Indiana State University Doxastic Involuntarism Essay 1000 words Double Spaced 12-point Font Essays in Unit 3 Readings regarding this essay: W.K.Cliffo

Indiana State University Doxastic Involuntarism Essay 1000 words

Double Spaced

12-point Font

Essays in Unit 3

Readings regarding this essay: W.K.Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”

William James, “The Will to Believe”

Follow the instructions of Part A B and C for this essay, and there should be 1000 words in total.

Part A) Discuss and explain Alston’s argument for doxastic involuntarism, and the problem that doxastic involuntarism poses. [About 400 words]

Part B) Discuss and explain James’ solution to the problem of doxastic involuntarism. [About 400 words]

Part C) Argue that James successfully or unsuccessfully solves the problem of doxastic involuntarism. [About 200 words]

The attached class ppt are very helpful. But do not copy from the ppt while writing. Introduction to Epistemology
and Clifford’s “The Ethics of
Belief”
Unit 3: Epistemology
By: Christopher Becker
Epistemology
• Epistemology
• The study of knowledge and related concepts
•
•
•
•
•
•
Understanding
Belief
Judgment
Faith in a sense
Justification
The extent of our knowledge
• Whereas our first two units were about metaphysics, that is, about
whether free will or God exists, epistemic questions ask what
knowledge is or how do we know the answer about particular topics.
Different Types of Knowledge
• There are different types of knowledge
• Knowledge by Acquaintance
• This is knowledge about a particular object.
• One might say that they know their friend or they know about Gainesville.
• Know-how (skill/abilities)
• Know-how is being able to do something.
• So, for instance, one might know how to ride a bike or know how to play a musical
instrument.
• Propositional Knowledge
• Propositional knowledge is knowledge that something is the case.
• So, for instance, one might know that it is sunny outside.
• Roughly, propositions are states of affairs, descriptions about how the world is.
• This is the kind of knowledge that Epistemologists most often talk about.
Knowledge
• Commonly, Epistemologists take the justified true belief (JTB) account of
knowledge, as their starting point in their theorizing of propositional
knowledge
• JTB Analysis of Propositional Knowledge
• S knows that P if and only if S has a justified true belief that P.
• Where ‘S’ denotes an epistemic subject and ‘P’ denotes a proposition.
• Why knowledge is thought to require a justified true belief.
• Truth
• It is commonly supposed that one cannot know that something is the case if this belief is false, for
knowledge is thought to be a relationship between an agent and the world.
• Belief
• It is commonly thought that knowledge requires belief, because knowledge is representational,
meaning that although knowledge is about the world, mentally, we represent how the world is
through beliefs.
• Justification
• Mere true belief is thought insufficient for knowledge, since we do not possess knowledge off mere
lucky guesses, which is compatible with knowledge requiring mere true belief.
Norms of Belief
• Providing a conceptual analysis of knowledge is interesting, but our
focus will be on examining different norms of belief.
• Norms of belief
• Also known as the ethics of belief, norms of belief are essentially rules that we
should follow in forming our beliefs.
• In other words, a good norm of belief will tell us when we should hold a
particular belief and why we should hold that belief.
• Another way of putting it, a norm of belief provides conditions for when we
are being reasonable.
• Reasons
• Epistemic reasons
• Roughly, an epistemic reason is a reason which is related to truth, justification, or knowledge.
• Pragmatic reasons
• Roughly, a pragmatic reason is a reason which help one attain their goal(s).
Some Classic Norms of Belief
• Pyrrhonian Skeptic
• Believe that P if and only if P is indubitable or self-evident
• Pyrrhonians believe that we should believe how things appear to us and things that are
indubitable.
• Essentially, Pyrrhonian skeptics think that disagreement and doubt disturbs our peace of
mind. And so, if we want to have a tranquil state of mind, which we should want, then we
should suspend judgment over any claim that is doubtable.
• Cartesian Norm of Belief
• Believe that P if and only if one is objectively certain that P is true.
• In order to avoid error and to set his philosophy upon a firm foundation, Descartes
advocated this demanding norm of belief
• Hume and Locke
• One should proportion their belief to the evidence
• According to Hume and Locke, one’s beliefs should mirror one’s evidence.
Clifford’s Shipowner Case
• Clifford’s shipowner case
• Clifford begins his article with the case of a shipowner who has doubts about the
safety of their ship, pre-voyage.
• In the first case, Clifford imagines that the ship falls apart at sea and everyone on it dies.
• In the second case, Clifford imagines that the ship safely makes its trip, and so, everyone on
board survives.
• According to Clifford, in both cases, the shipowner is guilty and blameworthy of the
deaths of the travelers since, given their evidence, the shipowner had no right to
believe that their ship was safe to sail.
• “He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by
stifling his doubts. And although in the end he may have felt so sure about it that he
could not think otherwise, yet inasmuch as he had knowingly and willingly worked
himself into that frame of mind, he must be held responsible for it.” (86)
Possible Objection to Clifford’s Shipowner
Case and Clifford’s Concession
• According to this objection, it is not that the shipowner’s belief that
the ship was safe is morally wrong, but rather, it was the shipowner’s
action that was morally wrong.
• Clifford concedes that this objection is “right” and “necessary.”
• Right insofar as Clifford agrees that even if one is certain that their ship is
safe, they can still choose to investigate their ship’s safety.
• Necessary insofar as one does not base their decisions off their knowledge,
they still need a rule for acting (presumably, acting risk-aversely).
• Nonetheless, Clifford does not think that this objection is
problematic to his position, because it is “not sufficient.”
Clifford’s Reply
• According to Clifford, we should still hold the shipowner responsible,
in both cases, for two reasons:
• Firstly, one’s actions might be biased if their belief is not based on fair
inquiry.
• Here Clifford seems to be saying that if the shipowner is certain that their ship
is safe, then their checkup of the ship will be biased.
• Secondly, Clifford says that all of our beliefs affect our actions in some
way and that our beliefs are not a private matter.
• Although one may think that they have a right to believe whatever they want,
and perhaps they do if we consider this issue from a legal perspective,
morally, Clifford is thinking that since our beliefs affect our actions, which
affect others, and because we pass our beliefs on to others, our beliefs are a
public matter.
Justifying Clifford’s Norm of Belief
• So, according to Clifford, we all have a duty of inquiry
• In other words, Clifford advocates the following norm of belief:
• It is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient
evidence (89)
• Clifford’s No Man is an Island Argument
• 1. Everyone’s beliefs affect other people.
• 2. If everyone’s beliefs affect other people, then it is always wrong to
believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
• C. So, it is always wrong to believe anything upon insufficient
evidence.
Clifford’s No Man is an Island Argument
• Clifford’s No Man is an Island
Argument
• 1. Everyone’s beliefs affect other
people.
• 2. If everyone’s beliefs affect other
people, then it is always wrong to
believe anything upon insufficient
evidence.
• C. So, it is always wrong to believe
anything upon insufficient evidence.
• Clifford’s No Man is an Island
Argument’s Support
• 1) Either one’s beliefs directly affect
their overt actions or one’s belief
forming habits affect their character,
which indirectly affects other people.
• 2) Presumably, Clifford is thinking that
basing one’s beliefs on insufficient
evidence leads to harming others. And
so, since we should not harm others,
we are morally prohibited against
holding any beliefs upon insufficient
evidence.
The Threat of Skepticism
• At this point, one might worry that Clifford’s norm of belief is too
demanding, and leads to skepticism.
• After all, if it turns out that, in most or all cases, we lack sufficient
evidence for a claim then, given Clifford’s norm of belief, we should
suspend judgment about most or all of our beliefs.
• But, if, as Clifford thinks, our beliefs affect our actions, then if we
suspend judgment about all or most of our beliefs, then it seems that
Clifford’s norm of belief leads to paralysis, for nobody would your
should pursue certain actions.
Clifford’s Reply to Skepticism
• According to Clifford, we do have sufficient evidence for many claims.
So, as Clifford sees it, the previous objection is unsuccessful.
• Still, it seems that Clifford should clarify what kind of evidence he
takes to be sufficient.
• Towards this end, Clifford discusses a few reliable sources of
evidence:
• Testimony
• Experience
• Reason
Clifford on Testimony
• Roughly, let us say that testimony is the act of telling, saying, or asserting
something, to someone else, which the speaker takes to be true.
• Lots of our putative knowledge comes from testimony, but why should we
think that testimony from other people is reliable? Or, as Clifford puts the
question, under what conditions is it reasonable to accept the testimony of
others as the ground of our belief?
• Clifford’s Three conditions for Reliable Testimony (90)
• 1) There must be reasonable grounds for trusting the speaker’s veracity.
• That is, we must have good grounds for thinking the speaker desires to tell us the truth.
• 2) The speaker must have had an opportunity for knowing the truth of their
statement.
• 3) There must be reasonable grounds for trusting the speaker’s judgment.
• That is, the speaker must have properly used their opportunity for acquiring said knowledge.
Clifford’s Chemistry Examples
• In order to explain his account of testimony, Clifford considers two Chemistry
examples.
• In the first one, the Chemist tells Clifford that “a certain substance can be made
by putting together other substances in certain proportions and subjecting them
to a known process.” (91)
• According to Clifford, since we have no grounds for doubting the truth of what the Chemist
says, nor their opportunity for attaining this true belief, and we trust the Chemist’s judgment,
we have sufficient evidence that the Chemist’s testimony is accurate.
• In the second Chemistry example, the Chemist tells Clifford that, “an atom of
oxygen has existed unaltered in weight and rate of vibration throughout all time.”
(91)
• Clifford says that we should not accept this testimony from the Chemist, because the Chemist
cannot verify any kind of claim about eternal existence.
• So, it seems for Clifford, that sometimes the content of the testimony can be
sufficient evidence to distrust one’s testimony if this content is untestable.
Inference: Going Beyond Experience
• Nearly all philosophers, if not all philosophers, believe in some shape or
form that experience is one of the best, if not our only guide to knowledge.
• There is a live debate on whether or not testimony itself is justified by
experience.
• Nonetheless, Clifford agrees with the common view that experience often
gives us sufficient evidence for a claim.
• However, as Clifford notes, a lot of our beliefs (and actions, which depend
upon such beliefs) goes beyond experience
• Any belief about the past, for example, relies upon the non-experiental premise that
our memory is trustworthy.
• Any belief about the future, as well, goes beyond our present experience.
• Given that, Clifford asks the following question, “How far and in what
manner may we add to our experience in forming our beliefs?” (93)
Clifford’s Answer to the Inferential Question
• Clifford’s Inferential Question
• “How far and in what manner may we add to our experience in forming our beliefs?” (93)
• Clifford’s Answer
• “We may go beyond experience by assuming that what we do not know is like what we do
know; or, in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of a uniformity in
nature.” (93)
• Uniformity in/of nature
• Basically, as Clifford understands this principle, to say that nature is uniform is to say that if
one has like causes, then we should expect like effects.
• Clifford’s Spectroscope example
• In general, Clifford seems to be thinking that we have sufficient evidence for
matters which go beyond experience only if we assume that nature is uniform,
and have experiences which are similar to our “unknown” beliefs.
Summary of Clifford
• Clifford sums up his views as follows: (95)
• “We may believe what goes beyond our experience, only when it is
inferred from that experience by the assumption that what we do not
know is like what we know.”
• “We may believe the statement of another person, when there is
reasonable ground for supposing that he knows that matter of which
he speaks, and that he is speaking the truth so far as he knows it.”
• “It is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence; and where
it is presumption to doubt and to investigate, there it is worse than
presumption to believe.
Additional Support for Clifford’s Norm of
Belief
• As we saw earlier, Pyrrhonian Skeptics accept the following norm of belief:
• Believe that P if and only if P is indubitable or self-evident
• Pyrrhonians believe that we should believe how things appear to us and things that are
indubitable.
• Essentially, Pyrrhonian skeptics think that disagreement and doubt disturbs our peace of
mind. And so, if we want to have a tranquil state of mind, which we should want, then we
should suspend judgment over any claim that is doubtable.
• It seems that one could support Clifford on the grounds that if one
disagrees with Clifford’s norm of belief, and so, that one believes even
when one lacks insufficient evidence, then one will not experience peace of
mind, because then they will have unresolved doubts.
• “Inquiry into the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for all, and
then taken as finally settled. It is never lawful to stifle a doubt; for either it
can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry already made, or else it
proves that the inquiry was not complete.” (Clifford 89)
First Objection to Clifford
• Clifford’s No Man is an Island
Argument
• 1. Everyone’s beliefs affect other
people.
• 2. If everyone’s beliefs affect other
people, then it is always wrong to
believe anything upon insufficient
evidence.
• C. So, it is always wrong to believe
anything upon insufficient
evidence.
• One might disagree that everyone’s
beliefs affect other people.
• For example, one might think that,
strictly speaking, it does not matter if
I believe that the number of stars in
the universe is even.
• Clifford might respond that even this
seemingly harmless belief is actually
harmful, because then one forms bad
epistemic habits.
• In response to this, one might think
that Clifford commits the slippery slope
fallacy.
• Slippery Slope Fallacy
• When one infers that a certain
event will cause and a bad
consequence, but there is
insufficient evidence that this
bad consequence will follow.
Second Objection to Clifford
• Secondly, one might object to Clifford on the grounds that his norm of
belief is too demanding.
• Perhaps, as we will see with James, rather than suspending judgment
on cases where there are live options, we should take a risk and
believe a certain proposition.
• For example, one might think that there is insufficient evidence that
God or free will exists.
• Nonetheless, rather than suspending judgment on whether God or
free will exists, one might respond that we should believe that God
and free will exists on pragmatic grounds.
William James’ “The Will to
Believe”
Unit Three: Norms of Belief
By: Christopher Becker
James’ Defense of Faith
• James starts off by noting that he is attempting to provide a defense
of Religious faith.
• As we will see, presumably, though, James’ defense of faith extends
past mere Religious faith.
• Since, contra Clifford, James’ thesis is that, given certain conditions, it
is morally permissible to believe in matters where we lack sufficient
evidence.
James on Hypotheses
• Hypothesis
• Anything that may be proposed to our belief (97)
• According to James, hypotheses can be live or dead.
• Live hypothesis
• A hypothesis which appeals as a real possibility to whom it is proposed
• Dead hypothesis
• A hypothesis which does not appear to be a real possibility to whom it is proposed
• For James, the liveness or deadness of a hypothesis is not an intrinsic property of
said belief, but rather, it is a relation between the hypothesis and the believer.
• In other words, depending on one’s other beliefs, a hypothesis may appear live or dead.
• For example, one who is skeptical of gravity, may consider it a live possibility that the earth is flat.
• Like Clifford, James notes that there is a connection between belief and action.
• For, according to James, if one considers a hypothesis maximally live, then one will act off
that belief without doubt.
James on Options
• Option
• The decision between two hypotheses
• According to James, in regard to belief, there are different options. That is, a
hypothesis, for James may be:
• Living or dead
• Forced or avoidable
• Accepting either disjunction of a logical dilemma is forced, according to James.
• So, excluding Chisholm (sorry Roderick) the proponent of the dilemma argument might say that one is forced to
accept the truth of determinism or indeterminism.
• Momentous or trivial
• If one’s opportunity is a one time event, it is momentous. Presumably, if the stakes are high, an option is
momentous.
• On the other hand, according to James, an option is trivial when “the opportunity is not unique, when
the stake is insignificant, or when the decision is reversible if later prove unwise.” (98)
• Interestingly, according to James, most decisions in science are trivial (in this sense).
• Genuine Option
• An option is genuine, for James, if the decision between two hypotheses is forced, living, and
momentous.
James on Doxastic Voluntarism
• When discussing the psychology of belief, James notes that, in some cases,
it seems preposterous to suppose that we can change our beliefs at will.
• “Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions being
modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our intellect in its perceptions of
truth? Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abraham Lincoln’s existence is a myth,
and that the portraits of him in McClure’s Magazine are all of some one else? Can
we, by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, believe
ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or feel
certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred
dollars?”(99)
• James is raising an important question, namely, do we have any sort of
control over our beliefs or doxastic attitudes more broadly: affirmation,
denial, suspension of judgment?
• This topic has been discussed at least going back to Pascal but, more
recently, William Alston has put forth an influential argument that we do
not have any direct control over our beliefs. This is known as the problem
of doxastic involuntarism.
Alston’s Argument for Doxastic Involuntarism
• 1. If we have direct voluntary control over any of our actual beliefs or
possible beliefs, then we can change any of our beliefs at will or form
any belief at will. (Definition of Doxastic voluntarism)
• 2. We cannot change any of our beliefs at will nor can we form any
belief at will. (Challenge from Doxastic Involuntarism)
• C. So, we do not have direct voluntary control over any of our actual
beliefs or possible beliefs (1,2)
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