A Shift for Lieutenant Colonel Adams Case Study Answer Q 1 & 3 from Lt Colonel case EXPLICITLY APPLY textbook material in your answer! Also, explicitly a

A Shift for Lieutenant Colonel Adams Case Study Answer Q 1 & 3 from Lt Colonel case

EXPLICITLY APPLY textbook material in your answer!

Also, explicitly apply ideas from the Jones (1991) paper in your discussion.

Also, view the …RIVER KWAI video again, and use its material

on ethical perspectives in your discussion

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=t9f5FmSQeB4&feature=emb_logo * Academy o/ Managem^it BBVWW
1991. Vol. 16. No. 2, 366-39S.
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING BY INDIVIDUALS
IN ORGANIZATIONS:
AN ISSUE-CONTINGENT MODEL
THOMAS M. JONES
Univeraity oi Washington
Existing theoretical models of indiyiducd ethiccd decision nuiking in
orgcmizationi place little or no emphasis on characteristics of the
ethical issue itself. This article (a) proposes an issue-contingent
model containing a new set of variables called moral intensity; (b)
using concepts, theory, and evidence derived largely from social psychology, argues that moral intensity influences every component of
moral decision making and behavior; (c) offers four research propositions: and (d) discusses implications of the theory.
Reasons for increased societal focus on ethics in organizations are
many. Insider trading on Wall Street; defense contractor scandals, involving both private and public sectors; rental car repxiir overcharges; and the
resignation of over 100 Reagan administration officials have helped keep
ethical issues in the public eye. Institutions have responded to these challenges in a variety of ways. Corporations have established or updated
codes of ethics, and some business schools have responded with increased
offerings in business ethics. Academe has also produced a greatly expanded literature on the subject of ethics, including textbooks and two
scholarly journals—the Journal of Business Ethics and the Business and
Professional Ethics Journal An entire volume of Research in Corporate
Social Performance and Policy has been devoted to business ethics and
values (Frederick, 1987).
Despite this increased attention to ethics in organizations, theoretical
and empirical examinations of ethical decision making in organizations are
in relatively short supply. Trevino (1986) offered a general theoretical model,
whereas Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Hunt and Vitell (1986), and Dubinsky
and Loken (1989) offered models that focus on marketing ethics. Rest (1986)
presented a theory of individual ethical decision making that can easily be
generalized to organizational settings. Among the empirical contributions to
date are the works of Hegarty and Sims (1978, 1979), Fritzsche and Becker
(1983), Frederick (1987), Laczniak and Inderrieden (1987), Fritzsche (1988),
Dubinsky and Loken (1989), and Weber (1990). One reason for this relative
The author wishes to thank Vandro Huber, who made useful suggestions on an earlier
draft of this article. Marilyn Gist’s thoughtful critique helped to polish the final draft.
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367
paucity of theoretical and empirical work in ethics may be that few scholars
are interested in both ethics and organizational behavior and decision making. The models that have emerged are the products of scholars in psychology or psychology-based disciplines, including organizational behavior
and marketing. In addition, organizational scholars may be reluctant to
study value-based issues because of ideological reasons or because methodological problems are considered difficult to surmount. Although this article is grounded in social psychology, it also contains elements of moral
philosophy and applied ethics.
The purpose of this article is to introduce concepts not present in prior
models and to offer a model that supplements, but does not replace, other
models. The article argues that moral issues vary in terms of their moral
intensity and that an issue-contingent model of ethical decision making and
behavior can add significantly to the understanding of moral processes.
This is an initial attempt to identify, not empirically validate, the issuerelated components of ethical behavior on which future research may be
based. It attempts to build a nomological net of constructs and theory, which
can be formally validated and tested in future studies. The validity of the
proposed constructs is here limited to content validity based on logic, observation, and, m some cases, empincal analogy. The article also advances
and discusses four general research propositions.
DEFINrnONS
Three definitions are central to the article. First, a moral issue is present
where a person’s actions, when freely performed, may harm or benefit
others (Velasquez & Rostankowsh, 1985). In other words, the action or decision must have consequences for others and must involve choice, or volition, on the part of the actor or decision maker. The definition is broad;
decisions frequently have some consequences for others and volition is
almost always present, although the costs of certain choices may be high.
In sum, many decisions are moral decisions simply because they have a
moral component. Second, a moral agent is a person who makes a moral
decision, even though he or she may not recognize that moral issues are at
stake. This feature of the definition is important because a central element
of the moral decision-making model presented here is recognizing moral
issues. (In this article, the terms morai and ethical are considered equivalent
and will be used interchangeably, depending on context.)
Third, an efhicai decision is defined as a decision that is both legal and
morally acceptable to the larger community. Conversely, an unethical decision is either iUegal or morally unacceptable to the larger community. This
definition follows from Kelman and Hamilton’s (1989) definition of crimes of
obedience and is consistent with the definitions used, either explicitly or
implicitly by some other authors in the field of ethics. Although the definition is admittedly impreose and relativistic, it is adequate for the purposes
of this article. Some authors, including Ferrell and Gresham (1985), Trevino
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April
(1986), Hunt and Vitell (1986), and Dubinsky and Loken (1989) did not provide
substantive definitions of the terms ethical and unethical. Discussions regarding the difficulty of establishing substantive definitions for ethical behavior can be found in Cavanagh, Moberg, and Velasquez (1981),
Beauchamp and Bowie (1979), and Jones (1980).
EXISTING MODELS
Rest (1986) proposed a four-component model for individual ethical decision making and behavior, whereby a moral agent must (a) recognize the
moral issue, (b) make a moral judgment, (c) resolve to place moral concerns
ahead of other concerns (establish moral intent), and (d) act on the moral
concerns. He argued that each component in the process is conceptually
distinct and that success in one stage does not imply success in any other
stage. For example, a person with a well-developed sense of moral reasoning (Component 2) will not necessarily have great resolve to act morally
(Component 3). Much of the empirical research conducted in the context of
this model has involved either Component 2, called moral development by
Kolberg (1976) and Rest (1979, 1986), or the relationship between Components 2 and 4, moral development and action. Rest (1979) developed an
instrument for measuring moral development that can be administered in
groups and scored relatively easily, which probably accounts for the dozens
of empirical studies involving this stage of the process.
Although Trevino (1986) did not directly address Rest’s model, she offered a completing model, which implicitly builds on it. Her person-situation
interactionist model begins with the existence of an ethical dilemma and
proceeds to a cognitions stage, wherem Kohlberg’s cognitive moral development model becomes operative. Moral judgments made in the cognitions
stage are then moderated by individual and situational factors. Individual
factors include ego strength, field dependence, and locus of control. Situational factors include elements of immediate job context, organizational
culture, and characteristics of the work. Moral judgments, thus moderated,
affect ethical or unethical behavior.
Ferrell and Gresham (1985) proposed a contingency framework for ethical decision making in marketing. In this model, an ethical issue or dilemma emerges from the social or cultural environment. The contingent
factors that affect the decision maker are both individual (knowledge, values, attitudes, and intentions) and organizational (significant othere and
opportunity). The effect of significant others is supported in this model by
differential association theory (Sutherland & Cressey, 1970) and role-set
theory (Merton, 1957). Opportunity (to behave unethically) as a variable
stems from the work of Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and, in Ferrell and Gresham’s model, is related to the existence (or nonexistence) of professional
codes, corporate policy, and rewards and punishment. The decision that
emerges from this process leads first to behavior and next to evaluation of
behavior, which, in turn, is the starting point for a feedback loop to individual and organizational factors.
1991
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369
Hunt and Vitell (1986) proposed a general theory of marketing ethics
that consists of several stages. A substantially simplified summary of this
model is offered here. Environmental factors (cultural, industrial, and organizational) and personal experiences affect perceptions of the existence of
an ethical problem, alternatives, and consequences. In turn, these perceptions, along with deontological norms and an evaluation of consequences,
lead to both deontological and teleological evaluations, which, in turn, lead
to ethical judgments. Judgment affects intentions, which, along with situational constraints, affect behavior. A feedback loop leads from behavior to
actual consequences and back to personal experiences.
Dubinsky and Loken (1989) presented an ethical decision-making model
based on the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Their
model begins with behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations, normative beliefs, and motivation to comply. The first two of these variables affect attitude
toward ethical or unethical behavior; the latter two variables affect subjective norms toward ethical or unethical behavior. Finally, attitude and subjective norms lead to intentions to engage in ethical or unethical behavior
which, in turn, affect actual behavior, ethical or unethical. No feedback loop
is present.
Although they did not add to present theory, Ferrell, Gresham, and
Fraednch (1989) developed a five-stage synthesis of other models. Awareness (of ethical issues), cognitions (moral development), moral evaluations
(deontological and teleological judgments), determination (intentions), and
actions (ethical or unethical behavior) constitute the sequential order of their
model. They also featured a feedback loop with behavioral evaluation of
consequences leading to awareness, cognitions, moral evaluations, and
determination.
Brommer, Gratto, Gravender, and Tuttle (1987) also claimed a model of
ethical decison mabng, but it actually distills to a catalog (albeit a thorough
one) of factors that influence ethical decision makers. Environmental factors
(work, personal, professional, governmental, legal, and social) join mdividual attnbutes to affect the ethical decision process. In all, over 20 variables
are expected to be relevant to ethical decision making in this formulation.
Each of these models has something to contribute to the understanding
of ethical decision making. None, however, does more than hint that charactenstics of the moral issue itself will affect the moral decision-making
process. Ferrell and Gresham (1985) noted that the consensus regarding
proper ethical conduct will be likely to change as the issue changes. They
suggested that fewer people would endorse embezzling company funds
than would endorse padding an expense account. Their model, however,
includes no acknowledgement that issue differences affect ethical decision
making. Hunt and Vitell (1986) added a teleological evaluation stage,
wherein the consequences of the moral decison are evaluated, but they did
not suggest a systematic relationship between consequences and subsequent elements of the model—intentions and behavior. Dubinsky and
Loken (1989) implied that attitudes may vary according to the behavior
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April
being evaluated, but they made no attempt to explain how this variation
would occur. In sum, existing models do not adequately account for differences in ethical issues.
A rough synthesis of existing models is useful for assessing their collective strengths and weaknesses. This synthesized model, shown in Figure 1,
IS necessarily simplified (e.g., feedback loops are omitted), and it uses Rest’s
(1986) four-stage model as a foundation.
The process begins with the environment, which typically includes economic, social, cultural, and organizational factors (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985;
Hunt & Vitell, 1986). From the environment emerge ethical issues (Ferrell &
Gresham, 1985; Hunt & Vitell, 1986). Hunt and Vitell (1986) acknowledged
that not all moral issues may be recognized by their use of the term perHGUREl
Synthesis of Ethical Decision-Making Models
Characteristics of
the Moral Issue
(Moral Intensity)
^^
^-‘
Environment
Social
Cultural
Economic
Organizational’
F/G
H/V
Recognize
Moral
Issue
/
/
Jones’s
Model
Make
Moral
ludgoMnt
V

R
H/V
Implicit
T
F/G
Not Spedfiea
D/L
Cognitive Moral
Development
R
T
Moral Evaluation
D/L
WV
Not Specified
F/G
“^-^^
EstabUsh
Moral
Intent
R
D/L
HA/
T
F/G
Exphcit
~~^^
t.
R
D/L
WV
D/L
Significant
Others
F/G
Individual
Moderators
T
F/G
Situational
Moderators
T
Opportunity
F/G
Key:
R
T
D/L
F/G
H/V
=
=
=
=
=
Rest (1986)
Trevino (1986)
Dubinsky & Loken (1989)
Ferrell & Gresham, (1985)
Hunt & Vitell (1986)
Engage
in
Moral
Behavior
1991
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371
ceived ethical problem, whereas Rest (1986) made recognition of moral
issues an explicit element of his model. Trevino (1986) and Ferrell and Gresham (1985) left this step implicit, but Dubinsky and Loken (1989) did not include it.
Four of the five models contain some form of moral judgment stage. In
Rest’s (1986) and Trevino’s (1986) models, cognitive moral development is the
critical element in the judgment phase. For Hunt and Vitell (1986) and Dubinsky and Loken (1989), moral evaluation (teleological and deontological)
takes place. Ferrell and Gresham (1985) did not specify a process for this
step.
Rest (1986), Dubinsky and Loken (1989), and Hunt and Vitell (1986) explicitly included a step whereby the ethical decision maker establishes
moral intent before engaging in moral behavior. Trevino (1986) and Ferrell
and Gresham (1985) postulated a direct transition from the moral judgment
phase to moral behavior. Moderating variables include significant others
(Dubinsky & Loken, 1989; Ferrell & Gresham, 1985), individual moderators
(Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Trevino, 1986), situational moderators (Trevino,
1986), and opportunity (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985).
Despite the fact that collectively these models are reasonably comprehensive, this synthesized model clearly shows that none of the previous
models of ethical decision making explicitly includes characteristics of the
moral issue itself as either an independent variable or a moderating variable. If the models making up this synthesized model are taken at face
value, the moral decision-making and behavior process of individuals in
organizations is identical for all moral issues. For example, people will
decide and behave in the same manner whether the issue is the theft of a
few supplies from the organization or the release of a dangerous product to
the market. As the relationships represented by dotted lines (see Figure 1)
indicate, the model presented here and explained in detail in the following
sections explicitly rejects that view and formally includes characteristics of
the moral issue itself as an independent variable affecting all four stages of
moral decision making and behavior.
Specifically, ethical decision making is issue contingent; that is, characteristics of the moral issue itself, collectively called moral intensity, are
important determinants of ethical decision making and behavior. The issuecontingent model presented here owes its genesis to intuitive, observational, and empirical factors. Intuitively, people tend to become much more
concerned about moral issues that affect those who are close to them rather
than those with whom they have little or no contact. Individuals also seem
to react more strongly to injustices that have immediate effects as opposed
to those that have effects in the distant future.
In terms of observational evidence, the quotation of a militiaman for one
of Beirut’s factional forces explains his reasoning that as long as the victims
are strangers, the killing doesn’t bother him: ‘Those I do not know, I don’t
care about ” and “for bloody and tough battles, I take other fighters, not the
ones I have here. These are my friends. I don’t want a guilty conscience if
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Academy of Management Review
April
something happens” {Newsweek, 1989: 58). Similarly, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, though recognized by Americans as horrible, registered “only
at the fringes of our consciousness,” according to Kaplan (1989: 29). This
occurred, he argued, because “the war in Afghanistan—in addition to
being difficult to report—happened too far away, to an alien people with
few ethnic compatriots in America” (Kaplan, 1989: 29). These observations
suggest that distance (physical, psychological, cultural, or social) affects the
manner in which human beings view moral issues. In an organizational
context, it can be noted that some employees, who would not consider
stealing from individual strangers, pilfer supplies from their firms or make
personal long-distance calls on company phones. Dispersion of effect seems
to play a role in these moral decisions.
Empirically, Fritzsche and Becker (1983: 297), who conducted a survey
of managerial attitudes toward the appropriate responses to various ethical
vignettes, rejected the hypothesis that “the behavior of marketing managers
is invariant across categories of ethical problems.” Further, respondents
“would act more ethically in the dilemmas posing serious consequences
than they would in less risky situations” (1983: 297). Similarly, Fritzsche
(1988) found that marketing managers responded differentially to ethical
vignettes where the magnitude of the consequences was varied. In some of
the vignettes, the variation was related to the magnitude of the consequences. Additionally, Weber (1990) offered evidence that corporate managers use different modes of moral reasoning for different types of moral
issues.
The previous evidence suggests that human beings may respond differentially to moral issues in a way that is systematically related to characteristics of the issue itself. This article, drawing on theory from social psychology, argues that six characteristics of the moral issue (magnitude of
consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy,
proximity, and concentration of effect) will be positively related to moral
decision making and behavior. These characteristics of moral issues, collectively called moral intensity, are integral parts of an issue-contingent
model of moral decision mabng and behavior. This model is discussed in
detail, following an elaboration of the moral intensity construct.
MORAL INTENSITY
Central to the issue-contingent model presented here is the notion of
moral intensity. Moral intensity is a construct that captures the extent of
issue-related moral impjerative in a situation. It is multidimensional, and its
component parts are characteristics of the moral issue such as magnitude of
consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy,
proximity, and concentration of effect. Moral intensity does not include traits
of moral decision makers, such as moral development (Kohlberg, 1976); ego
strength, field dependence, or locus of control (Trevino, 1986); or knowledge
or values (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985). It also does not include o…
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