APUS Reforms Movement during the Progressive Era Paper Question 1: While most women workers continued to be employed in the jobs that had a predominantly f

APUS Reforms Movement during the Progressive Era Paper Question 1: While most women workers continued to be employed in the jobs that had a predominantly female labor force, some areas of paid work expanded and others openedup for women after the Civil War. How did these developments connect to the rise of reform movements during this era? 300 word minimum Chicago style format Strategic International Marketing: LRMS1-UC 927
Fall 2019
Written Case Assignment 1
“Starbucks-Going Global Fast,” (Posted in Resources-NYU Classes)
Elements of the Case Assignment
Read the case listed above and use the following as guides for preparation and
submission, using the comprehensive case method introduced in this course:
— Identify the marketing problems and challenges Starbucks has faced in its global
expansion over the years, especially in the late 2000s, as presented in this case.
Find information? how do u collect marketing?we call marketing research?
Company/ORG problems and challenges face?SWOT?not request but swot
will help?
— Do a search on Starbucks and determine if the company faces the same marketing
problems and challenges within the past three years focus on last three years (2016-2019)
as it did a decade or so earlier. If it does, identify them here briefly. Select your own
Starbucks-relevant key words to help you search and identify the company’s current
problems/challenges.
— Are there other areas of information you would like to introduce into this case to help
your analysis? If so, show them here.
— What recommendation(s) would you make to Starbucks, given what you know about
the company from this case, new information you may have introduced above as well as
any experience you may have had with Starbucks.
Submission Requirements
•
The format of presentation you choose should reflect the above guides as well as
the framework consistent with the case method. You should attempt to use section
headings in the format of a project paper.
•
The case should be written in no more than 7 pages (including references), with
1.5 line spacing and 12 font letter size in Word. (A pdf is optional as a second
copy).
•
Submit a copy of the assignment in Messages-NYU Classes to the instructor only
•
Due date of submission IN Messages: October 3, 2019 (Week 5)
If you have any question, please contact me at: kafriyie@nyu.edu.
A Free style prose
B structure Witten
Es
Section1 A
Section2 B
Section3 C
Summary?conclusion
CASE 1-1 Starbucks—Going Global Fast
The Starbucks coffee shop on Sixth Avenue and Pine Street in
downtown Seattle sits serene and orderly, as unremarkable as
any other in the chain bought years ago by entrepreneur Howard
Schultz. A few years ago, however, the quiet storefront made front
pages around the world. During the World Trade Organization
talks in November 1999, protesters flooded Seattle’s streets, and
among their targets was Starbucks, a symbol, to them, of free-market capitalism run amok, another multinational out to blanket the
earth. Amid the crowds of protesters and riot police were blackmasked anarchists who trashed the store, leaving its windows
smashed and its tasteful green-and-white decor smelling of tear
gas instead of espresso. Says an angry Schultz: “It’s hurtful. I think
people are ill-informed. It’s very difficult to protest against a can of
Coke, a bottle of Pepsi, or a can of Folgers. Starbucks is both this
ubiquitous brand and a place where you can go and break a window. You can’t break a can of Coke.”
The store was quickly repaired, and the protesters scattered
to other cities. Yet cup by cup, Starbucks really is caffeinating the
world, its green-and-white emblem beckoning to consumers on
three continents. In 1999, Starbucks Corp. had 281 stores abroad.
Today, it has about 7,000—and it’s still in the early stages of a plan to
colonize the globe. If the protesters were wrong in their tactics, they
weren’t wrong about Starbucks’ ambitions. They were just early.
The story of how Schultz & Co. transformed a pedestrian commodity into an upscale consumer accessory has a fairy-tale quality.
Starbucks grew from 17 coffee shops in Seattle 15 years ago to over
19,000 outlets in 58 countries. Sales have climbed an average of 20
percent annually since the company went public, peaking at $10.4
billion in 2008 before falling to $9.8 billion in 2009. Profits bounded
ahead an average of 30 percent per year through 2007 peaking at
$673, then dropping to $582 billion and $494 billion in 2008 and
2009, respectively. The firm closed 475 stores in the U.S. in 2009 to
reduce costs. But more recently, sales revenues rebounded to $11.2
billion in 2011, and profits reached a record $1.2 billion.
Still, the Starbucks name and image connect with millions of
consumers around the globe. Up until recently, it was one of the
fastest-growing brands in annual BusinessWeek surveys of the top
100 global brands. On Wall Street, Starbucks was one of the last
great growth stories. Its stock, including four splits, soared more
than 2,200 percent over a decade, surpassing Walmart, General
Electric, PepsiCo, Coca-Cola, Microsoft, and IBM in total returns.
In 2006 the stock price peaked at over $40, after which it fell to just
$4, and then again rebounded to more than $50 per share.
Schultz’s team is hard-pressed to grind out new profits in a
home market that is quickly becoming saturated. The firm’s
12,000 locations in the United States are mostly in big cities,
affluent suburbs, and shopping malls. In coffee-crazed Seattle,
there is a Starbucks outlet for every 9,400 people, and the company considers that the upper limit of coffee-shop saturation. In
Manhattan’s 24 square miles, Starbucks has 124 cafés, with more
on the way. That’s one for every 12,000 people—meaning that
there could be room for even more stores. Given such concentration, it is likely to take annual same-store sales increases of
10 percent or more if the company is going to match its historic
cat29974_case1_01-016.indd 2
overall sales growth. That, as they might say at Starbucks, is a tall
order to fill.
Indeed, the crowding of so many stores so close together has
become a national joke, eliciting quips such as this headline in The
Onion, a satirical publication: “A New Starbucks Opens in Restroom
of Existing Starbucks.” And even the company admits that while
its practice of blanketing an area with stores helps achieve market
dominance, it can cut sales at existing outlets. “We probably selfcannibalize our stores at a rate of 30 percent a year,” Schultz says.
Adds Lehman Brothers Inc. analyst Mitchell Speiser: “Starbucks is
at a defining point in its growth. It’s reaching a level that makes it
harder and harder to grow, just due to the law of large numbers.”
To duplicate the staggering returns of its first decades, Starbucks
has no choice but to export its concept aggressively. Indeed, some
analysts gave Starbucks only two years at most before it saturates
the U.S. market. The chain now operates more than 7,000 international outlets, from Beijing to Bristol. That leaves plenty of room
to grow. Most of its planned new stores will be built overseas, representing a 35 percent increase in its foreign base. Most recently,
the chain has opened stores in Vienna, Zurich, Madrid, Berlin, and
even in far-off Jakarta. Athens comes next. And within the next
year, Starbucks plans to move into Mexico and Puerto Rico. But
global expansion poses huge risks for Starbucks. For one thing, it
makes less money on each overseas store because most of them are
operated with local partners. While that makes it easier to start up
on foreign turf, it reduces the company’s share of the profits to only
20 percent to 50 percent.
Moreover, Starbucks must cope with some predictable challenges of becoming a mature company in the United States. After
riding the wave of successful baby boomers through the 1990s, the
company faces an ominously hostile reception from its future consumers, the twenty- or thirty-somethings. Not only are the activists
among them turned off by the power and image of the well-known
brand, but many others say that Starbucks’ latte-sipping sophisticates and piped-in Kenny G music are a real turnoff. They don’t
feel wanted in a place that sells designer coffee at $3 a cup.
Even the thirst of loyalists for high-price coffee cannot be
taken for granted. Starbucks’ growth over the early part of the past
decade coincided with a remarkable surge in the economy. Consumer spending tanked in the downturn, and those $3 lattes were
an easy place for people on a budget to cut back.
To be sure, Starbucks has a lot going for it as it confronts the challenge of regaining its fast and steady growth. Nearly free of debt, it
fuels expansion with internal cash flow. And Starbucks can maintain
a tight grip on its image because most stores are company-owned:
There are no franchisees to get sloppy about running things. By relying on mystique and word of mouth, whether here or overseas,
the company saves a bundle on marketing costs. Starbucks spends
just $30 million annually on advertising, or roughly 1 percent of revenues, usually just for new flavors of coffee drinks in the summer
and product launches, such as its new in-store web service. Most
consumer companies its size shell out upwards of $300 million per
year. Moreover, Starbucks for the first time faces competition from
large U.S. competitors such as McDonald’s and its new McCafés.
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Cases 1
An Overview
Schultz remains the heart and soul of the operation. Raised in
a Brooklyn public-housing project, he found his way to Starbucks,
a tiny chain of Seattle coffee shops, as a marketing executive in
the early 1980s. The name came about when the original owners
looked to Seattle history for inspiration and chose the moniker of
an old mining camp: Starbo. Further refinement led to Starbucks,
after the first mate in Moby Dick, which they felt evoked the seafaring romance of the early coffee traders (hence the mermaid logo).
Schultz got the idea for the modern Starbucks format while visiting
a Milan coffee bar. He bought out his bosses in 1987 and began
expanding.
The company is still capable of designing and opening a store
in 16 weeks or less and recouping the initial investment in three
years. The stores may be oases of tranquility, but management’s
expansion tactics are something else. Take what critics call its
“predatory real estate” strategy—paying more than marketrate rents to keep competitors out of a location. David C.
Schomer, owner of Espresso Vivace in Seattle’s hip Capitol Hill
neighborhood, says Starbucks approached his landlord and
offered to pay nearly double the rate to put a coffee shop in the
same building. The landlord stuck with Schomer, who says: “It’s a
little disconcerting to know that someone is willing to pay twice
the going rate.” Another time, Starbucks and Tully’s Coffee Corp.,
a Seattle-based coffee chain, were competing for a space in the
city. Starbucks got the lease but vacated the premises before the
term was up. Still, rather than let Tully’s get the space, Starbucks
decided to pay the rent on the empty store so its competitor could
not move in. Schultz makes no apologies for the hardball tactics.
“The real estate business in America is a very, very tough game,”
he says. “It’s not for the faint of heart.”
Still, the company’s strategy could backfire. Not only will neighborhood activists and local businesses increasingly resent the tactics, but customers could also grow annoyed over having fewer
choices. Moreover, analysts contend that Starbucks can maintain
about 15 percent square-footage growth in the United States—
equivalent to 550 new stores—for only about two more years. After
that, it will have to depend on overseas growth to maintain an annual 20 percent revenue growth.
Starbucks was hoping to make up much of that growth with
more sales of food and other noncoffee items but stumbled
somewhat. In the late 1990s, Schultz thought that offering $8 sandwiches, desserts, and CDs in his stores and selling packaged coffee in supermarkets would significantly boost sales. The specialty
business now accounts for about 16 percent of sales, but growth
has been less than expected.
What’s more important for the bottom line, though, is that Starbucks has proven to be highly innovative in the way it sells its main
course: coffee. In 800 locations it has installed automatic espresso
machines to speed up service. And several years ago, it began offering prepaid Starbucks cards, priced from $5 to $500, which clerks
swipe through a reader to deduct a sale. That, says the company,
cuts transaction times in half. Starbucks has sold $70 million of the
cards.
When Starbucks launched Starbucks Express, its boldest experiment yet, it blended java, web technology, and faster service.
At about 60 stores in the Denver area, customers could pre-order
and prepay for beverages and pastries via phone or on the Starbucks
Express website. They just made the call or clicked the mouse before
arriving at the store, and their beverage would be waiting—with
their name printed on the cup. The company decided in 2003 that
the innovation had not succeeded and eliminated the service.
cat29974_case1_01-016.indd 3
And Starbucks continues to try other fundamental store
changes. It announced expansion of a high-speed wireless Internet service to about 1,200 Starbucks locations in North America
and Europe. Partners in the project—which Starbucks calls the
world’s largest Wi-Fi network—include Mobile International, a
wireless subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom, and Hewlett-Packard.
Customers sit in a store and check e-mail, surf the web, or download multimedia presentations without looking for connections
or tripping over cords. They start with 24 hours of free wireless
broadband before choosing from a variety of monthly subscription plans.
Starbucks executives hope such innovations will help surmount
their toughest challenge in the home market: attracting the next
generation of customers. Younger coffee drinkers already feel uncomfortable in the stores. The company knows that because it once
had a group of twenty-somethings hypnotized for a market study.
When their defenses were down, out came the bad news. “They
either can’t afford to buy coffee at Starbucks, or the only peers they
see are those working behind the counter,” says Mark Barden, who
conducted the research for the Hal Riney & Partners ad agency
(now part of Publicis Worldwide) in San Francisco. One of the recurring themes the hypnosis brought out was a sense that “people
like me aren’t welcome here except to serve the yuppies,” he says.
Then there are those who just find the whole Starbucks scene a bit
pretentious. Katie Kelleher, 22, a Chicago paralegal, is put off by
Starbucks’ Italian terminology of grande and venti for coffee sizes.
She goes to Dunkin’ Donuts, saying: “Small, medium, and large is
fine for me.”
As it expands, Starbucks faces another big risk: that of becoming
a far less special place for its employees. For a company modeled
around enthusiastic service, that could have dire consequences for
both image and sales. During its growth spurt of the mid- to late1990s, Starbucks had the lowest employee turnover rate of any restaurant or fast-food company, largely thanks to its then unheard-of
policy of giving health insurance and modest stock options to parttimers making barely more than minimum wage.
Such perks are no longer enough to keep all the workers happy.
Starbucks’ pay doesn’t come close to matching the workload it
requires, complain some staff. Says Carrie Shay, a former store
manager in West Hollywood, California: “If I were making a decent living, I’d still be there.” Shay, one of the plaintiffs in the suit
against the company, says she earned $32,000 a year to run a store
with 10 to 15 part-time employees. She hired employees, managed
their schedules, and monitored the store’s weekly profit-and-loss
statement. But she was also expected to put in significant time behind the counter and had to sign an affidavit pledging to work up
to 20 hours of overtime a week without extra pay—a requirement
the company has dropped since the settlement.
For sure, employee discontent is far from the image Starbucks
wants to project of relaxed workers cheerfully making cappuccinos. But perhaps it is inevitable. The business model calls for lots of
low-wage workers. And the more people who are hired as Starbucks
expands, the less they are apt to feel connected to the original mission of high service—bantering with customers and treating them
like family. Robert J. Thompson, a professor of popular culture at
Syracuse University, says of Starbucks: “It’s turning out to be one of
the great 21st century American success stories—complete with all
the ambiguities.”
Overseas, though, the whole Starbucks package seems new and,
to many young people, still very cool. In Vienna, where Starbucks
had a gala opening for its first Austrian store, Helmut Spudich, a
12/10/12 12:02 PM
Part 6
Supplementary Material
business editor for the paper Der Standard, predicted that Starbucks would attract a younger crowd than the established cafés.
“The coffeehouses in Vienna are nice, but they are old. Starbucks is
considered hip,” he says.
But if Starbucks can count on its youth appeal to win a welcome
in new markets, such enthusiasm cannot be counted on indefinitely. In Japan, the company beat even its own bullish expectations, growing to over 900 stores after opening its first in Tokyo in
1996. Affluent young Japanese women like Anna Kato, a 22-yearold Toyota Motor Corp. worker, loved the place. “I don’t care if it
costs more, as long as it tastes sweet,” she says, sitting in the world’s
busiest Starbucks, in Tokyo’s Shibuya district. Yet same-store sales
growth has fallen in Japan, Starbucks’ top foreign market, as rivals
offer similar fare. Meanwhile in England, Starbucks’ second-biggest overseas market, with over 400 stores, imitators are popping
up left and right to steal market share.
Entering other big markets may be tougher yet. The French
seem to be ready for Starbucks’ sweeter taste, says Philippe Bloch,
cofounder of Columbus Cafe, a Starbucks-like chain. But he wonders if the company can profitably cope with France’s arcane regulations and generous labor benefits. And in Italy, the epicenter of
European coffee culture, the notion that the locals will abandon
their own 200,000 coffee bars en masse for Starbucks strikes many
as ludicrous. For one, Italian coffee bars prosper by serving food
as well as coffee, an area where Starbucks still struggles. Also, Italian coffee is cheaper than U.S. java and, say Italian purists, much
better. Americans pay about $1.50 for an espresso. In northern
Italy, the price is 67 cents; in the south, just 55 cents. Schultz insists that Starbucks will eventually come to Italy. It’ll have a lot to
prove when it does. Carlo Petrini, founder of the antiglobalization
movement Slow Food, sniffs that Starbucks’ “substances served
in styrofoam” won’t cut it. The cups are paper, of course. But the
skepticism is real.
As Starbucks spreads out, Schultz will have to be increasingly
sensitive to those cultural challenges. For instance, he flew to Israel
several years ago to meet with then Foreign Secretary Shimon Peres
and other Israeli officials to discuss the Middle East crisis. He won’t
divulge the nature of his discussions. But subsequently, at a Seattle
synagogue, Schultz let the Palestinians have it. With Starbucks outlets already in Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia,
he created a mild uproar among Palestinian supporters. Schultz
quickly backpedaled, saying that his words were taken out of context and asserting that he is “pro-peace” for both sides.
There are plenty more minefields ahead. So far, the Seattle coffee company has compiled an envious record of growth. But the
giddy buzz of that initial expansion is wearing off. Now, Starbucks
is waking up to the grande challenges faced by any corporation
bent on becoming a global powerhouse.
In a 2005 bid to boost sales in its largest intern…
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