ADM 624 Grand Canyon University Intergovernmental relations in America Discussion After reading the article “‘Big Questions About Intergovernmental Relatio

ADM 624 Grand Canyon University Intergovernmental relations in America Discussion After reading the article “‘Big Questions About Intergovernmental Relations and Management: Who Will Address Them?” by Kincaid and Stenberg, choose two of the questions from the article that intrigued you the most. Then in 750-1,000 words, do the following:

Explain whether the questions still need answering or if they have been addressed by government since the article was published.
If they have been answered, explain why and how. If they have not been answered, explain what government can do to start finding answers to them.
Describe the importance of the questions as they relate specifically to state and local governments.

Use three to five scholarly resources to support your explanations.

Below is the Big Question About Intergovernmental Relations and Management John Kincaid
Lafayette College
Carl W. Stenberg
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Intergovernmental
Management
Symposium
“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations
and Management: Who Will Address Them?
Fiscal, administrative, and political tensions among the
partners in the federal system have not eased, and perhaps
have grown, since the demise of the U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996.
Yet no governmental organizational capacity exists to
address big intergovernmental questions in an ongoing
manner through nonpartisan or bipartisan research, data
collection, deliberation, and policy formulation.
S
ince the death of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in
1996, important intergovernmental issues have
remained on the country’s agenda. Shortly after the
2008 presidential election, for example, the Federal
Systems Panel (2008) of the National Academy of
Public Administration delivered an “Intergovernmental Agenda” to the incoming administration asserting
a need to “restructure intergovernmental management
across the federal system” on the basis of “collaboration rather than command and control.” The agenda
cited such policy challenges as health care access
(e.g., Medicaid) and cost reductions, housing, natural
disasters, terrorism, energy consumption, unemployment, and infrastructure. The agenda disappeared in
the bowels of the White House.
Yet continuing intergovernmental process issues
deserve attention. These include, among others, fiscal
pressures on all governments; declining federal aid
for such place-based functions as infrastructure and
economic development; escalating social welfare costs
for state and local governments; increasing conditions of federal aid; the proliferation of grants to
more than 900; federal programs designed poorly for
efficiency, effectiveness, and equity; coercive intergovernmental regulations and federal preemptions;
unfunded and underfunded federal and state mandates; tensions in state–local jurisdictional and fiscal
relations; impediments to multistate and substate
regional collaboration; the nationalization of state
criminal law; federal restrictions on state and local
taxes; and federal court orders (Kincaid 2008; Posner
and Conlan 2008).
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The following 15 questions—which are not exhaustive
and do not include constitutional questions such as
those posed by the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 and by calls to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment—are derived from the contributions to this symposium as well as recent literature. In
framing these questions, it is difficult to distinguish
consistently between intergovernmental relations
(IGR) and intergovernmental management (IGM).
In the main, we take “intergovernmental relations” to
be a term that encompasses all types of interactions
between elected and nonelected officials of federal,
state, and local governments. The especially important
dimension of IGR is policy making—both lawmaking
and regulation promulgation—in which elected officials and agency heads are important actors. We take
“intergovernmental management” to be a less comprehensive term, encompassing the implementation and
management of intergovernmental policies. Politics
cannot, of course, be divorced from management, but
the especially important dimension of IGM is administration, in which nonelected officials from agency
heads to street-level bureaucrats are prime actors.
We do not seek to answer the following questions,
but rather to pose them, sometimes provocatively, for
discussion.
1. Can intergovernmental relations generate more
effective and efficient policies and implementation
without restoring the primacy of the “governmental” in intergovernmental? The U.S. ACIR was
founded on the democratic premise that elected
government officials legitimately represent the people.
The ACIR also was founded on the constitutional
premise that American democracy is federal. The
people’s democratic representatives, therefore, are
principally the elected executive and legislative officials of the nation’s general-purpose federal, state,
and local governments, with federal and state officials
each presiding over a sovereign order of government.
Consequently, intergovernmental initiatives should be
formulated and overseen by elected federal, state, and
local officials. In this respect, assembling these officials (and from
both political parties) in a peak intergovernmental advisory organization made eminent sense. The ACIR reflected the sine qua non of
the idea of cooperative federalism.
late 1990s, local governments were relegated, perhaps, to a back seat
in Washington, D.C.
Even though about 63 percent of federal aid is dedicated to social
welfare benefits for individuals, which is predominantly a state
responsibility, the health of “places” remains
vital to the social welfare of all citizens. As a
[T]he rise of “governance” as
Canadian initiative put it, “We are rediscova theoretical perspective and
ering that economic competitiveness, social
empirical reality brought into
well-being, and ecosystem resilience depend,
play a competing organizational in large part, on collective behaviour in specific
dynamic rooted in the private ‘places’” (Shugart and Townsend 2010, 4).
sector. . . . in which government Furthermore, some other federal countries
have strengthened the intergovernmental roles
is one among many actors and of local governments, and several have even
in which government officials
recognized local, usually municipal, governenjoy no presumption of
ments as the third order of government in their
primacy, even though they are constitution (Steytler 2009).
However, the rise of “governance” as a theoretical perspective and empirical reality brought
into play a competing organizational dynamic
rooted in the private sector. This dynamic
reflected disenchantment with government
as well as enchantment with the thought
of a more porous, pluralistic polity made
wiser, more effective, and more democratic
by networks of “governing” organizations in
which government is one among many actors
and in which government officials enjoy no
presumption of primacy, even though they are
the only democratically elected representatives
of the people within governance networks.
the only democratically elected
3. How will efforts to induce national
Furthermore, because the federal government
representatives of the people
economic growth and remedy the interis the preeminent source of fiscal and regulawithin governance networks.
governmental system’s unsustainable fiscal
tory resources for such networks, it is not clear
condition affect state and local revenues
that the governance paradigm even values state
and services? Studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Ofand local officials and, thereby, intergovernmental relations. Given
fice (GAO), Congressional Budget Office, Peterson Foundation,
that state and local governments are entrenched constitutionally,
National Academy of Public Administration, and others point to
intergovernmental relations remain a necessary—and perhaps, for
the unsustainability of current federal, state, and local spending.
the paradigm’s proponents, a lamentably frictional—component of
governance, but not a component necessarily valued as a principle of The GAO (2010b) has projected a $9.9 trillion fiscal gap between
state and local expenditures and revenues for 2009 to 2058 that
democratic self-government and multigovernmental negotiation to
could require state and local spending reductions or tax increases of
enhance policy outcomes.
about 12.3 percent every year for the next 50 years. Under current
policies, the GAO also expects that demographic changes (mainly a
2. Should local governments have a more prominent seat at the
growing senior citizen population), rising health care costs, and defiintergovernmental table? Although local governments are not
cit spending will require the federal government’s major entitlement
constitutional partners of the federal system, as a practical matter,
programs, plus net interest payments, to consume “93 cents of every
they are vital to IGR and IGM. Local governments gained a seat at
the intergovernmental table during the New Deal, largely because of dollar of federal revenue” by 2030 (2010a, 6). These projections, if
accurate, have grave implications for intergovernmental programs
their Democratic political clout, especially that of big-city mayors.
and state and local finances. In turn, the possibility of reviving a
Hence, federal aid often flowed directly to local governments, and
program such as General Revenue Sharing (e.g., Shiller 2010) is
local officials cooperated and competed with their state superiors in
virtually out of the question.
the federal arena. Local officials sometimes distrusted state governors and legislators, and they argued that federal funds for local,
No agreement has been reached on solutions, although Medicare,
especially urban, needs and the poor would not reach their targets
Medicaid, Social Security, defense, and deficit spending have been
if they were passed through state agencies. This concern triggered
identified as prime targets for federal budget reform. Given the
a debate, which was addressed by the ACIR, about whether federal
high-profile politics associated with these budget items and the
aid bypassing state capitals was beneficial or detrimental to federalism and public policy, and under what conditions federal aid should “sacred cow” status of the major programs, lower-profile programs
could bear the brunt of initial cutbacks. For example, discretionary
go through the states.
spending for both place (e.g., infrastructure) and person (e.g., social
services) functions carried out by states and localities could be reHowever, three developments largely unseated local governments
duced. Also, the federal government could enact new taxes, such as a
from being influential intergovernmental lobbyists. First, President
national sales tax or value-added tax (VAT). A federal consumption
Ronald Reagan and subsequent Republican presidents defined IGR
as primarily a federal–state relationship. Democratic presidents have tax likely would place downward political pressure on state and local
sales tax rates. Conceivably, the states could be pressured or manbeen more attentive to local governments, but only insofar as it has
dated to abolish their sales taxes and join a national VAT regime,
been politically advantageous to do so. Second, after 1987, federal
which would make them dependent on revenues distributed by the
aid shifted sharply from places to persons, significantly reducing
federal government from its VAT. The tax-exempt status of state and
federal funding for local place functions such as economic devellocal bonds could be reduced further, too. There is a need to identify
opment, urban renewal, housing, education, transportation, and
and measure the possible impact of such federal initiatives on state
government operations. Third, the ACIR was eliminated in 1996.
and local finances.
Local governments occupied 27 percent of the ACIR’s seats. By the
“Big Questions” about Intergovernmental Relations and Management 197
4. What design features should accompany federal economic
stimulus programs, health care and financial regulation reform,
and other national policy initiatives in order to facilitate more
effective state and local implementation in times of austerity?
Federal responses to the 2007–9 national recession, banking and
securities failures, stock market collapse, housing crisis, and soaring
health care costs have focused more on money than on management. While this is understandable, little attention has been given
to the implementation of national remedial actions by state and
local governments, many of which have reduced managerial capacity
in the wake of retirements, hiring freezes, and personnel cutbacks.
For example, from September 2009 to September 2010, state and
local government employment declined by 1.3 percent, while federal employment grew by 3.4 percent (Cauchon 2010). Traditional
channels for awarding funds have usually been followed, producing
delays and distortions, and performance measures have been modest
or nonexistent, as exemplified by the sole metric of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA): the number of jobs created by stimulus funds, an indicator developed by auditors, not
managers (Posner 2010, 26–27). The success of these national initiatives is largely in the hands of state and local public administrators
who are operating with minimal guidance and support, whose ranks
are stretched thin, and whose oversight abilities are diminished.
Having an organizational capacity to anticipate and prepare for the
IGM dimensions of national policy making could improve implementation and avoid micromanagement and “horror stories.”
In 2005, the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
recommended eliminating income tax deductions for state and
local taxes. Most state and local officials oppose the elimination.
This issue has a partisan dimension, though: in 2005, for instance,
the average state and local tax payment in Democratic states was
$7,487, compared to $4,834 in Republican states (Maggs 2005).
Because most state income taxes are coupled to the federal tax code,
state officials fear that changes in federal tax laws, especially tax
cuts and retroactive changes, will reduce state tax revenues. Federal
officials feel no obligation to coordinate tax policies with state and
local officials.
At the same time, many state and local governments have been less
than fiscally responsible. The GAO found, for instance, that tax
increases boosting state and local own-source revenues increased faster
than the growth of personal income in 43 states during 1977–2007.
State and local general expenditures increased faster than personal
income growth in 47 states during 1977–2007 (GAO 2010b). Although most states are formally complying with their balanced budget
rules, some are making questionable choices or unwarranted fiscal
assumptions in order to do so. Many states also have exhausted their
“rainy day” funds. It has become evident, as well, that most state and
local governments have underfunded pension programs and health
care benefits for their employees, placing a potentially huge fiscal
burden on taxpayers in future years. There is a need to monitor the
complex interactions of federal and state tax laws and revenues, as well
as trends in funding commitments and capacities to meet obligations.
The experience with ARRA also suggests that the federal government has not developed a capacity to provide effective countercyclical aid to states and localities. Generally, ARRA’s economic
outcomes are consistent with analyses of previous federal efforts to
assist states and localities during recessions, which suggest that such
programs are less than optimal because they are not usually timed
well, triggered adequately, or targeted effectively (Mattoon 2009).
5. How can state and local governments be
viable intergovernmental partners without
greater fiscal capacity and fiscal responsibility? One characteristic of contemporary
federalism is federal preemption of state taxes
through legislation and judicial action usually
undertaken pursuant to the commerce clause,
beginning especially with the enactment of
limits on tax-exempt private activity bonds in
1984. Federal judicial and statutory prohibitions of state taxation of Internet services and
interstate mail-order sales are among the most
prominent constraints. In October 2007,
President George W. Bush signed a seven-year
extension of the moratorium on state and local
taxation of Internet access.
6. Should functional responsibilities be “sorted out” with turnbacks or partial de-intergovernmentalization in order to achieve
greater efficiency and effectiveness? Attempts to “divide the job”
of service delivery among intergovernmental actors originated in
the early days of cooperative federalism, but efforts to do so have
not been undertaken since President Reagan’s unsuccessful “swap”
initiative in 1981–82. Some observers contend
that “sorting out” is futile because of the comOne characteristic of
plexity of intergovernmental management, the
resilience of functional picket-fence silos, the
contemporary federalism is
widely varying appetites for taxes and services
federal preemption of state
taxes via legislation and judicial among states and localities, and the lack of
political rewards. Others contend that sorting
action usually undertaken
out is unrealistic because of the complex interpursuant to the commerce
governmental interdependence of most policy
clause, beginning especially
functions. Still others add that “bigger is not
necessarily better.”
with the enactment of limits
on tax-exempt private-activity
bonds in 1984. Federal judicial
and statutory prohibitions
of state taxation of Internet
services and interstate mailorder sales are among the most
prominent constraints.
A number of states negotiated the Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Agreement to collect taxes on
interstate mail-order sales. The agreement was
implemented voluntarily among consenting states in October 2005.
Although several large retailers comply voluntarily with the agreement,
Congress has not sanctioned the agreement or otherwise authorized
states to require sales tax collections by out-of-state vendors.
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To these skeptics, consolidation or integration
of services and better coordination among
state, regional, and local agencies are more
practical and promising ways to bolster the
performance of governmental functions. Yet
these modest steps might not be sufficient. If
revenue constraints and spending cutbacks
prove to be long-term IGM conditions that
cause public officials to fundamentally rethink
their service delivery strategies, then bold “idea federalism” studies
could help challenge the status quo and highlight innovations from
across the world for consideration by federal, state, and local policy
makers.
Although the federal government has a poor track record of approving turnbacks, they are still worth considering. For example, some
observers have long regarded surface transportation (and motor
fuels taxes) as a prime candidate for a federal turnback to the states
(see, e.g., ACIR 1987a). Nothing intrinsic to federalism requires a
federal role. In Canada, for example, since 1867, “the provision of
highways has been mainly a provincial responsibility, with only a
small role played by the federal government” (Turgeon and Vaillancourt 2002, 179).
Is education a candidate for partial de-intergovernmentalization?
(Kincaid 1992). Since 1965, the federal regulatory role in K–12
education has increased tremendously, while the federal fiscal role
has grown modestly; yet education outcomes remain unacceptably
low, and President Barack Obama acknowledged on NBC’s Today
Show in early October 2010 that “our per-pupil spending has gone
up during the last couple of decades even as results have gone down”
(quoted in McGurn 2010, 10). To what extent has the federal role
increased the bureaucratization, legalization, unionization, and
nationalization of education to the detriment of the state- and,
especially, local-specific factors associated with better outcomes,
such as teacher qualifications, rewards for good teaching, principal
and superintendent leadership, challenging curriculum, and parental
involvement? By contrast, K–12 and postsecondary education are
predominantly provincial responsibilities in Canada (Simeon and
Papillon 2006) and…
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