Comparative Politics

Exam Study Guide

 

Part I. Chapters 1&3 from Shively  (for multiple choice format)

p.5 three forms or tools of power

p.12 [narrower] use of the term politics “has to do with . . .”?

p.40 six or seven hundred years ago, people did not . . .

pp.41-42 [at that time] most members of the elite wrote in . . ?

thought of themselves as . . . ?

p.42 the invention of the modern state in Europe was completed by . . . ?

p.43 [the role of] railroads, telegraphs, etc. in the rise of modern states . . .?

p.47 points [in world] at which state and nation fail to coincide are . . . ?

p.48 use of term “nation-state” (every state tries to . . .)

p.54 with the development of the world economy, states actually . . . ?

p.58 “none of the above” (in terms of a category for states in the world)

p.59 original plan for Nigeria was to divide it into three regions, each centered on . . .?

p.61 the European Union (EU) initially an agreement  that all trade . . . ?

and coordination of policy in what area?

p.62 European Commission (of EU): its characteristics

p.63 European Parliament: change in its powers, character in 1979?

 

Part II. Chapters 1&3 from Shively  (for matching  format)

pp.3-4 politics

p.5 power

p.14 theory

p.14 “interpretivist” political scientists

p.14 “behavioural” political scientists

p.44 nation

p.44 state

p.47 nationalism

p.49 government

p.50 society

 

Shively ch.4

P 66 [Shively compares the US, the UK and Sweden in terms of government involvement in the economy and finds that despite different historical circumstances] . . . all three devoted . . . of all economic activity

P 68 [Shively makes the following points that for all the industrialized democracies,

US, UK and Sweden, state involvement and activity in the economy (as a % of GNP)] . . . expanded . . . 20th century . . . very large

p.70 an example of “subsidies with strings attached” was Norway’s milk policy

[what they did, for what purpose]

p.71 government regulation has expanded from “traditional” areas such as . . . ?

to new areas such as …?

p.72 nationalization [by government of an industry: defined, described]

p.72 comparison of US and France in terms of nationalization of industries, businesses

p.74 large defense budgets in  poor countries are tragic because . . .?

p.76 [in 1988] the Netherlands purchased part of Costa Rica’s debt; they wrote it off

on condition that . . . ?

p.77 basic [low tech] industries (clothing, plastics, etc.) tend nowadays to be . . .    /

p.77 almost half of US manufacturing exports were . . . ?

p.78 governments of developed economic systems make considerable effort to secure  . .?

 

Shively Ch 8 Democracy

1. 160 democracy requires an implicit agreement . . . ?

p.160-161 it is easy to see why a democracy might be fragile . . .?

 

 

Shively ch11

p.213 institutions may be devised for a particular purpose [but] . . . ?

p.213 two purposes of elections ??

p.214 [At most] 50%-60% of Americans vote, compared with . . .{Soviet}?

p.215 [apparently] elections in the old Soviet Union were mainly to . . . ?

p.216 [In 1968 US elections, reaction before, after election to] “people like me . . .”?

Systems

p.218  plurality [defn. v. majority]

p.218 SMDP systems tend to be found in world . . .?

p.219 SMDP favors/hurts large parties?

p.219 SMDP favors/hurts small parties

p.219 [In their early elections in their democratic histories] most European states used???

p.220 SMDP tends to favor multiparty? Two party?

p.220 the tradeoff ?

p.220 [In proportional representation systems] electoral participation is likely to be

higher? Lower? than SMDP

p.220 [argument that] there is an advantage to SMDP: provides legislators with ????

p.220 a small party may not be hurt by SMDP if??

p.220 a small party may be hurt even more if?? [number of electoral districts?]

p.221 where there is a “presidency” [logical equivalent to a single electoral district] there

is strong pressure for the system to evolve to . . . ?

p.221-222 all of the following have provisions for a national referendum

p.222 referendum (defn.)

Participation

pp.222-223 compared to other democracies, turnout in US is ???

p.223 factors [about individual voters] that influence voter turnout include ???

p.224 paradox of voting

p.224 most politicians spend more time trying [not to change people’s minds] to ????

p.226 a long term factor in determining individual vote choice is ??

p.229 [In Israel’s PR system] voters actually cast votes for ???

p.229 [In Israel’s system and elsewhere in most PR systems] the formula used to allocate

“surplus” votes tends to favor??

p.229 In Germany’s version of PR, a party receives no seats in the Bundestag  until they

receive ??

pp.230-231 Some of Nigeria’s special problems in running elections have been

[for example in 1983] ???

p.231Olesegun Obasanjo won the 1999 elections in 27 out of 36 districts:

[strangely] he was weakest in ????

Short Answer.

Define and distinguish SMDP v. PR systems.

 

From “Wolin, Democracy Incorporated, Ch.2” on canvas objective questions

pp 15-19 [understand his points about political “imagination” and “imaginary”]

p 19 “power imaginary”  . . . [v] . . . “constitutional imaginary” [contrasting characteristics of ] means by which power . . . legitimated,  accountable . . . stability, restraint  . . . [versus] power . . .  restless . . . power after power

p 20 [with dominance of power imaginary] . . . empire has become a precondition for democracy [not its antithesis] . . . fantasy . . . opposites . . . superpower

p 20 an American [power] imaginary . . . began to emerge . . . during WWII

p 20 however . . . imaginary it displaced  .  .  . terms of FDR’s . . . substantial attempt

. . . social democracy

p 20 [the American imaginary of FDR program, elements] . . . planning . . . resources on the poor . . . public works . . . participatory schemes . . . decision making process

p 21 spontaneous belief . . . economic crisis . . . state power in peace time

— what does a democracy do in a war . . . until it was over

p 22 [new vocabulary of government power] . . . national planning, mobilization of labor . . . consumer protection . . . [but all this] strictly domestic

p 22 the aim of the New Deal [for the leaders] . . .  save capitalist system . . . government regulation . . . endemic to capitalism

p 22 [then] once the economy appeared . . . public relations . . . New Deal . . . leftist forces . . .country’s economy

p 23 [the New Deal had coincided with, more important] popular political movements . . . challenged . . . economic power of capital

p 23 [most important of these] Share the wealth . . . Townsend . . . Coughlin [focusing on]  . . . poor, unemployed, workers . . . radio

p 23 [all this added up to] an American version of demos . . . had emerged

p 23 Huey Long’s movement . . . actually . . . improving the lives of poor people

pp23-24 . . . “fugitive” democracy . . . challenging the credentials . . . economic oppression . . . from political power

p 24 [before WWII, Taft spoke for America then] . . . imperialism is wholly foreign . . . national identity

p 26 [after WWII and creation of “Cold War”] would the egalitarian tendencies . . . faith in government regulation . . . defense rather than welfare

p26 the propaganda of business interests . . . [defamed New Deal as] . . . relative of communism . . . promote business . . . without  . . . socially responsible . . . cuts in social spending . . . borne by the less well off

pp 26-27 [this program called for the elimination of the USSR, but also] the Containment and rollback  . . . of he New Deal

p 27[ a new animal, Cold War “liberals” took up Niebuhr’s] Christian realism . . . pessimist . . . dark side of human nature

p 27 [the new, so-called, “liberal” after WWII] was fired less by hopes for socioeconomic . . . egalitarian ends

p 28 [the new, endless “Cold”] war for the most part would be fought . . . without actual battles . . . undercover . . . assured by politicians . . . hidden

p 29 NSC 68 begins with a favorite ploy . . . un-nuanced evil . . . two centers . . . Soviet Union . . . absolute authority over rest of the world

p 29 USSR . . . inescapably militant . . . utterly amoral . . . Soviet policy

p 30 [US policy must be “total”] . . . fomenting and supporting . . . satellite countries

— [ the strategy of the USSR – at least our image of its immoral goals and means – becomes our goals and means] global supremacy . . . means of subversion . . . it would be the current Soviet Cold War . . . used against the Soviet Union

p 33 . . . during Cold War, the stockpiling of atomic . . . fear

p 34 . . . fixation upon [war-time like] mobilization and re-armament . . . control of corporations . . . every measure that strengthened capitalism . . . against communism

p 34 Taft-Hartley Act outlaws . . . strike . . . portrayed . . . war production

p 35 [by contrast with the simple] nationalism and patriotism [of WWII] . . . Cold War power imaginary turned inwards . . . thought policing . . . conformity

p 36 domestic version of anticommunism was aimed at . . . social democracy . . . New Deal

p 36 . . . uncomfortable similarity to . . . Soviet regime . . . purges, loyalty tests . .  global network of spies

p 37 [Joe] McCarthy was remarkable . . . lied . . . spectacularly.  No matter how often . . . the media caved in.

p 38 [in sum, the “Cold War” ideological attack at home resulted in] New Deal values of social . . . power imaginary

p 39 tow crucial consequences  . . .[1] shrinking space . . . defer to . . . experts

. . . . [2] . . . legitimation of elitism . . . claim to power [of elites is that they were] realists

 

From “Susser on Fascism 179-203” on canvas, a chapter from his “Political Ideology in the Modern World”

179 liberalism, social democracy, Marxism  . . .  all children of the enlightenment [in that they cherish] rationality, human progress —- Fascism by contrast

179 [the Nazis] assumed their dictatorial power . . . means

180 [fascism] was the greatest surprise . . . tribalism

180-181 for traditional conservatives . . . utilitarian principles

181 Fascists tended to be . . . [class background]

181 [description of Nazis] anti-  anti-   anti-  . . .

181 virtually every European country . . . .

183 fascism not “conservative” so much as “reactionary” [meaning] ?

184 [fascism] shares with reaction . . . modern establishment

188 much of what is most contagious [in relatively positive sense] about fascism . . .?

189 [on human being as being egoistic] it is both laughably . . . democrats

190 the state liberates individuals . . .concerns

196 [fascist thought that] the strong points of socialism . . . nationalism, hierarchy

199 industrialist and financiers who had supported the fascists . . . disappointed

203 Where in our contemporary world . . . .might develop  (think about it)

 

 

Essay

1. At least until the 1980s, Sweden has often been regarded as the quintessential example of the modern welfare state, the most successful realization of the principles and policies of “democratic socialist” ideology.  Briefly outline and explain how the Swedish Social Democrats managed to pursue high growth, full employment, industrialization and competitive industrial exports — all with a relatively expensive labor force and social welfare state provided.

 

1. Discuss and explain the “stagflation” of the 1970s, early 80s. Why, exactly, should simultaneous inflation and unemployment not occur, in theory? What factors, as a matter of fact, caused simultaneous inflation and unemployment to occur?
2. Discuss how and why Keynesian solutions don’t work to solve simultaneous inflation and unemployment. (What is the Keynesian model? its logic? when it might be appropriate? Why was it not appropriate for stagflation?)
3. Discuss how and why “supply side” solutions were inappropriate. (What is supply side? its logic? when might it be appropriate? Why it was not appropriate for stagflation?)
4. How, exactly, did Saddam Hussein save the world from this economic disaster.