Judaism

ISRAEL AND ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS 55

Society Society Society Society Society AbrAbrAbrAbrAbroadoadoadoadoad

If education is the key to success for any group,it is doubly so for the Ethiopians. For them, it not only affects their chances for upward mobil- ity, it plays a critical role in their integration into Israel’s mainstream-modern, technological and mostly urban society. The Israeli educational sys- tem prides itself on having considerable experi- ence with immigrants. The question is, however, what do we do with our experience? Do we learn from it, or do we simply repeat the mistakes of the past?

In 1991, on the southern edge of the city of Beer-Sheva, the Israeli government established temporary housing for new immigrants. Called Nachal Bekka, this encampment of 2500 units soon housed 1613 Soviet and 302 Ethiopian im- migrant families. Three hundred units for Ben Gurion University students, who preformed com- munity service, served as buffers between the Russians and Ethiopians.

Every 45-square-meter unit was divided into two residences, each with a kitchenette, toilet, shower, bedroom, sitting room, running water and electricity. Public transportation, a subsidized coin operated laundry, grocery stores, kindergartens and public phones served the community. Within a year or two, some residents had purchased au- tomobiles and many had installed telephones, washing machines and air conditioners. At the far end, two small buildings served as kindergarten facilities, one for religious and the other for non- religious pupils respectively. Immigrant children from the former Soviet Union occupied one and Ethiopian immigrant children the other. In com- menting to an American visitor, an Israeli profes- sor explained: “One is ‘black,’ one is ‘white’; but it’s not like in the United States. It’s more com- plex. Religion and not race explains the separa- tion in educational institutions.” The professor

ISRAEL AND ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS

Fred A. Lazin erred! The following examination of educational policies to absorb Ethiopian pupils from 1984 through 1993 shows that political party politics and not religion explain the separation of the two groups of immigrants. Moreover, matters of nation- ality, ethnicity and more recently race have been concerns of Israeli educational policy. Importantly, the experience of the Ethiopian pupils resembled that of earlier non-European Jewish immigrant children from North Africa and the Middle East in the 1950s. Israeli education policy also absorbed them into segregated and inferior schools.

Since the early 1980s almost 50,000 non-white Jews from Ethiopia immigrated to Israel. In 1973, then Sephardi Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef recog- nized them as descendants of the Tribe of Dan and eligible to immigrate under the Law of Re- turn. For the purpose of marriage, however, he insisted that they undergo “strict conversion pro- cedures” involving immersions for men and women, symbolic recircumcision for the men and a commitment to obey Jewish Law. Although, the Israeli government began to foster their immigra- tion after 1977, the issue of the legitimacy of their Jewish identity remained.

Following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in 1974 and up to 1984 almost 6500 Ethiopian Jews immigrated to Israel. Between 21 November 1984 and 5 June 1985 the Israeli government brought almost 8000 Ethiopian Jews from Sudan to Israel in a covert airlift called Operation Moses. With resumption of diplomatic relations between Israel and Ethiopia, immigration continued. In a second airlift, Operation Solomon, the Israeli Air Force flew 14,160 persons from Ethiopia to Israel dur- ing a 36-hour period during May 24-26, 1991.

Most Ethiopian immigrants “came from one of the most conservative, rural regions of Ethiopia, where modern means of communication and

56 SOCIETY • MAY / JUNE 2002

transportation were undeveloped, il literacy among the adult population was more than 90 percent.…” Also, between 25 and 38 percent, com- pared to 9 percent for Israeli families, were single- parent families. Many families with children lacked a breadwinner. As with other Jewish immigrants, the Government and Jewish Agency assumed re- sponsibility to absorb them into Israeli society. An important component of absorption included the formal schooling of children.

This essay documents how Israel’s educational system absorbed Ethiopian immigrant pupils, many of whom had little or no formal education. Issues addressed are (1) whether absorption poli- cies provided similar opportunities offered chil- dren of veteran Israeli Jews? and (2) how similar or different were educational policies to absorb the immigrant pupils from the former Soviet Union who arrived after 1988?

The essay further provides a case study of how Israel’s political-administrative systems influenced the absorption of immigrant children into the education system. To an extent much greater than in the United States and many other countries, political party interests determined Israel’s edu- cational absorption policies. Political decisions at the highest level determined educational policies that segregated Ethiopian immigrant children within an inferior school system. Most importantly, leaders of the government and Jewish Agency re- quired Ethiopian children to study in the state religious school system for the first year (and longer). These policies denied them the option given to all Jewish Israelis and other new immi- grants to attend the much larger, more diverse and academically superior state secular school system. They also mandated all Ethiopian teenagers to attend relatively few religious boarding schools, denying them the option afforded other Jewish Israeli and immigrant children to study at local schools or at secular boarding schools.

While much of the relevant comparative litera- ture focuses on empirical studies of school per- formance of immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities this study emphasizes macro policy. It examines policy parameters that influenced the opportunities and experiences of Ethiopian im- migrant children in Israeli schools.

Education and NeEducation and NeEducation and NeEducation and NeEducation and New Immigw Immigw Immigw Immigw Immigrrrrrantsantsantsantsants Politics have always dominated Israeli educational

policies that served as the main institutional means for integrating immigrant children into Israeli soci-

ety. Moreover, ethnic considerations (among Jews) as well as nationality (between Jews and Arabs) have always been major concerns of Israeli educational policy. The Ethiopians, being non-white Jews, placed race on the agenda within the context of a charac- teristic of their ethnic or national identity.

In 1953, two separate public school systems— state secular and state religious—replaced “educa- tional streams” controlled by political parties. The Ministry of Education, however, controlled only the state-secular system. The law gave a public commit- tee controlled by the National Religious Party au- thority over matters of pedagogy in the state-reli- gious system. It remained a party controlled school system devoting “considerable time to the Bible, learning daily prayers, analysis of the rules of … keeping kosher and Jewish holidays.”

The 1953 reform also established “recognized” private schools, many operated by ultra-Orthodox religious groups. As a condition of state aid, these systems had to adopt parts of a standard curricu- lum and agree to ministry supervision. In practice, however, party and coalition politics have made these autonomous of ministry supervision. Today they receive government aid on par with the state systems. In some municipalities, their schools oper- ate as state religious schools.

During the 1950s and 1960s, national, ethnic and class separation characterized the Israeli educational system. The government and Jewish Agency settled large numbers of immigrants in specific neighbor- hoods and towns in central Israel. The Ministry of Education’s neighborhood school policy resulted in children of veteran Israelis (mostly Ashkenazim or European Jews) and immigrants from Arab lands (mostly Sephardim or Oriental Jews) attending dif- ferent schools. In addition, the more religious Ori- ental immigrants and more secular veteran Israelis (and most European immigrants) preferred differ- ent school systems.

In the periphery, a complex segregated demo- graphic mix had Israeli Arabs living in their villages and Israeli Jews in kibbutzim, moshavim and in new or development towns. The Arabs of Israel wanted to educate their children in their own schools, which met the desire of the Israeli government to have them in a separate system. The government and not the Arabs, however, control these schools. The kib- butzim, with almost all veteran (Ashkenazi) Israelis had their own, ideologically oriented schools. The Jewish youth they absorbed from Arab lands in the 1950s and 1960s studied in separate tracks.

In contrast the moshavim absorbed large num-

ISRAEL AND ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS 57

bers of Jewish immigrants from Europe and Arab lands in ethnically homogeneous settlements. Most Oriental Jews on moshavim sent their chil- dren to state religious schools while veteran (Ashkenazim) moshav members and some of the newer European immigrants sent their children mostly to state secular schools. When Oriental immigrant and veteran Israeli Jewish children went to the same school, they were placed in sepa- rate tracks. In the new towns in the rural and pe- ripheral areas the new, low-income immigrant population, mostly Oriental Jews, studied in their own state secular and religious schools.

Beginning in the early 1980s some parent groups in the larger cities established more elite schools (Noam) within the state religious system. While being more religious (separate classes and/ or schools for boys and girls), Noam Schools at- tracted an almost exclusive wealthier Ashkenazi clientele that could afford special fees. Some claim that these schools were established to circumvent the integration of Ashkenazi and Sepharadi pupils. Consequently, the percentage of economically poor and Oriental pupils in the regular state reli- gious systems increased. It became the far weaker system; many of its pupils did very poorly in the school system.

Despite a declared policy of establishing edu- cational opportunities for all (Jewish) Israeli pu- pils, by the late 1950s, large numbers of Oriental immigrant children, concentrated in poor neigh- borhoods, development towns and moshavim re- ceived an inferior educational experience. Begin- ning in the 1960s the Ministry of Education pursued policies to close a perceived educational gap between the stronger veteran (Ashkenazi) pupils and the weaker, newer, mostly Oriental Jew- ish pupils. The ministry provided additional re- sources, instituted a longer study day, recruited and trained teachers, funded enrichment for schools and instituted a program for social inte- gration in post-primary schools. In 1974, the min- istry introduced an American-style “Head Start” pre-kindergarten program. Later, its Welfare Project and the Government-Jewish Agency Project Re- newal targeted resources to schools in socially disadvantaged neighborhoods. The educational impact of these efforts remains questionable.

Education PEducation PEducation PEducation PEducation Policy and Ethiopian Immigolicy and Ethiopian Immigolicy and Ethiopian Immigolicy and Ethiopian Immigolicy and Ethiopian Immigrrrrrantsantsantsantsants In the early 1980s, Zevulun Hammer, minister

of education and head of the National Religious Party, met with the chief rabbis in light of Rabbi

Ovadia Yosef’s earlier ruling that the Ethiopians were to be considered Jews for the purpose of immigration and education. Thereafter, he in- formed the Executive Committee of the ministry that Ethiopians would attend state religious schools during their first year in Israel. They would not be allowed to exercise their legal right to choose either the state secular or religious sys- tem. While neither enacting legislation nor pass- ing a formal resolution, the Knesset (parliament), Government and the Jewish Agency supported this policy. A formal decision may have been ille- gal and could have led to petitions to the High Court of Justice.

Hammer and his supporters believed that a religious education was necessary for Ethiopian Jews who had been cut off from Rabbinical Juda- ism for centuries. No similar policy was deemed necessary for the overwhelmingly assimilated Soviet Jewish immigrants arriving after 1989 who had lived in a communist system for several gen- erations. Almost one-third were estimated to be non-Jews.

The Labor Party supported this policy for a dif- ferent reason. Its leaders wanted to avoid the ab- sorption “errors” made by the Labor Party in the 1950s that forced traditional religious Jews to send their children to secular schools. They now argued that religious schools would be less threat- ening, more supportive and reduce the shock of transition from traditional to modern society. Oth- ers, in light of the questions raised about their Jewishness by the Orthodox, believed that send- ing Ethiopians to state religious schools would lead to their acceptance as Jews.

Hammer’s decision had political consequences. First, the policy increased resources for the state religious school system, controlled by his National Religious Party. Second, the education of Ethio- pian pupils and involvement of their families pro- vided potential voters for the National Religious Party. In the long run, however, it also paid a price. After 1991, with the increased number of immi- grants from Operation Solomon, the system and schools suffered from overload and “white flight”. Some of its officials were willing to “give up” some of the Ethiopian pupils to the secular school sys- tem. Officials of the state religious system deny political motives. In their view the system ac- cepted a spiritual and national challenge to help educate and absorb Jewish immigrant children.

While most Ethiopian parents at the time prob- ably had no idea of the differences in the school

58 SOCIETY • MAY / JUNE 2002

systems, many may have preferred a religiously oriented education for their children. Regardless, Hammer had “consulted” only with Ethiopian re- ligious leaders. He had no contact with parents or non-religious Ethiopian leaders. Parents had no choice in the matter in the same way that reli- gious Moroccan Jewish immigrants in the 1950s had no right or means to object to their children going to secular Israeli schools.

Importantly, while wanting to understand and respect the traditions of the Ethiopian pupils, the religious school system adopted a policy of as- similation. It wanted the immigrants to adopt “mannerism, language, traditions, cultural mores and values of the host society.” Successful inte- gration meant “their abandoning ‘old ways’ and becoming models of veteran Israelis.”

Before examining the educational conse- quences of this policy, it should be emphasized that upon arrival, many Ethiopian children had little or no formal schooling. A large number could neither read nor write in any language and most did not know Hebrew. They also had minimum support from often illiterate (in their mother tongue) and very poor parents who did not know the language, curriculum, or host culture.

Second, place of residence proved to be an im- portant variable (handicap) for education because of the Ministry of Education’s neighborhood school policy for elementary schools. Importantly, the government and Jewish Agency did not allow Ethiopian immigrants to participate in “direct ab- sorption.” This program, initiated in 1988, enabled most Soviet immigrants to rent private housing in a municipality or neighborhood of their choice. It also allowed them to choose the school system for their children.

Despite government and Jewish Agency deci- sions and policies to settle Ethiopians in central Israel “the economic realities of the country con- tinued to favor the ‘ghettoization’ of the [Ethio- pian] immigrants.” In the 1980s, the only sources of vacant public housing existed in peripheral development towns and lower income neighbor- hoods in central Israel. Ethiopian immigrants oc- cupied many of these units often in the same building, street or neighborhood. Later, the gov- ernment turned many temporary (convertible) absorption centers in these areas into permanent public housing, which resulted in instant mini- ghettos of black Ethiopians. Later arrivals followed relatives and friends to these lower-income envi- ronments despite policies urging them to live else-

where. After 1988 the government built tens of thousands of units in these same areas for Soviet Jews. Ethiopians occupied some of these units. Costs of existing apartments and construction of new housing in “better” areas in central Israel were prohibitive. The enlarged mortgages, for example, given Ethiopian families, were “usually insufficient to buy an apartment in a decent neighborhood.”

The concentration of Ethiopians in develop- ment towns and in poorer neighborhoods of less well to do cities and towns in central Israel meant that most Ethiopian children would be assigned to schools serving low income disadvantaged and mostly Oriental (non-European) Jewish Israeli pupils. Moreover, being restricted to Israel’s state religious schools, placed Ethiopian pupils in the smaller of the two educational systems which had between 15 to 20 percent of Israeli Jewish pu- pils. This policy ensured their greater segregation within schools and individual classes. Rather than spread the Ethiopian pupils out, policies excluded schools in the larger secular system.

More importantly, the overall educational level of the state religious school system and academic training of its teachers, is far below that of its secu- lar counterpart. It has more than double the per- centage of low performing and problem pupils who compose two-thirds of the student body. In both state educational systems, moreover, there is a wide divergence in terms of quality between schools in different locations. The level of teach- ing, resources and pupil performance is much lower in the periphery and much higher in the center, especially in the more established and well- to-do areas. Therefore, had they been allowed to study in secular schools their opportunities may or may not have been changed significantly.

The situation was more complex. First, the rec- ognized ultra-Orthodox school systems with ex- tensive networks in areas where Ethiopians lived refused to accept Ethiopian pupils unless they converted. Second, some state religious schools, like those associated with the Noam Group, were reluctant to take Ethiopian pupils. Initially, the Ministry of Education did not oppose this policy. Third, some municipalities concentrated Ethio- pian pupils in the weaker schools of the state re- ligious system. This probably ref lected concern with “white f light” whereby parents would with- draw their children from a school when the num- ber of Ethiopian pupils increased. Fourth, in schools accepting Ethiopian pupils, authorities placed them in special preparatory classes for the

ISRAEL AND ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS 59

first year, in accordance with Ministry guidelines. Placement in special classes, however, often lasted for several years. Here too, the Ministry did not object. Even more importantly, teachers in these classes were poorly trained, often part time and many may have lacked certification. Fifth, many municipal school systems placed many normal Ethiopian pupils in special-education classes, “the educational equivalent of a death sentence.” While a similar practice in New York City schools may serve “to segregate difficult students from the rest of the population” in Israel it also enabled mu- nicipalities to request more funding.

Operation Solomon in May 1991 exacerbated this situation by increasing the number of Ethio- pian pupils by two or three times. Almost all were absorbed in state religious schools located in the periphery and in poor neighborhoods of central Israel. No one enforced the Immigration Cabinet’s official quota of 15 percent (unofficial 30 percent) Ethiopian pupils per school and the Ministry of Education’s 25 percent. Many schools became more than 60-70 percent Ethiopian. As late as 1996-97 at least 60 schools in Israel had more than 25 percent Ethiopian pupils; in 1997 18 schools had above 40 percent. Interestingly, in August 1997 the state religious school authorities issued guide- lines ending a cap on the percentage of Ethiopian pupils in a classroom.

Other factors also contributed to problems in educating Ethiopian pupils. For example, Ethio- pian families from Operation Solomon would move (or be moved) on the average of four times in six years. In response, some receiving commu- nities refused to accept new pupils in the middle of the year. This left many children out of school for months.

Finally, the entire educational system and par- ticular state religious schools suffered from a lack of planning, preparation, space and resources. Ex- acerbating this situation was the poverty of most Ethiopian families. While Israeli public education is free, parents have to purchase books and sup- plies. One study found that as many as 37 percent of Russian immigrant pupils lacked funds for books. Considering the worse economic situation of Ethiopians and shortcomings of aid programs probably a larger percentage did not have the proper books and supplies for elementary school.

It is misleading, if not ludicrous, therefore, to claim “that never before has a group of immigrants [the Ethiopians] been greeted by such expanded and extended benefits.…” Placing students with

inadequate educational backgrounds and weak family situations into deficient schools with weak pupils resulted in minimal learning experiences. Many researchers euphemistically refer to low per- formances. Some suggest that many children learned nothing.

In late spring 1992 the Absorption Cabinet of the Likud-led Shamir government decided to al- low Ethiopian parents to send their children to state secular schools. This did not mean that the NRP-controlled Ministry of Education would com- ply. This policy would be adopted, however, by the Rabin government after its election in June 1992. Its minister of education, Ms. Shulamit Aloni of the Meretz Party, an activist for “civil rights and the separation of state and religion” instituted a policy allowing Ethiopians freedom to choose ei- ther public school system. Her successor Profes- sor Amnon Rubenstein continued this policy. In 1993 approximately 95 percent of Ethiopian pu- pils were in the state religious schools. The per- centage dropped to 85 percent in 1995 and 76 percent in 1996.

YYYYYouth outh outh outh outh AliyAliyAliyAliyAliyahahahahah A second major component of educational

policy for Ethiopians concerned Youth Aliyah schools of the Jewish Agency. Established in the 1930s to absorb Jewish refugee children from Hitler’s Germany, Youth Aliyah performed a simi- lar function for successive groups of immigrant youth. With the drop in immigration in the 1970s, it began to care for disadvantaged Jewish-Israeli youth that failed to adjust to regular schools.

Education policy required the compulsory par- ticipation of Ethiopian youth between the ages of 14-18 (later 12-18) in the Youth Aliyah religious boarding schools and institutions. While operat- ing several youth villages and schools, Youth Aliyah also subcontracted with many external institu- tions operated by national organizations, women’s organizations and the National Religious Party.

Youth Aliyah policy toward Soviet Jewish im- migrants accepted only those who wanted to ap- ply and who met the institutions’ profile of need. It placed them in better academic institutions and experimented with open boarding schools, which involved their parents and municipalities.

Several factors prompted the “Ethiopian” policy. First, in Operation Moses many young people ar- rived without their parents. Second, the decision reflected long held assumption that the state and the boarding schools could provide a better envi-

60 SOCIETY • MAY / JUNE 2002

ronment than immigrant parents and the family! Youth Aliyah saw its role as being “substitute par- ents.” Third, at the time, the Jewish Agency funded Youth Aliyah. This relieved the government of the expense and the municipalities of the responsi- bility of educating large numbers of “weak” pu- pils in local schools. Although an expensive en- terprise, having “Ethiopians” in Youth Aliyah helped Jewish Agency overseas fundraising efforts. Fourth, the util ization of religious boarding schools affiliated with the National Religious Party brought them important resources. In some cases it kept them from closing.

What were the consequences of this policy? Some would claim that for teenage Ethiopians Youth Aliyah provided a place of refuge, total ab- sorption and education. Others were more criti- cal. First, the academic level and standards of Youth Aliyah were very low. By 1984, it served mostly poorly adjusted Israeli problem youth. In 1988, one critic warned that to put Ethiopian teen- agers in Youth Aliyah would socialize them into the “lowest level of Israeli society.”

Second, Youth Aliyah policy placed most Ethio- pian youth in “dead end” non-academic “vocational programs that preclude academic careers” and fu- ture job opportunities. This policy would change only after 1992. For example in 1990-1991, 13 per- cent of the Ethiopians studied in academic tracks and 87 percent in vocational. By 1994-95 the ra- tio was 40 percent academic and 60 percent vo- cational. By 1996 80 percent were in academic tracks. In 1991 only 4.5 percent of Ethiopian pu- pils had the potential for full matriculation. In 1994 32 percent of Ethiopian pupils (versus 80- 85 percent of Israelis) were eligible to take ma- triculation exams. This number reached 48 per- cent in 1996. Regardless, many Ethiopian pupils study at the Universities. Although often ill pre- pared, universities provide extensive preparatory and other support programs along with extensive scholarships.

Third, placement in state religious institutions concentrated and segregated them. As late as 1994, Ethiopian students made up over 70 percent of the student body in Youth Aliyah religious institu- tions. Some weaker educational facilities became 80 to 100 percent Ethiopian. Until 1992, several elite religious institutions would not take them. Fourth, this policy separated Ethiopian children from their families, which “disrupted cultural con- tinuity and undermined the community’s close family structure.…” Fifth, this was another ex-

ample of denying Ethiopians freedom of choice. It was the first time in Israel’s history that the government required an entire group of immigrant youth to study at boarding schools.

By 1991-1992, some Israeli politicians pres- sured Youth Aliyah to accept more Russians and Israelis. Consequently, Youth Aliyah began to pay less attention to the policy of exclusively place- ment of Ethiopian youth in religious institutions. Some senior staff also questioned Youth Aliyah’s Ethiopian policy. In the spring of 1992 Youth Aliyah decided to absorb only needy and or dis- advantaged Ethiopians. Paying a price for this change in policy were Ethiopian teenagers who moved from hotels to caravan sites and missed months of school. While Youth Aliyah would not accept many, local schools also refused to accept them during the academic year.

EthnicityEthnicityEthnicityEthnicityEthnicity,,,,, Class, Class, Class, Class, Class, and Education P and Education P and Education P and Education P and Education Policyolicyolicyolicyolicy A recent Joint Distribution Committee report

concluded that the Israeli “educational system has not yet responded sufficiently to the special needs of … [the Ethiopian] … population.” The report missed the mark. This study has shown that the educational policies of the Israeli government denied Ethiopian children access to better edu- cational opportunities, placed them in an inferior school system and segregated them. This resulted from two decisions taken by leaders of the gov- ernment and Jewish Agency. One required all Ethiopian children to study in the state religious school system. The other mandated compulsory enrollment of all Ethiopian teenagers at religious boarding schools.

These policies in effect until the election of the Rabin government in June 1992 had two in- terrelated consequences. First, they denied Ethio- pian immigrants freedom to choose the school system for their children. Similarly parents of teen- agers could neither enroll them in local schools nor send them to secular boarding schools. Most Jewish Israeli citizens and immigrants from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere have exer- cised these rights since the early 1970s.

Second, the decisions denied Ethiopian pupils the option to attend the much larger, more diverse and academically superior state secular school system. This resulted in attendance at inferior schools and greater segregation. An understand- ing of Minister of Education Hammer’s policy for Ethiopians requires reference to the political-ad- ministrative context of Israeli politics. First, po-

ISRAEL AND ETHIOPIAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS 61

litical party and coalition interests often dominate the government and ministry decisions especially in domestic affairs. Most importantly, since the first parliamentary elections in 1949, no party has ever won a majority. This resulted in the need for a coalition government. The largest party (or prime minister since 1996) brings other parties into the government coalition in exchange for control of one or more ministries. Thus, the Is- raeli government is “composed of largely indepen- dent ministries” that often “operate more as com- peting units than as integral parts of a coordinated government machinery.” Provided he/she does not violate coalition principles the minister and his/ her party operate the ministry independently.

Thus Hammer set education policy for the gov- ernment in a manner serving the broad interest of his own party. In this case, however, his policy had the support of the entire Government and opposition Labor Party. No political party or ma- jor political interest objected. With the election of Rabin and the return of the Labor Party to the Government in 1992, Meretz, a left-wing party opposed to religious coercion and influence in society, took over the Ministry of Education. It officially ended the requirement that Ethiopians had to study at state religious schools. It also re- inforced recently altered boarding school regula- tions that allowed Ethiopian parents freedom of choice as to a boarding school option and access to secular boarding schools. The inroads made al- ready by the National Religious Party and religious school system might explain the relatively small percentage of Ethiopian children who transferred. Alternatively, parents may have preferred religious schools.

The present study suggests that politicians and their appointees made the major macro policy de- cision on the absorption of Ethiopians into the educational system. Professional administrators then implemented these decisions. There is little evidence to support the contention of Israel be- coming a bureaucratic state. In matters of educa- tion, politicians continue to dominate in much the way that a party controlled bureaucracy operated in the 1960s.

The findings here also support the claim that ethnicity, class and race continue to be important factors in Israeli politics in general and Israeli edu- cational policy in particular. Race per se, however, may not be the key to explain the discrimination against the Ethiopians. More important than race is the relative political importance, inf luence or

power of the respective ethnic or racial group within the Israeli political-administrative system. This is clearly evident in the different experiences of the European and Oriental Jewish immigrants of the 1950s and the Ethiopian and Soviet immi- grants in the 1980s.

The experience of Ethiopians as immigrants in the 1980s resembled that of Oriental (non-Euro- pean) Jewish immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa who arrived decades earlier. Then, the Israeli Ashkenazi (European) Jewish establish- ment settled the poorer, less educated and often darker-skinned Oriental Jews in separate periph- eral communities and placed their children in in- ferior schools. It forced many religious immigrants to send their children to secular institutions. Like many Ethiopians, some had their names changed (to David and Sarah) and their birth dates disre- garded in ID cards which listed month and date of birth as 00 00. Like the Ethiopians in the 1980s, earlier immigrants were too dependent and weak to resist.

The immigrants at this time from Europe had a very different experience. Despite a general nega- tive attitude toward immigrants and a stigma as- sociated with Holocaust survivors, new immi- grants from Europe received more favorable treatment in both housing and education. They had many more human resources, options to go to other countries, relatives in the country and shared many cul tural values with veteran Ashkenazi Israelis.

This pattern repeated itself in the 1980s. Both Ethiopians and Soviet immigrant children faced a less than receptive educational system operating a policy of assimilation that expected them to abandon their old ways. Yet, in practice, the expe- rience proved different for both groups.

The larger number of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union after 1988 had substan- tial and growing political inf luence in the Israeli political-administrative system. They had consid- erable human capital (highly educated) and most were Ashkenazim, a preferential ethnic identity. Their political clout in national politics (and later in municipalities) helped mold an initially less than supportive educational system on all levels to meet their needs.

As a group, the students arrived from the former Soviet Union with a rich educational experience and had well educated parents. Most families had free- dom of choice as to where to live and in which school system to study. The majority settled in cen-

62 SOCIETY • MAY / JUNE 2002

tral Israel, which has the better schools and job op- portunities. Over 90 percent chose to study in state secular schools. They had the option of sending their older children to secular or religious boarding schools (few did) or having them study at local schools. While they too suffered from poor teach- ers, inadequate Hebrew instruction and weak sup- port, they were able to study some subjects and take some of the matriculation exams in their mother tongue. Their large numbers overloaded the system and resulted in more of a process of a multicultural form of assimilation.

In sharp contrast the much smaller Ethiopian immigrant community had little political influence. They were settled in the periphery with its poor schools and fewer job opportunities. Most Ethiopian pupils lacked educational experience and had illit- erate parents. They became wards of the “second- rate” state educational system of the National Reli- gious Party. While some argue that the system wanted to respect Ethiopian traditions and did, reli- gious educators saw themselves as returning the Ethiopians to traditional Judaism. Basically, they lacked political clout and influence to resist and bargain with those wielding power.

The absorption of Ethiopian children into Israel’s educational system involved a white, modern, edu- cated, Western country absorbing non-white Africans with little formal education and human capital. In some ways the Israeli case differs from the experi- ence of African immigrants and refugees in other Western countries due to the common “Jewishness” of both the host and immigrant group. By the mid 1980s, Israel actively assisted the immigration of Ethiopian Jews and granted them full citizenship and considerable aid in housing, health care and social welfare. In other ways the Israeli case is not so different. Ethiopian children were placed in the

weaker schools within an inferior educational sys- tem. Many studied in segregated classes and schools with poorly trained teachers. Consequently, they were denied educational opportunities offered vet- eran Israeli and other non-Ethiopian immigrant chil- dren.

The experience of Ethiopians in Israeli absorp- tion system resembles that of many racial and eth- nic minorities in other countries. A crucial question is whether they will become more like involuntary or voluntary (immigrant) minorities? The immigrant sees “increased residential segregation and occupa- tional restrictions” as temporary obstacles that will change with his/her education and advancement. In contrast the involuntary minority develops an identity and culture to cope with denigration and subordination. They loose hope and lower their ex- pectations and accept their inferior status. Their marginality becomes stabilized.

Evidence cited here suggests the potential for Ethio- pian Jews in Israel becoming an involuntary marginalized minority. Some Israeli academics argue that they have already been marginalized. On the other hand, changes in educational policies after 1992 and the programs of the universities to accept and sup- port Ethiopian students may suggest that the situation will change and society will open up opportunities for the Ethiopians. As with marginalized minorities in Japan and the United States respectively, opportuni- ties may change their orientation.

Fred A. Lazin is the Lynn and Lloyd Hurst Family Professor of Local Government and a member of the Department of Politics and Government at Ben Gurion University. His most recent books are Poli- tics and Policy Implementation: Project Renewal in Israel, Israel in the Nineties and The Policy Imple- mentation Process in Developing Nations.