Leadership & Qualities of A Good Political Leader Paper Machiavelli lists many qualities of a good political leader. Select 3-5 of the qualities outlined b

Leadership & Qualities of A Good Political Leader Paper Machiavelli lists many qualities of a good political leader. Select 3-5 of the qualities outlined by Machiavelli in the sections we read. Explain each quality as described by Machiavelli, citing references from the book. Why are these qualities essential qualities  to good leadership?
Machiavelli is the author of the text ‘The Prince’. I am attaching the textbook. Please refer the textbook. Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14
Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527). The Prince.
The Harvard Classics. 1909–14.
Introductory Note
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, one of the most brilliant and versatile intellects of the Italian
Renaissance, was born at Florence, May 3, 1469. He entered the public service as a young
man, and between 1500 and 1512 he was employed in a number of diplomatic missions to
the other Italian cities, to France, and to Germany. When the Medici returned to power in
Florence in 1512, Machiavelli lost his positions, and suffered imprisonment and torture.
On his release in the following year, he retired to the country and devoted himself to study
and the composition of his most famous work, “The Prince.” Other writings followed; and
in the last year of his life we find him again in active life, this time as a soldier. He died
June 21, 1527.
1
A more detailed account of Machiavelli, by Lord Macaulay, will be found in the volume
of “English Essays” in the Harvard Classics.
2
Machiavelli’s aim in “The Prince” has been very variously interpreted. His motive was
probably mainly patriotic; but the exclusion of moral considerations in his treatment of
politics led, even in his own century, to his name’s becoming a synonym for all that is
diabolical in public and private policy. Whatever may be the relation of the methods
expounded in “The Prince” to his personal ideals, the book remains a most vivid and
suggestive picture of political conditions in the Italy of the Renaissance.
3
Machiavelli’s “Discourses on Livy’s Decades” deals on a larger scale with many of the
topics of “The Prince”; his “Art of War” elaborates his views on the military side; and his
“History of Florence,” his “Life of Castruccio Castracani,” and his comedy,
“Mandragola,” are characteristic products of an accomplished man of letters who one time
was diplomat and soldier, at another historian, poet, and dramatist. Few men represent so
thoroughly the extraordinary versatility of that wonderful age.
4
“Of all Machiavelli’s writings,” says Garnett, “‘The Prince’ is the most famous, and
deservedly, for it is the most characteristic. Few subjects of literary discussion have
occasioned more controversy than the purpose of this celebrated book. Some have beheld
in it a manual for tyrants, like the memoirs of Tiberius, so diligently perused by Domitian;
others have regarded it as a refined irony upon tyranny, on the sarcastic plan of Swift’s
Directions to Servants, if so humble an analogy be permissible. From various points of
view it might alternately pass for either, but its purpose is accurately conveyed by neither
interpretation. Machiavelli was a sincere though too supple a republican, and by no means
desired the universal prevalence of tyranny throughout Italy…. His aim probably was to
show how to build up a principality capable of expelling the foreigner and restoring the
independence of Italy. But this intention could not be safely expressed, and hence his
work seems repulsive, because the reason of state which he propounds as an apology for
infringing the moral code appears not patriotic, but purely selfish…. With all his faults
and oversights, nothing can deprive Machiavelli of the glory of having been the modern
Aristotle in politics, the first, or at least the first considerable writer who derived a
practical philosophy from history, and exalted statecraft into science.”
5
Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14
Dedication
To the Magnificent Lorenzo di Piero de’ Medici
IT is customary for such as seek a Prince’s favour, to present themselves before him with
those things of theirs which they themselves most value, or in which they perceive him
chiefly to delight. Accordingly, we often see horses, armour, cloth of gold, precious
stones, and the like costly gifts, offered to Princes as worthy of their greatness. Desiring in
like manner to approach your Magnificence with some token of my devotion, I have
found among my possessions none that I so much prize and esteem as a knowledge of the
actions of great men, acquired in the course of a long experience of modern affairs and a
continual study of antiquity. Which knowledge most carefully and patiently pondered over
and sifted by me, and now reduced into this little book, I send to your Magnificence. And
though I deem the work unworthy of your greatness, yet am I bold enough to hope that
your courtesy will dispose you to accept it, considering that I can offer you no better gift
than the means of mastering in a very brief time, all that in the course of so many years,
and at the cost of so many hardships and dangers, I have learned, and know.
1
This work I have not adorned or amplified with rounded periods, swelling and
high-flown language, or any other of those extrinsic attractions and allurements wherewith
many authors are wont to set off and grace their writings; since it is my desire that it
should either pass wholly unhonoured, or that the truth of its matter and the importance of
its subject should alone recommend it.
2
Nor would I have it thought presumption that a person of very mean and humble station
should venture to discourse and lay down rules concerning the government of Princes. For
as those who make maps of countries place themselves low down in the plains to study
the character of mountains and elevated lands, and place themselves high up on the
mountains to get a better view of the plains, so in like manner to understand the People a
man should be a Prince, and to have a clear notion of Princes he should belong to the
People.
3
Let your Magnificence, then, accept this little gift in the spirit in which I offer it;
wherein, if you diligently read and study it, you will recognize my extreme desire that you
should attain to that eminence which Fortune and your own merits promise you. Should
you from the height of your greatness some time turn your eyes to these humble regions,
you will become aware how undeservedly I have to endure the keen and unremitting
malignity of Fortune.
4
Niccolo Machiavelli
5
I. Of the Various Kinds of Princedom, and of the Ways in Which They Are
Acquired
ALL the States and Governments by which men are or ever have been ruled, have been
and are either Republics or Princedoms. Princedoms are either hereditary, in which the
sovereignty is derived through an ancient line of ancestors, or they are new. New
Princedoms are either wholly new, as that of Milan to Francesco Sforza; or they are like
limbs joined on to the hereditary possessions of the Prince who acquires them, as the
1
Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14
Kingdom of Naples to the dominions of the King of Spain. The States thus acquired have
either been used to live under a Prince or have been free; and he who acquires them does
so either by his own arms or by the arms of others, and either by good fortune or by merit.
II. Of Hereditary Princedoms
OF Republics I shall not now speak, having elsewhere spoken of them at length. Here I
shall treat exclusively of Princedoms, and, filling in the outline above traced out, shall
proceed to examine how such States are to be governed and maintained.
1
I say, then, that hereditary States, accustomed to the family of their Prince, are
maintained with far less difficulty than new States, since all that is required is that the
Prince shall not depart from the usages of his ancestors, trusting for the rest to deal with
events as they arise. So that if an hereditary Prince be of average address, he will always
maintain himself in his Princedom, unless deprived of it by some extraordinary and
irresistible force; and even if so deprived will recover it, should any, even the least,
mishap overtake the usurper. We have in Italy an example of this in the Duke of Ferrara,
who never could have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in 1484, nor those of Pope
Julius in 1510, had not his authority in that State been consolidated by time. For since a
Prince by birth has fewer occasions and less need to give offence, he ought to be better
loved, and will naturally be popular with his subjects unless outrageous vices make him
odious. Moreover, the very antiquity and continuance of his rule will efface the memories
and causes which lead to innovation. For one change always leaves a dovetail into which
another will fit.
2
III. Of Mixed Princedoms
BUT in new Princedoms difficulties abound. And, first, if the Princedom be not wholly
new, but joined on to the ancient dominions of the Prince, so as to form with them what
may be termed a mixed Princedom, changes will come from a cause common to all new
States, namely, that men, thinking to better their condition, are always ready to change
masters, and in this expectation will take up arms against any ruler; wherein they deceive
themselves, and find afterwards by experience that they are worse off than before. This
again results naturally and necessarily from the circumstance that the Prince cannot avoid
giving offence to his new subjects, either in respect of the troops he quarters on them, or
of some other of the numberless vexations attendant on a new acquisition. And in this
way you may find that you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing
the Princedom, yet cannot keep the friendship of those who helped you to gain it; since
you can neither reward them as they expect, nor yet, being under obligations to them, use
violent remedies against them. For however strong you may be in respect of your army, it
is essential that in entering a new Province you should have the good will of its
inhabitants.
1
Hence it happened that Louis XII of France, speedily gaining possession of Milan, as
speedily lost it; and that on the occasion of its first capture, Lodovico Sforza was able
with his own forces only to take it from him. For the very people who had opened the
2
Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14
gates to the French King, when they found themselves deceived in their expectations and
hopes of future benefits, could not put up with the insolence of their new ruler. True it is
that when a State rebels and is again got under, it will not afterwards be lost so easily. For
the Prince, using the rebellion as a pretext, will not scruple to secure himself by
punishing the guilty, bringing the suspected to trial, and otherwise strengthening his
position in the points where it was weak. So that if to recover Milan from the French it
was enough on the first occasion that a Duke Lodovico should raise alarms on the
frontiers to wrest it from them a second time the whole world had to be ranged against
them, and their armies destroyed and driven out of Italy. And this for the reasons above
assigned. And yet, for a second time, Milan was lost to the King. The general causes of
its first loss have been shown. It remains to note the causes of the second, and to point
out the remedies which the French King had, or which might have been used by another
in like circumstances to maintain his conquest more successfully than he did.
I say, then, that those States which upon their acquisition are joined on to the ancient
dominions of the Prince who acquires them, are either of the same Province and tongue
as the people of these dominions, or they are not. When they are, there is a great ease in
retaining them, especially when they have not been accustomed to live in freedom. To
hold them securely it is enough to have rooted out the line of the reigning Prince; because
if in other respects the old condition of things be continued, and there be no discordance
in their customs, men live peaceably with one another, as we see to have been the case in
Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have so long been united to France.
For although there be some slight difference in their languages, their customs are similar,
and they can easily get on together. He, therefore, who acquires such a State, if he mean
to keep it, must see to two things; first, that the blood of the ancient line of Princes be
destroyed; second, that no change be made in respect of laws or taxes; for in this way the
newly acquired State speedily becomes incorporated with the hereditary.
3
But when States are acquired in a country differing in language, usages, and laws,
difficulties multiply, and great good fortune, as well as address, is needed to overcome
them. One of the best and most efficacious methods for dealing with such a State, is for
the Prince who acquires it to go and dwell there in person, since this will tend to make
his tenure more secure and lasting. This course has been followed by the Turk with
regard to Greece, who, had he not, in addition to all his other precautions for securing
that Province, himself come to live in it, could never have kept his hold of it. For when
you are on the spot, disorders are detected in their beginnings and remedies can be
readily applied; but when you are at a distance, they are not heard of until they have
gathered strength and the case is past cure. Moreover, the Province in which you take up
your abode is not pillaged by your officers; the people are pleased to have a ready
recourse to their Prince; and have all the more reason if they are well disposed, to love, if
disaffected, to fear him. A foreign enemy desiring to attack that State would be cautious
how he did so. In short, where the Prince resides in person, it will be extremely difficult
to oust him.
4
Another excellent expedient is to send colonies into one or two places, so that these may
become, as it were, the keys of the Province; for you must either do this, or else keep up
a numerous force of men-at-arms and foot soldiers. A Prince need not spend much on
colonies. He can send them out and support them at little or no charge to himself, and the
only persons to whom he gives offence are those whom he deprives of their fields and
houses to bestow them on the new inhabitants. Those who are thus injured form but a
5
Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14
small part of the community, and remaining scattered and poor can never become
dangerous. All others being left unmolested, are in consequence easily quieted, and at the
same time are afraid to make a false move, lest they share the fate of those who have
been deprived of their possessions. In few words, these colonies cost less than soldiers,
are more faithful, and give less offence, while those who are offended, being, as I have
said, poor and dispersed, cannot hurt. And let it here be noted that men are either to be
kindly treated, or utterly crushed, since they can revenge lighter injuries, but not graver.
Wherefore the injury we do to a man should be of a sort to leave no fear of reprisals.
But if instead of colonies you send troops, the cost is vastly greater, and the whole
revenues of the country are spent in guarding it; so that the gain becomes a loss, and
much deeper offence is given; since in shifting the quarters of your soldiers from place to
place the whole country suffers hardship, which as all feel, all are made enemies; and
enemies who remaining, although vanquished, in their own homes, have power to hurt.
In every way, therefore, this mode of defence is as disadvantageous as that by colonizing
is useful.
6
The Prince who establishes himself in a Province whose laws and language differ from
those of his own people, ought also to make himself the head and protector of his feebler
neighbours, and endeavour to weaken the stronger, and must see that by no accident shall
any other stranger as powerful as himself find an entrance there. For it will always
happen that some such person will be called in by those of the Province who are
discontented either through ambition or fear; as we see of old the Romans brought into
Greece by the Aetolians, and in every other country that they entered, invited there by its
inhabitants. And the usual course of things is that so soon as a formidable stranger enters
a Province, all the weaker powers side with him, moved thereto by the ill-will they bear
towards him who has hitherto kept them in subjection. So that in respect of these lesser
powers, no trouble is needed to gain them over, for at once, together, and of their own
accord, they throw in their lot with the government of the stranger. The new Prince,
therefore, has only to see that they do not increase too much in strength, and with his
own forces, aided by their good will, can easily subdue any who are powerful, so as to
remain supreme in the Province. He who does not manage this matter well, will soon lose
whatever he has gained, and while he retains it will find in it endless troubles and
annoyances.
7
In dealing with the countries of which they took possession the Romans diligently
followed the methods I have described. They planted colonies, conciliated weaker
powers without adding to their strength, humbled the great, and never suffered a
formidable stranger to acquire influence. A single example will suffice to show this. In
Greece the Romans took the Achaians and Aetolians into their pay; the Macedonian
monarchy was humbled; Antiochus was driven out. But the services of the Achaians and
Aetolians never obtained for them any addition to their power; no persuasions on the part
of Philip could induce the Romans to be his friends on the condition of sparing him
humiliation; nor could all the power of Antiochus bring them to consent to his exercising
any authority within that Province. And in thus acting the Romans did as all wise rulers
should, who have to consider not only present difficulties but also future, against which
they must use all diligence to provide; for these, if they be foreseen while yet remote,
admit of easy remedy, but if their approach be awaited, are already past cure, the disorder
having become hopeless; realizing what the physicians tell us of hectic fever, that in its
beginning it is easy to cure, but hard to recognize; whereas, after a time, not having been
8
Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince. The Harvard Classics. 1909-14
detected and treated at the first, it becomes easy to recognize but impossible to cure.
And so it is with State affairs. For the distempers of a State being discovered while yet
inchoate, which can only be done by a sagacious ruler, may easily be dealt with; but
when, from not being observed, they are suffered to grow until they are obvious to every
one, there is no longer any remedy. The Romans, therefore, foreseeing evils while they
were yet far off, always provided against them, and never suffered them to take their
course for the sake of avoiding war; since they knew that war is not so to be avoided, but
is only postponed to the advantage of the other side. They chose, therefore, to make war
with Philip and Antiochus in Greece, that they might not have to make it with them in
Italy, although for a while they might have escaped both. This they did not desire, nor did
the maxim leave it to Time, which the wise men of our own day have always on their lips,
ever recommend itself to them. What they looked to enjoy were the fruits of their own
valour and foresight. For Time, driving all things before it, may bring with it evil as well
as good.
9
But let us now go back to France and examine whether she has followed any of those
methods of which I have made mention. I shall speak of Louis and not of Charles,
because from the former having held longer possession of Italy, his manner of acting is
more plainly seen. You will find, then, that he has done the direct opposite of what he
should have done in order to retain a foreign State.
10
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who hoped by his
coming to gain for themselves a half of the State of Lombardy. I will not blame this
coming…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment