Ashford University Information Technology Specialist Resume Paper I need a resume completed for a Information Technology Specialist, TRAINING Job trainin

Ashford University Information Technology Specialist Resume Paper I need a resume completed for a Information Technology Specialist,

TRAINING

Job training for an information technology specialist requires 10 weeks of Basic Combat Training and 20 weeks of Advanced Individual Training with on-the-job instruction.

Instruction will include the following topics: microcomputer software, operat-ing systems, software utilities, assembly/disassembly of microcomputers, data communications, local area networks (LANS), tactical LANS, problem solving structured design techniques, database system design and development (programming), error recovery, data security, Defense Message System, computer configuration, operation and maintenance, and network configuration and troubleshooting. (17weeks)

Information technology specialists are responsible for maintaining, processing and troubleshooting military computer systems/operations.

Some of the skills I’ve learn are:

Use of computer consoles and peripheral equipment
Computer systems concepts
Planning, designing and testing computer systems

Achieve:

maintained services for over 1,000 U.S. and Coalition Forces, to include 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade and Combined Joint Task Force OIR; uptime rate 5% better than last year

stood up a full helpdesk and Information Assurance program supporting over 4400 pieces of automations equipment on three different networks

o trained over 20 Information Management Officers; decreased the number of Help Desk calls by 25%

o raised number of positive customer comments by 25% due to a positive attitude and professionalism; indicates increased efficiency

o earned Cisco Certified Network Associate certification

Descriptions of Day to day activities

o maintained 12 COMSEC accounts with 100% accountability and zero COMSEC compromises or reportable COMSEC Incidents

o Serves as the Senior Local Area Network Manager for the 230th Financial Management Company; responsible for maintaining, managing and distributing all automation equipment for 3 detachments; responsible for all future system fielding; responsible for creating, maintaining and managing life cycle replacements for all system and non-system related automations equipment within the company; responsible for submitting weekly automation updates to the commander and serves as a Subject Matter Expert (SME) on finance automation and software; responsible the welfare, development, supervision, readiness and training of two team leader and five Subordinates .

o Serves as the Senior Local Area Network Manager for the HHC, 1HBCT 1ID; responsible for maintaining, managing and distributing all automation equipment for the brigade; responsible for the fielding of Command Post Platform (CPP) and the integration of the Command Post Communication System (CPCS) which provides voice and data communications for tactical command and control for Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS); manages the creation and transition of users’ accounts/mailboxes and network printers in tactical and garrison environments.

o Provide desktop computer support which includes diagnosing and resolving any workstation operating system software, application software or hardware problems; provide user instruction for any workstation operating system software or standard application software; setup and configure standard workstation operating system software, all authorized standard application software, and all related services and authorized application software.

Serves as Information Systems Security NCO for the 25th ID Combat Aviation Brigade; responsible for daily operations of local networks which consist of five Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), Standard Army Management Information Systems (STAMIS), Combat Service Support Automated Information System Interface (CAISI) and other peripheral devices which include routers and switches; personally accountable for automations and communication equipment valued over two million; provides technical advice and assistance to logistical users within the brigade; responsible for the training, supervision and professional development of nine personnel .

Please see attach for Transcipt of training I have complete and their summary of above them. Week1
Warfare is coordinated inter societal violence .It is an attempt in an anarchic system
to maximize power when bargaining or deterrence fail to gain a states core
objectives like resources ,hegemony or a reversal of state decline.Key concepts:
states are typically ranked according to power ,and all power is considered relative.
Major powers have the greatest level of power and only major powers can initiate a
war the engulfs an entire system. Systems are distinct geographical regions like
Europe. Truly global wars are rare because they are too costly and difficult to wage.
Stares can be differentiated into war states and peace states war steps have a
predominant preference for war. War states are not necessarily autocracies.
Preferences depend on international factors. Wars are fought for historically
contingent motives like the conflicts discussed in Fromkin. They can also be fought
to prevent decline or prevent one state from gaining hegemonic power in a system.
Germany between 1890 and 1945 was objectively threatening because of its
hegemonic potential, and this also applies to Russia between 1914 1945. Wars may
be averted through bargaining but this is not likely if a state believes its pay offs from
war exceed payoffs from bargaining. This can be a fully rational choice.
“Structure” refers to he distribution of power, primarily military power, in an anarchic
system The most important concept is the balance of power. If adversaries are in
balance there is no rational incentive to initiate war because no one is likely to win
But if the balance breaks and war may result if declining powers use war to stop their
decline or rising powers act to prevent preemption by hostile adversaries. States are
assumed to be unitary ,rational and thus capable of choosing war. Anarchy is taken
as the typical condition of systems.Institutional theory assumes that peace is
preferred to war and war results from failed bargaining or a lack of information about
an adversaries preferences for war and peace that leads to choices that lead to war .
The outcome of bargaining is assumed to always to exceed the pay offs from war.
It is often assumed that war results from misperception of an adversaries
preferences for war and peace or a failure to understand the causal implications of
factors like weapons or the likelihood a war would be longer or more costly than
planned.If irrational choices are unlikely this means tha war could result from a
failure of state and or its adversaries for war and peace or on inability to estimate the
costs of actual war fighting. This explanation is typically illustrated with the ww1
case. However as a general explanation of war this is unlikely. First it overestimates
the ability of stars to signal their preferences for war and peace and there incentive
to bluff. If adversaries prefer to gain an advantage through bargaining they will
choose it unless they are war states. In that case there preferences are known and
war will not result from miscalculation. In 1914 the preferences for war were common
knowledge revealed through diplomacy and all sides hoped to avoid the costs of a
long war through a decisive battle or campaign. They also understood that although
they had to launch offensives the new weapon s like rapid fire artillery favored the
defensive. Offensives were necessary to avoid possible economic collapse domestic
pressure for quick action and the fear of losing the initiative to the adversary.
hope all of you will be well . Hirer is some explication for Fromkin .The chief problem
with Fromkin is his attribution to Germany of stating Ww1 But did Germany want war
asa first preference or did it choose war as a response to breakdown of the balance
of power that forced Germany to act to save Aus.Hungary ,Germany’s only ally ,or
was Germany a war state . If the Former is true Germany was a war starter but not a
war state More importantly this denies the crucial role of Aus. in choosing
mobilization in order to crush Serbia Mobilization as a matter of common knowledge
meant war. Finally could Russia have prevented war by accepting Austrian
aggression against Serbia.
In reading Fromkin note that Germany allied with Aus Hungary .This followed the
logic of gains from trade because both states rationally were better off than if they
had followed rational self help The alliance liked the strongest and weakest of the
great powers,and thus allowed them to balance against any possible counter
alliance. In general, states will only ally if the benefits exceed costs because the
alliance is better than self help. States prefer self help to alliances because benefits
do not have to be shared. Self help is a guarantee against defection to the enemy
conflicting objectives like peace or war and free riding by allies. Coalitions(alliances}
follow a minimum wining formula or only as many allies as are necessary. Allies
rationally distrust each other and attempt to war plan for fighting alone ww1 is an
excellent example of all these principles.
Week3
Major powers can be assumed to start a systemic war if it is in decline or
opportunistically seeks to exploit a temporary advantage. The difficult problem is to
predict the behavior of an ascending major power. In principle an ascending major
power has no incentive to initiate war because it can wait until its power is sufficient
to dominate its system. However,this makes the rising power an objective threat to
its system,particularly if it has hegemonic potential ,and this perceived threat will
trigger counterbalancing adversary coalitions .This generates an incentive for the
ascending power to pre empt this threat by striking first. Germany fits the above
description and calls into question Fromkin portrayal as a war state.
The puzzle of Austria Hungary. One aspect of ww1 that makes it a least likely case is
the behavior of Austria Hungary in 1914 As the weakest of the five great powers, its
leaders had the most to lose from a major systemic war because defeat or even the
defeat of Russia,its most significant adversary,could cause political collapse and the
end of the state.Given minimal rationality and a correct perception of its enemies pay
offs from war and peace ,one might assume that the balance of costs and benefits
would favor peace( the status quo) or bargaining. However Austria chose war with
Serbia even though doing so would likely lead to Russian intervention and systemic
war. But this choice was rational if decision makers correctly believed that any other
choice was equivalent to defeat and the death of the state War with Serbia could
potentially end its primary threat and restore the balance of power by reversing its
decline. Note that this explanation does not depend on German behavior and
focuses on Austria Hungary’s rational perception that the benefits of war outweighed
the costs. (R=benefits of war exceed net costs. This is a rational gamble and
illustrates the danger to European peace of a balance of power that deepened on a
declining major power facing major power adversaries.
Week 5
Most of the literature on war focuses on major wars because they re shape entire
systems and reconfigure the balance of power. However,most wars statistically are
major minor power wars that involve a major power attack ona minor power that
refuses the demands of the major power. Serbia’s decision to fight Austria is an
example. What is theoretically interesting is that such wars should never occur. This
is because the minor power should always accept a bargain short of war. The minor
power should bargain because. it cannot defeat the major power but it can be
defeated while the major power can gain while not paying the costs of war. But this
logic will be overridden if the minor power sees the benefits of war as greater than
the net costs. This will be true if any bargain acceptable to the major power
threatens the survival of the minor power and it is a give that any state will fight if it
can rather than accept a loss of sovereignty. Consider this situation. The major
power makes demands that of the conflict. threaten the independence of a minor
power.The latter faces a stark choice between peace and war and controls the
outcome of the conflict. If the minor power chooses war the major power chooses
war The major power bargains only if the minor power offers a bargain with sure
benefits that exceed the sure benefitsof war. The major power is indifferent between
the minimum benefits of war and an equivalent bargain. The minor power will
choose war if any feasible bargain threatens the minor powers survival and there is
acrdible belief that the minor pews population will pay the costs of war.
Week6
illustration of major minor power wars .As indicated, these wars are counter intuitive
because they are frequent and should not occur because of bargaining as in the
case of Serbia. Other examples include the American Revolution, the war of 1812:
napoleons wars in Spain .and so called wars of national liberation in the 20 th
century. One excellent illustration of such wars is the Soviet Finnish war of 1939. 40
In 1939 Stalin made demands on Finland that would have ended its existence .Even
though Finland was tiny in comparison to Russia ,Finland chose to fight and initially
defeated a Soviet invasion at great cost to the Russians Although the Finns
ultimately made concessions the Russians never again threatened Finland’s
sovereignty or made demands on Finnish resources To be blunt,Finland won.
Moreover, the Soviet Unions reputation for military prowess was damaged up to
1941, and this guaranteed that the other major powers did not ally with the Soviets to
stop Hitler and this allowed Hitler to isolate and conquer France.
Week8
Domestic commitment is equivalent to the opportunity cost domestic politiciansand
populations are willing to pay to fight war in general and any specific war. The most
significant point is that commitment has increased even though war has become
more costly over time. Combat compliance is the range of incentives combats have
toco ply with commands. This should be predictable on the basis of the measurable
level of domestic commitment.

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