Southern Union State Community College Bowtie Analysis PPT Review Questions You required to review attached PPT and complete attached questions . Bowtie An

Southern Union State Community College Bowtie Analysis PPT Review Questions You required to review attached PPT and complete attached questions . Bowtie Analysis
Our Project Bowtie
Project Bowtie Analysis
1. Control Effectiveness
8. Causes
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2. Consequence level
3. Likelihood level
4. Level of Risk
10. Controls on Causes
5. Potential exposure
11. Controls on consequences
7. Main Event
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6. Risk Owner
9. Consequences
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Existing controls on causes Control owner
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general
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Existing controls on consequences Control owner
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Treatment Tasks
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Treatment Tasks
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Task Owner / Due Date
Task Owner / Due Date
Rule 1 – Know what you want to achieve
• In using the bowtie to provide an overview of risk measures,
simple is generally best.
• If, for example, we want to gather the detail on safeguarding
measures, an overview is insufficient and plenty of additional
information is required.
• Knowing the objective before embarking on the exercise will
allow the effective allocation of resources.
Rule 2 – No numbers in the beginning
• The primary purpose of a bowtie is to present a logical, accessible
picture of risk management arrangements.
• By leaving out the numbers we are able to keep the focus on
understanding what’s important in relation to a facility or particular
operation.
Rule 3 – Losing control of the hazard
• A bowtie should help us to identify what are known as “top events” –
namely the point at which control of a hazard is lost.
• So if as part of a Safety Case we are faced with a hazard such as gasoline in a
bulk storage tank, the top event could be “loss of containment”.
• This is the point at which the tiger gets out of the cage which means
plenty of attention to both prevention and mitigation.
Rule 4 –Threats lead to top events
• On the left hand side of the bowtie, threats are defined as events
or states which could realistically lead to the top event in the
absence of any safeguarding measures.
• These threats should be specific enough to ensure that the
safeguards identified are relevant to the threat.
• For example: ‘corrosion’ is a threat which could result in a loss of
containment, unless prevented by measures such as painting or injection
of corrosion inhibitor. However, painting is only relevant to external
corrosion and injection of corrosion inhibitor is only relevant to internal
corrosion. Thus, having two threats – internal and external corrosion –
would be preferable.
Rule 5 – Top events lead to consequences
• Consequences represent a worst case scenario if no
mitigation barriers are in place.
• Thus without the right barriers, a loss of containment of
flammable material can ignite, escalate and result in harm to
people, the environment and assets.
• A consequence should be defined to represent the particular
harmful outcome that would be prevented by the set of
safeguarding measures in place.
Rule 6 – Barriers must do something
• This goes to the heart of bowtie analysis.
• Identify effective barriers and show them as part of the
bowtie.
• The barrier should be specific enough that its intended
function can be defined and its performance can be verified.
• The term “operator intervention” for example is so vague as to be
meaningless whereas “operator shuts down the process” makes
more sense and could be tied to a particular procedure and
competency requirement.
Rule 7 – Barriers can fail
• Safeguarding measures are not perfect and there will be ways in which
these can be compromised, referred to as ‘escalations’ in bowtie parlance.
• However, the bowtie shouldn’t go overboard on including repeated,
generic failure mechanisms on barrier after barrier, particularly if these
are adequately addressed in, for example, maintenance procedures.
• The generic threat ‘maintenance failure’ could be applied to practically
any barrier and adds nothing to a bowtie except superfluous detail.
• Specific escalations should be included, together with the specific
measures in place to protect against them.
Rule 8 – Human failure is not generic
• People make mistakes and take short-cuts, but an effective bowtie
diagram needs to be specific, not generic about human error.
• What is the error?
• How might a short-cut be taken?
This allows specific safeguarding measures to be defined,
rather than relying on the tired, generic barriers of
‘training’ and ‘procedure’, neither of which is particularly
meaningful or helpful.
Rule 9 – Engage with the people in the know
• Bowties should be developed using the expertise of
those with relevant knowledge, and be relevant to
those who need to know this information – your
stakeholders.
• Only by talking to stakeholders – for example
employees at a particular facility – can the bowtie
accurately reflect risk on the ground and influence
those affected.
Rule 10 – Guidelines, not a straightjacket
• We can break any of the rules outlined above if it provides a clearer
understanding of how hazards are managed and risks reduced.
General Guidance
• The 10 rules listed are designed to provide guidance in developing
useful bowties.
• Like so many rules, they may be broken when absolutely necessary if
this provides extra insight in achieving the desired objectives.
Source: http://www.erm.com/en/news-events/platform/ten-rules-forsmart-bowtie-analysis/
Name: _______________________
Bowtie Analysis PPT Review questions (2 points each)
1. What is the purpose of the Bowtie analysis?
2. What is the purpose of leaving the numbers out during the first part of the analysis?
3. Provide an example of a reason and a specific control measure on why chemical leak can occur
and get outside of containment.
4. How should preventative barriers be defined?
5. Provide an example of a generic type of failure on Bowtie. Should theses be repeated
throughout the analysis?
6. What are two questions that should be asked when addressing human error?

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