FIU American Government American Government and Politics Essay Write a short paper MLA style (4 pages) developing the impact and influence upon American go

FIU American Government American Government and Politics Essay Write a short paper MLA style (4 pages) developing the impact and influence upon American government and politics of ONE of the individuals listed below.

John Dickinson (do paper on this individual)

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Paper assignments must be 3-4 pages in length, typed and double spaced. They must follow the format shown in the sample pages on the course website link.

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-You should use a bare minimum of two sources in a paper for this course. Dig deeper though–you should be using more sources to learn more about your topic and differing interpretations for events.

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One could assume that failure of German offensives in 1914 occurred because of lack of
mobility on the battlefield against improved defensive weaponry. But the doctrine of the
offensive would gain more credence because improved tanks and the concerted use of airpower
tilted the scales one again by 1940 in favor of the aggressor —with devastating results for Poland
and France. Heinz Guderian thought the armored tank was the difference maker. German
Panzers would allow rapid breakthroughs against infantry and crush reserves—with speed being
of the essence before the enemy could effectively counterattack. The new strategic realities that
planes and tanks brought to the fore essentially created a resurrection of the Schlieffen Plan by
1940 (but in France with armor through the Ardennes rather than Belgium). The German goal
was an attack that scored a decisive victory—but with armor used at the decisive point (Keegan,
No matter which weapon is to be employed, uncertainty and the law of unintended
consequences will continue to permeate the battlefield, attenuating the applicability of military
strategy to real war. In turn, a wise commander could learn much by studying Clausewitz and the
concept of friction on the battlefield. It is unjust to blame Schlieffen for the failure of the 1914
plan that became associated with him. Being in the grave before the event, there is no way to tell
for sure how he would have accounted for friction. His plan did lack strategic options and it is
fair to be critical on that point. But the German High Command went forward with it in modified
form and should take much of the blame for its failure. As Obama ordered the operation against
Bin Laden’s in Pakistan to go forward and had to take credit or blame for the results, Moltke Jr.
faced responsibility for the Schlieffen Plan’s eventual failure or success. Ultimately as
Rothenberg shows, the High Command went forward with the August offensive as they felt no
better option was available. This limiting of options and lack of consideration for battlefield
friction would have made Clausewitz uncomfortable.
Clausewitz’s wrote on the importance of subordinating military objectives to civilian
authority. He felt that armed forces should be a tool of policy for the political leadership and be
accepting of their decisions. Schlieffen did follow Clausewitz on these points and stayed
generally out of politics. These suggestions remain instructive for us today. Ignoring Clausewitz
and having no real political check on their power, both Napoleon and then Hitler both pursued
the goals of absolute war, requiring total mobilization of their societies. The composite of their
decisions led to disastrous results. The subordination of politics to unchecked military control
has also provided fertile ground for bad strategic decisions. This is clearly seen in those men
ordering their armies to move deep into the Russian heartland in 1812 and 1941 respectively……

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