Colorado State University Boston Marathon Bombing Case Study paper see two attachments. One article from CSU Library also. Unit V Case Study Weight: 10% of

Colorado State University Boston Marathon Bombing Case Study paper see two attachments. One article from CSU Library also. Unit V Case Study
Weight: 10% of course grade
Grading Rubric
Due: Tuesday, 03/26/2019 11:59 PM (CST)
Instructions
Man-Made Disaster
This case study requires that select a man-made disaster that has occurred in the past decade. You
should research in the CSU Online Library for any peer-reviewed journal articles related to the disaster
and how the community recovered. You may also do an Internet search for articles or information
regarding how the aftereffects of the disaster were mitigated through a community-wide effort.
Disaster suggestions include, but are not limited to:
Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing, or
Boston Marathon bombing.
Your case study should address at least three of these four main points:
disaster summary,
NGOs that provided assistance,
public utilities recovery, and
community recovery from the emergency.
Your case study should be well-organized and at least two pages in length, not including the title and
reference pages. You are required to have at least two sources, one of which must be from the CSU
Online Library. Your textbook is NOT required for this assignment, although you may choose to use it
when discussing concepts that apply to the disaster. All sources used, including the textbook, must be
referenced; paraphrased and quoted materials must have accompanying citations in accordance with
APA standards.
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2016
Vol. 30, No. 3, 539–549, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1010487
BRIEF REPORT
Threat perception after the Boston Marathon
bombings: The effects of personal relevance and
conceptual framing
Jolie Baumann Wormwood1, Spencer K. Lynn1, Lisa Feldman Barrett1,2, and
Karen S. Quigley1,3
1
Department of Psychology, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA
Department of Psychiatry and the Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General
Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA
3
Edith Nourse Rogers Memorial VA Hospital, Bedford, MA, USA
2
(Received 18 August 2014; accepted 19 January 2015)
We examined how the Boston Marathon bombings affected threat perception in the Boston
community. In a threat perception task, participants attempted to “shoot” armed targets and avoid
shooting unarmed targets. Participants viewing images of the bombings accompanied by affectively
negative music and text (e.g., “Terror Strikes Boston”) made more false alarms (i.e., more errors
“shooting” unarmed targets) compared to participants viewing the same images accompanied by
affectively positive music and text (e.g., “Boston Strong”) and participants who did not view bombing
images. This difference appears to be driven by decreased sensitivity (i.e., decreased ability to
distinguish guns from non-guns) as opposed to a more liberal bias (i.e., favouring the “shoot”
response). Additionally, the more strongly affected the participant was by the bombings, the more
their sensitivity was reduced in the negatively framed condition, suggesting that this framing was
particularly detrimental to the most vulnerable individuals in the affected community.
Keywords: Threat perception; Threat accessibility; Framing; Terrorism; Signal detection theory.
On 15 April 2013, the 117th Boston Marathon was
brought to a violent end when two bombs exploded
near the finish line, killing three people and injuring
more than 250. A subsequent manhunt involved
further public bloodshed and a day-long city-wide
lockdown. Fed by media coverage, many residents
Correspondence should be addressed to: Jolie Wormwood, Department of Psychology NI-125, Northeastern University, 360
Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02115, USA. E-mail: jbwormwood@gmail.com
This material is published by permission of the US Army Research Institute, operated by Northeastern University for the Department
of the Army under Contract Nos. W5J9CQ-12-C-0028, W5J9CQ-12-C-0049. The US Government retains for itself, and others
acting on its behalf, a paid-up, non-exclusive, and irrevocable worldwide license in said article to reproduce, prepare derivative works,
distribute copies to the public, and perform publicly and display publicly, by or on behalf of the Government.
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WORMWOOD ET AL.
reported hypervigilance—perceiving ambiguous
objects, people and situations as threatening.
Consistent with this observation, previous research
has repeatedly demonstrated that as threat-relevant
cognitions become more accessible, people believe
they are more likely to encounter threats (Freedy,
Saladin, Kilpatrick, Resnick, & Saunders, 1994;
Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Lichtenstein, Slovic,
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1979; Slovic,
Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1980). As media coverage in Boston shifted to emphasise resilience and
community cohesion (e.g., “Boston Strong”), however, hypervigilance seemed to decrease. This
observation suggests a novel hypothesis: how a
threat is framed may influence subsequent threat
perception. We hypothesised that negatively framing a real-world threat by focusing on death and
destruction would have a more pronounced impact
on subsequent threat perception than positively
framing the same information by focusing on
people’s heroic responses.
To test this hypothesis, members of the Boston
community were exposed to positively or negatively
framed audiovisual vignettes about the Boston
Marathon bombings in the months following the
tragedy. We then measured threat perception using
an in-lab shooting task. If threat accessibility alone
influences threat perception, we would expect more
false alarms (i.e., more errors mistakenly “shooting”
unarmed suspects) in both framing conditions
relative to a control condition in which no threatrelevant information was presented. If framing
matters, we would expect participants exposed to
negatively framed bombing information to make
more false alarms compared to participants exposed
to positively framed bombing information.
In addition, to help fill an important gap in the
existing literature, we utilised signal detection theory
to distinguish between two potential causal explanations for differences in false alarm rates. That is, we
examined whether any observed differences in false
alarm rates were driven by differences in biased
responding (i.e., favouring the “shoot” response over
the “don’t shoot” response) or decreased sensitivity
(i.e., decreased ability to distinguish threats from
non-threats). Understanding which underlying
mechanism is driving observed differences in false
540
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2016
alarm rates is crucial for developing successful
interventions aimed at reducing false alarm rates
following threats and, at a more basic level, understanding the observed phenomenon.
METHODS
We report how we determined our sample size, all
data exclusions, all manipulations and all measures
in the study.
Participants
Eighty-one participants completed the experiment for $10 within two to four months of the
Boston Marathon bombings. Participants were
recruited from Northeastern University and the
surrounding Boston community through fliers
and Craigslist.com advertisements. Target sample
size was based on previous experiments utilising a
similar threat detection task (e.g., Baumann &
DeSteno, 2010). Potential participants completed
the 8-item Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ8; Kroenke et al., 2008) and those without
significant depressive symptomology ( .05. However, post hoc tests suggested that
participants in the control condition felt marginally
more positive affect (M = 2.33, SD = 1.00) than
participants in both the positively framed bombing
condition (M = 1.92, SD = .67) and participants in
the negatively framed bombing condition (M =
1.88, SD = .78), ps < .10. The two bombing conditions did not differ significantly in reported positive or negative affect (ps > .05). A third oneway ANOVA failed to reveal differences in selfreported arousal (item: activated) across conditions,
542
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2016
F < 1. Thus, participants viewing images of the bombings felt similarly negative, regardless of the framing. We also conducted a one-way ANOVA to examine differences in self-reported fear (mean of three items: frightened, afraid and scared; ? = .79) across conditions. As expected, the experience of fear differed significantly by condition, F(2, 70) = 5.13, p < .05. Consistent with the other mood results, this effect was driven by differences between the control condition and the two bombing conditions only. Participants in the control condition reported experiencing significantly less fear (M = 1.22, SD = 0.39) than participants in both the positively framed bombing condition (M = 1.75, SD = .79) and participants in the negatively framed bombing condition (M = 1.88, SD = .97), ps < .05. Participants in the two bombing conditions did not report experiencing different amounts of fear (p > .05) despite receiving the different
framings.
Threat perception performance by condition
We first explored whether viewing images of the
bombings would produce increased estimations of
threat, as well as whether framing would moderate
this effect, by examining participants’ false alarm
rates in the threat perception task (i.e., the proportion of trials with an unarmed target on which a
participant mistakenly decided to “shoot”). As
predicted, framing condition had a significant
effect on false alarm rates, F(2, 70) = 3.26, p < .05 (Figure 1). Post hoc comparisons revealed that participants in the negatively framed bombing condition had a significantly higher false alarm rate (M = .30, SD = .16) than participants in both the positively framed bombing condition (M = .21, SD = .12) and the control condition (M = .23, SD = .11), ps ? 05. Despite viewing images of the bombings, participants in the positively framed bombing condition did not have a higher false alarm rate than participants in the control condition, p > .05.
Next, we utilised signal detection theory to
explore two potential causal explanations for
the observed differences in false alarm rates
THREAT PERCEPTION
participants’ sensitivity, F(2, 70) = 2.87, p = .06.
Post hoc comparisons revealed that participants in
the negatively framed bombing condition had
significantly lower sensitivity (M = .25, SD =
.36), indicating that they were less able to distinguish guns from non-guns, compared to participants in the positively framed bombing condition
(M = .52, SD = .41, p < .05). Sensitivity in the control condition (M = .41, SD = .43) was intermediate and did not differ significantly from sensitivity in either of the two bombing conditions (ps > .05).
Considering personal relevance as a covariate
Figure 1. Mean (±1 SE) false alarm rate by condition.
(Macmillan & Creelman, 1991; Wickens, 2002).
In signal detection theory, an increased false alarm
rate can result from either a bias in responding (i.e.,
a tendency to respond as if a target is holding a gun
vs. a non-threatening object regardless of the
stimulus shown) or a decrease in sensitivity (i.e., a
reduced ability to distinguish whether a person is
holding a gun vs. a non-threatening object).Thus,
for each individual participant, we calculated estimates of both bias (c) and sensitivity (d?). Bias was
calculated as c = –0.5(zH + zF), where zH and zF
represent the inverse of the standard normal
cumulative distribution for the hit rate and false
alarm rate, respectively. Sensitivity was calculated as
d? = zH – zF.
Bias
Across all participants, bias was significantly
greater than zero (M = .56, SD = .41), t(72) =
11.71, p < .05, indicating that participants had a significantly conservative bias (i.e., they favoured the “don’t shoot” response). A one-way ANOVA revealed that framing condition did not have a significant effect on response bias, F(2, 70) = 1.33, p > .05.
Sensitivity
A one-way ANOVA revealed that framing condition had a marginally significant effect on
We then examined whether the extent to which
participants reported being affected by the bombings (from the Marathon Recall Survey) predicted
bias and sensitivity using multivariate regression.
Multivariate regression was utilised to explore
covariance instead of an ANCOVA as the data
violated the assumption of homogeneity of slopes.
Regression equations were of the general form:
y ¼ b0 þ b1 D1 þ b2 D2 þ b3 BMa
þ b4 ðD1 BMa Þ þ b5 ðD2 BMa Þ
where framing condition was dummy coded (variables D1 and D2), and the variable BMa represents how affected participants reported being by
the bombings on the Marathon Recall Survey.
Bias
The regression model with bias as the outcome
variable was not significant (R2 = .10, F(5, 67) =
1.50, p > .05) suggesting that how affected
participants were by the bombings did not predict
bias and did not interact with experimental
condition to predict bias.
Sensitivity
The regression model with sensitivity as the
outcome variable was significant (R2 = .19,
F(5, 67) = 3.09, p < .05). The model revealed a significant interaction; the relationship between how affected participants were by the bombings and sensitivity significantly differed by framing COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2016 543 WORMWOOD ET AL. were by the bombings, participants in the negatively framed bo... Purchase answer to see full attachment