Client Memo Assignment | Online Assignment

I uploaded the assignment and templet No ouI uploaded the assignment and templet No outside sourcestside sources

Assignment

Create a Client memo for these cases using. Your memo should begin with a “Questions Presented” section, followed by a “Discussion” section in which you apply IRAC analysis to each element. At the end of your memo, briefly summarize your findings (no more than a paragraph) in a section titled “Overall Conclusion.” Apply  IRAC analysis to each element   DON’T PUT THE ELEMENTS TOGETHER

Precedent cases for element #1: that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff 

 

Alex v. Samantha

Early one April 1st, Alex was leaving his house for work when Samantha, his next-door neighbor, asked him to help her with a leak in her kitchen ceiling. Alex admits he was uneasy about and slightly suspicious of the request, since he had dated Samantha briefly until he decided they were a bad match. “She was a little too off-the-wall jokester for me,” Alex concluded. Since the breakup, the two neighbors rarely spoke other than the occasional hi and bye.

Once in her kitchen, Samantha aimed a gun at her head and threatened to commit suicide if Alex told her “that it’s really over… swear you no longer love me… but don’t worry, no matter what you say, I would never hurt you – I just want the truth.” Alex states “I couldn’t just turn and walk away. She might’ve killed herself.” Samantha says that she did not intend to confine Alex because he came into her house willingly, that she held the gun to her own head not his, and that she explicitly told him his safety was never in danger. “Besides,” Samantha stated in court, “Alex knows I’m a crazy jokester. It was just an April Fools’ prank.”

In this jurisdiction, “the test as to ‘intent to confine’ is whether defendant’s overt act or communication is such as to make a reasonable person in defendant’s position believe that plaintiff’s free and unencumbered exit from the premises is not a matter in sole control of the plaintiff but dependent on defendant’s allowance or acquiescence.” When applying this rule to the present case, Samantha committed an overt act when she held the gun to her own head in front of Alex. While defendant claims plaintiff entered her home willingly, this does not preclude a change in circumstances once plaintiff was inside the place of confinement. Defendant’s placing the gun to her own head rather than pointing it at the plaintiff must be viewed within the context of the situation. While it can be argued that this act alone would imprison the bystander by making hostage his sense of human decency and instinct to save a fellow human in their moment of distress, there are additional facts available here as well. The condition of life or death was whether plaintiff still loved the defendant, a topic that too often sparks extreme outbursts and ill-fated choices to be dismissed as a “joke;” therefore, walking out under such circumstances presented an impossible moral option. While plaintiff may have entered the house voluntarily, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would recognize that her demands, delivered at gun-point, created a situation in which a free and unencumbered exit from the premises was dependent on defendant’s allowance or acquiescence. Held for plaintiff.

 

 

Precedent cases for element #2: the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement

 

Zimmer v. Wilson (2008)

Appellant Darren Zimmer performed overnight security for the law offices of Goldblatt & Goffman when the appellee and recently-fired employee, George Wilson, used his still-active employee pass and entered into the premises. Unbeknownst to a napping Zimmer, Wilson propped a chair up against the door to Zimmer’s control room, preventing Zimmer from responding if alarms were activated. Wilson proceeded to burglarize the offices without setting off any alarms, then, before leaving the building, he removed the obstructing chair from Zimmer’s door, who slept through the entire incident. Zimmer sued Wilson for false imprisonment and the trial court awarded Zimmer $50,000. We reverse.

To support a finding of false imprisonment, plaintiff must show he was  conscious of the confinement. If Zimmer had woken and attempted to leave, he would have become conscious of his confinement. Alternatively, by trying to open the door, the barricade may have failed and plaintiff would become aware that he was not confined, despite the defendant’s attempt to confine. That is not to say that an affirmative attempt to leave is required in order for plaintiff to become conscious of confinement. A prisoner of war, detained in isolation in an unlocked hut and told by his army captors that the land surrounding the detention area is littered with land-mines is justified in believing he is confined despite subsequent evidence that the land-mines information wasn’t true (see Yogara v. U.S. Army).

Here, the plaintiff’s consciousness of confinement only occurred after the potential hindrance to exit was removed — Zimmer did not know he was unlawfully confined until seeing surveillance footage several hours later. The consciousness of confinement must occur during the incident in question. Dismissed.

IRAC is an acronym.

I = Issue

R = Rule of Law

A = Application of Rule to Facts

C = Conclusion

 

What does this mean? Basically, IRAC is a structure you apply to answer each and every legal issue

in a hypothetical. Let’s make this simple to begin — we’ll imagine a hypothetical with only one

issue (and we’ll make the legal issue familiar).

 

EXAMPLE TEMPLET OF CLIENT MEMO

CLIENT MEMO: Rosey Lee v. Frank “Old” MacDonald

 

Questions Presented

1. Is there an enforceable contract between Rosey Lee and Frank MacDonald?
2. Can the contract be legally breached according to the rule of false misrepresentation in

Blackson v. Johnson?

1. Did Frank MacDonald have ulterior intentions in order to falsely misrepresent Rosey

Lee?

1. Did Frank MacDonald have this ulterior intention while knowing Rosey Lee would

reasonably rely on the intention in order to execute the contract?

iii. Did Rosey Lee suffer suf]icient damages due to relying on such false

misrepresentations?

1. Is there an enforceable contract according to Drew v. Sorrentino?
2. Can the contract be legally breached according to rule of fair impracticability in Drew
3. Sorrentino?

 

 

Discussion

I.A. The rule for an enforceable contract requires promissory estoppel in which “a promise

which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of

the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding

if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise” (Blackson) In Blackson v.

Johnson, the plaintiff promised to drop out of the governor’s race in exchange for the

Governor’s daughter hand in marriage. Both Blackson and Johnson’s state of mind were not

as clear, due to the fact that they were both inebriated. Furthermore, the promise is less

reasonably expected to induce action because an election can be easily swayed by voters

and it cannot be guaranteed that the governor would win the election because of other

outside factors. In addition, this promise is less reasonable to induce action because love

can’t be forced in general and there was a small chance that Marianne Johnson would agree

to marry Blackson considering that she was not attracted to Blackson at all. However, the

defendant MacDonald was in a clear state of mind when he made his promise with Rosey

Lee, whom he emotionally manipulated into the contract while knowing she was recently

widowed and was left nothing by her husband Bill MacDonald. It is reasonable for Lee to

assume MacDonald would provide a living space for her and her seven kids because he was

in a clear state of mind when he made the promise to her.

 

I.A.i. The precedent in our jurisdiction holds false misrepresentations as a defense to

breach of contract according to the rule: “the party accusing false misrepresentation must

be able to show what ulterior intentions the accused party had in order to falsely

misrepresent the plaintiff” (Blackson). The precedent case, Blackson v. Johnson stated in its

ruling that there was not suf]icient evidence to show that Johnson had ulterior intentions

that would cause him to intentionally mislead Blackson in order to gain from the political

race that the Governor was already winning. However, on the other hand, Frank MacDonald

did have ulterior intentions in order to falsely misrepresent Rosey Lee. MacDonald

admitted to his psychologist that he did have feelings for Rosey and only decided to consult

a psychologist after he had been feeling “blue” for quite awhile because of his feelings for

Rosey. He clearly stated that he wanted to make Rosey his own. Frank MacDonald was

aware of our client’s vulnerable state in which she had just lost her husband, had seven kids

to raise, and no wealth to her name. He offered her a place to live on his property, even

though the plaintiff already had won a New York City apartment through a housing lottery.

“Old” MacDonald further exploited her vulnerabilities by explaining that New York was a

“dirty city” and it wasn’t a place to raise her kids. He further suggested she continue her

botanist business on his land in order to tempt her into living with him. If MacDonald was

truly worried about the way her kids were being raised in a “dirty city,” then he never

would have kicked them out so quickly while knowing their mother didn’t have a place to

live. This type of behavior indicates that the defendant simply lured the plaintiff to live with

him because he had feelings for her.

 

I.A.ii. The next element for false misrepresentation requires that the plaintiff “must show

that the defendant had these ulterior intentions while knowing the plaintiff would

reasonably rely on that intention in order to execute the contract” (Blackson). In Blackson v.

Johnson, Blackson reasonably relied solely on the Governor to persuade his daughter,

Marianne, into marrying him. He was aware of how much sway Johnson had over his

daughter’s choices and believed it would be the “push” to get them together. Similarly in

Rosey Lee’s situation, she solely relied on MacDonald to provide her with housing in order

to both start her botanical business and to raise her kids in a safer environment, especially

because her in-law pushed for it as well. It was even more reasonable for the plaintiff in our

case to reasonably rely on her brother-in-law, who is her own actual family, to allow her to

raise all seven kids until they are adults on his property. MacDonald was aware of our

client’s circumstances and her living arrangements. He knew that his brother Bill had left

her with nothing since his entire business was a ponzi scheme. This is in contrast to

Blackson and Johnson, whose relationship was largely a business relationship and so much

less intimate than Lee and the defendant. It would seem much more reasonable for a

person to rely on their close family members to provide them with shelter.

I.A.iii. The next element requires the plaintiff to have suffered substantial damage as a

direct result of the false misrepresentation. In the precedent case, the plaintiff lost a major

political position as a result of agreeing to the contract with the defendant. In exchange for

 

backing out of the governor’s race, the defendant promised the plaintiff that he would give

him his daughter’s hand in marriage. In my client’s situation, she has suffered substantially

more than the plaintiff of the precedent case. Rosey Lee ]irst lost a New York apartment

which she could have kept and eventually owned, buy which she relinquished due to

MacDonald’s offer. Our client continued to suffer more losses after Old MacDonald suddenly

kicked her off his property. Furthermore, while the precedent case deals with a lost political

opportunity, Rosey’s loss included her livelihood: her ]lourishing rose-farming business

that she started on the defendant’s property. Lee was able to cultivate the land and start her

business all by herself which grew rapidly in only two years. Rosey Lee was left with no

home to raise her kids and was stripped of her means of living after her brother-in-law

kicked her off the property on such short notice.

 

1. B. According to Drew v. Sorrentino, promissory estoppel requires “a promise which the

promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the

promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if

injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise” (Drew) When Mike

Sorrentino made a promise to allow his sister-in-law to live with him, he had been under

the in]luence of Remedil which is known for its strong ability to make people fall asleep

quickly. Later on, after Mike Sorrentino discovers that he has a severe allergic reaction to

Drew’s cats, he makes her aware of the allergy situation and gave her some time to live with

him until she was able to ]ind a new place since she refused to relocate her cats. In Rosey

Lee’s situation, MacDonald suddenly kicked her and her 7 kids out soon after the assault

occurred even though he had promised to raise her kids in a safer area than NYC.

MacDonald was in a clear state of mind when he made his promise to Rosey Lee, unlike,

Sorrentino who was heavily drugged when he made his promise to Drew due to the

Remedil pill. Furthermore, our client was not made aware of the defendant’s mental state;

however, Nancy Drew was fully made aware of Sorrentino’s condition. It is much more

reasonable for Rosey Lee to assume the promise to be ful]illed.

I.B.i. The state’s precedent case, Drew v. Sorrentino, states a contract can be breached based

on a “if the contract results in an unreasonable situation in which the parties did not

directly cause or could not have reasonably anticipated a situation from occurring that

would end up inevitably preventing the contract from being performed. If it becomes

impractical for both parties to continue the execution of this contract, then it can be

breached” (Drew). In the precedent case, Nancy Drew and Mike Sorrentino could not have

reasonably anticipated that Sorrentino would be allergic to the defendant’s two cats. Since

Sorrentino refused to take medication and Drew refused to relocate her cats, the contract

was not being executed because neither had a comfortable living situation in which both

parties suffered. Due to this, it would be reasonably legal to breach a contract when both

parties are unable to bene]it or execute it. Our client, Rosey Lee, however could not have

reasonably anticipated that Frank MacDonald would have feelings for her and would kick

her off the property because of the attempted assault. It is much more reasonable to

anticipate having a cat allergy than ]iguring out whether or not a person has feelings for

someone else. Lee was completely unaware of MacDonald’s feelings towards her and it is

reasonable for her to not anticipate his ardor because he was her brother-in-law and so