a leading role in the subsequent NETmundial Initiative, Brazil staked out new ground in
The choice of the United States is obvious and no
discussion of internet governance would be possible without it. The emergence of a “multi-stakeholder” governance model that includes government, private sector, and civil society actors in
decision-making processes on an equal footing is
rooted in the U.S. experience as an internet pioneer. That said, the U.S. role in internet governance
is often misunderstood. With the globalization of
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converging on the future of global internet governance
the global debate on developing standards and best
practices to address public policy issues raised by
the internet. At the same time, Brazil has remained
active in more traditional UN multilateral discussions. On the whole, Brazilians have played central
roles in both the multilateral and multi-stakeholder
arenas on internet governance in ways that illuminate real choices for the global community.
in the polarized debate between multi-stakeholder
and multilateral approaches to internet governance.3
Brazil’s path to the establishment of a domestic internet led to the development in 1995 of a truly
multi-stakeholder governance body, the Comitê
Gestor da Internet no Brasil (CGI.br), as well as the
passage in 2014 of the Marco Civil da Internet (Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet, hereafter Marco Civil),4 a far-reaching internet rights law.
Both the CGI.br and the Marco Civil are now being
held up as a model for others by organizations such
as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (ICANN) and the World Economic
Forum (WEF) through the new NETmundial Initiative, providing a path forward for developing countries seeking to address the public policy questions
raised by the internet.
Second, while some Brazilians oppose the tag (and
indeed claim it to be insulting), Brazil is often held
up as a swing state on internet governance issues.
Unlike more authoritarian states like China and
Russia—who show greater concern over the implications of the internet for regime stability than
for freedom—and the liberal democracies of the
United States and the European Union—who fear
increased state control—Brazil is broadly supportive of a universal free internet while being critical of
the international governance structures that guide
it. Thus, countries such as Brazil whose policies do
not obviously fall into either camp can expect to be
wooed by both sides of the ideological divide.1
By anchoring our story in the history of U.S. and
Brazilian politics and foreign policy, we aim to
show the choices available for policymakers addressing the future of internet governance. As the
country in which the internet originated, the United States developed governance policies and practices in an organic, piecemeal, and even ad hoc approach as technical and public policy issues arose.
Some of these have been successful and broadly
emulated, such as the multi-stakeholder model.
Others reflect U.S. cultural and legal idiosyncrasies and, in the area of cybersecurity and electronic surveillance, the role of the United States as a
global superpower. Brazil was an early and highly
successful adopter of the internet, but it was able
to consider and incorporate lessons learned from
the U.S. experience in developing its own domestic
multi-stakeholder model for addressing technical operations, the CGI.br, and domestic internet
Third, the path of Brazilian foreign policy as an
emerging power—particularly as a champion of
multilateralism, in part in opposition to perceived
U.S. “hegemony”—is also an important element
in this story. That Brazil was a leading voice critical of U.S. actions post-Snowden reflects its traditional approach to global diplomacy, favoring
universal institutions governed by international
law in which all states have an equal and sovereign voice.2
And fourth, Brazil’s own domestic experience with
the internet illuminates a potential middle ground
Tim Maurer and Robert Morgus, “Tipping the Scale: An Analysis of Global Swing States in the Internet Governance Debate,” Internet Governance Paper No. 7 (Waterloo, Canada: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/
no7_2.pdf.
2
For a discussion of Brazil’s traditional foreign policy, see Text Box 1 on page 18.
3
For initial discussion of a possible third way, see Wolfgang Kleinw…
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