POLI 142K University of California San Diego Leadership and Combat Compliance Essay Getting a good grade requires mostly that you make it look like you car

POLI 142K University of California San Diego Leadership and Combat Compliance Essay Getting a good grade requires mostly that you make it look like you care about the class enough to trick us into thinking your essay was high effort.

Essays should be a maximum of 7 pages. You are not required to turn in a works cited page if you use only materials from the syllabus. If you feel strongly about a source from outside of the class, you may use it, but then you must provide a works cited for those sources. Use Times New Roman, 12 point font, double-spaced with 1-inch margins.

Choose and answer one of the following prompts, using the formatting guidelines from the class Welcome Announcement for length and other requirements.

#1: Explain how domestic commitment has changed since 1500 (You must cite from lectures and Fromkin)

#2: Explain the combat contract and apply it to US military behavior in WWII (You must cite from lectures and Kindsvatter)

#3: How do domestic factors shape the ability of states to wage a war? (You must cite from lectures and Fromkin or Andrade)

#4: Explain how leadership affects combat compliance (You must cite from lectures and Kindsvatter)

#5: Explain the ability of small states to survive wars with major powers (You must cite from lectures and Fromkin) EUROPE’S
LAST SUMMER
Who Started the Great War in 1914?
DAVID F R O M K I N
T H I S
I S
A
B O R Z O I
B O O K
P U B L I S H E D
B Y
A L F R E D
A .
K N O P F
Copyright © 2004. by David Fromkin
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions.
Published in the United States by Alfred A. Knopf, a division of Random House, Inc.,
New York, and simultaneously in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto.
Distributed by Random House, Inc., New York.
www.aaknopf.com
Knopf, Borzoi Books, and the colophon are registered trademarks of Random House, Inc.
All photographs are reprinted with the kind permission of the Illustrated London News
Library excerpt: “Colonel Edward House” and “Count GrafBerchtold” (Hulton-Deutsch
Collection/Corbis); “German General Erich von Falkenhayn” (Corbis); and “German
Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz” (Bettman/Corbis).
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Fromkin, David.
Europe’s last summer: who started the Great War in 1914? /by David Fromkin.—1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-3 75-41156-9
1. World War, 1914-1918—Causes.
II.
I. Title: Who started the Great War in 1914?.
Title. D$ 11.F746 2004
940.3’n—dc22
2003027391
Manufactured in the United States of America
First Edition
/
The peremptory transition from an apparently profound peace to
violent general war in a few mid-summer weeks in 1 9 1 4 continues to
defy attempts at explanation.
— J O H N K E E G – A N , The First World War
CONTENTS
Map
xiii
PROLOGUE
(i) Out of the Blue 5
(it) The Importance of the Question 5
(Hi) A Summer to Remember
PART
EUROPE’S
12
ONE
TENSIONS
C H A P T E R 1 EMPIRES CLASH
C H A P T E R 2 CLASSES STRUGGLE
C H A P T E R 3 NATIONS QUARREL
C H A P T E R 4 C O U N T R I E S ARM
17
21
25
28
C H A P T E R 5 ZARATHUSTRA PROPHESIES
C H A P T E R 6 DIPLOMATS A L I G N
WALKING
39
43
PART
TWO
THROUGH MINEFIELDS
C H A P T E R 7 THE EASTERN QUESTION
49
C H A P T E R 8 A C H A L L E N G E FOR T H E A R C H D U K E
C H A P T E R 9 E X P L O S I V E G E R M A N Y 54
X
C O N T E N T S
PART T H R E E
DRIFTING TOWARD
WAR
C H A P T E R 10 M A C E D O N I A — O U T OF C O N T R O L
67
C H A P T E R 11 A U S T R I A — F I R S T OFF T H E MARK
70
C H A P T E R 12 F R A N C E AND G E R M A N Y M A K E T H E I R PLAY
C H A P T E R 13 ITALY GRASPS; T H E N T H E BALKANS DO T O O
C H A P T E R 14 T H E S L A V I C T I D E
87
C H A P T E R 15 EUROPE GOES TO T H E BRINK
C H A P T E R 16 MORE BALKAN T R E M O R S
94
98
C H A P T E R 17 AN A M E R I C A N T R I E S TO STOP IT
104
PART FOUR
MURDER!
CHAPTER 18 THE LAST WALTZ
113
C H A P T E R 19 IN T H E L A N D OF T H E A S S A S S I N S
C H A P T E R 20 T H E RUSSIAN C O N N E C T I O N
C H A P T E R 21 T H E T E R R O R I S T S S T R I K E
C H A P T E R 22 EUROPE YAWNS
118
129
132
137
C H A P T E R 23 DISPOSING OF T H E BODIES
144
C H A P T E R 24 R O U N D I N G UP T H E S U S P E C T S
146
PART F I V E
TELLING LIES
C H A P T E R 25 G E R M A N Y SIGNS A B L A N K C H E C K
C H A P T E R 26 T H E G R E A T D E C E P T I O N
153
162
C H A P T E R 27 B E R C H T O L D RUNS OUT OF T I M E
C H A P T E R 28 T H E S E C R E T IS K E P T
168
170
PART SIX
CRISIS!
C H A P T E R 29 T H E FAIT IS N O T ACCOMPLI
C H A P T E R 30 P R E S E N T I N G AN U L T I M A T U M
C H A P T E R 31 SERBIA MORE OR L E S S A C C E P T S
175
185
195
C O N T E N T S
PART SEVEN
COUNTDOWN
C H A P T E R 32 S H O W D O W N IN B E R L I N
C H A P T E R 33 J U L Y 26
206
C H A P T E R 34 J U L Y 27
212
C H A P T E R 35 J U L Y 28
217
C H A P T E R 36 J U L Y 29
225
C H A P T E R 37 J U L Y 30
229
C H A P T E R 38 J U L Y 31
234
C H A P T E R 39 A U G U S T 1
257
C H A P T E R 40 A U G U S T 2
243
C H A P T E R 41 A U G U S T 3
247
C H A P T E R 42 A U G U S T 4
249
201
C H A P T E R 43 SHREDDING T H E E V I D E N C E
THE
251
PART
EIGHT
MYSTERY SOLVED
C H A P T E R 4 4 A S S E M B L I N G I N T H E LIBRARY
C H A P T E R 45 W H A T DID N O T H A P P E N
257
259
C H A P T E R 46 T H E KEY TO WHAT HAPPENED
C H A P T E R 47 W H A T WAS IT A B O U T ?
269
276
C H A P T E R 48 WHO C O U L D HAVE P R E V E N T E D IT?
C H A P T E R 49 WHO S T A R T E D IT?
286
C H A P T E R 50 C O U L D IT H A P P E N AGAIN?
C H A P T E R 51 S U M M I N G UP
295
EPILOGUE
C H A P T E R 52 A U S T R I A ‘ S WAR
299
C H A P T E R 53 G E R M A N Y ‘ S WAR
303
Appendix 1: T h e Austrian Note
307
Appendix 2: T h e Serbian Reply
313
Who Was Who
Notes
Bibliography
Acknowledgments
Index
517
319
339
331
557
292
282
i
PROLOGUE:
( i ) Out of the Blue
Shortly after eleven o’clock at night on Sunday, December 29,1997,
United Airlines Flight 826, a Boeing 747 carrying 374 passengers
and 19 crew, was two hours into its scheduled trip across the Pacific
from Tokyo to Honolulu. It had reached its assigned cruising altitude
of between 31,000 and 33,000 feet. Meal service was about to be
completed. It had been an uneventful trip.
In a terrifying instant everything changed. The plane was struck,
without warning, by a force that was invisible. The aircraft abruptly
nosed up; then it nosed down into a freefall. Screaming bodies were
flung about promiscuously, colliding with ceilings and with serving
carts. A thirty-two-year-old Japanese woman was killed and 102 people were injured. Regaining control of the jumbo jet, the captain and
cockpit crew guided Flight 826 back to the Japanese airport from
which it had taken off hours before.
What was so frightening about this episode was its mysteriousness.
Until the moment of impact, the flight had been a normal one. There
had been no reason to expect that it would be anything else. There
had been no warning: no flash of lightning across the sky. You could
3
4
P R O L O G U E
not see it coming, whatever “it” may have been. Passengers had no
idea what had hit them and airline companies were in no position to
assure the public that something similar would not happen again.
Experts quoted by the communications media were of the opinion
that Flight 826 had fallen victim to what they called “clear air turbulence.” They likened this to a horizontal tornado, but one that you
could not see. Some of the experts who were interviewed expressed
the hope that within a few years some sort of sensing technology
would be developed to detect these invisible storms before they
strike. Transparency, the public learned from this episode, signifies
little; a pacific sky can rise up in wrath as suddenly as can a pacific
ocean.
Something like such an attack of clear air turbulence is supposed by
some to have happened to European civilization in 1 9 1 4 during its
passage from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The world of
the 1890s and 1900s had been, not unlike our own age, a time of international congresses, disarmament conferences, globalization of the
world economy, and schemes to establish some sort of league of
nations to outlaw war. A long stretch of peace and prosperity was
expected by the public to go on indefinitely.
Instead, the European world abruptly plunged out of control,
crashing and exploding into decades of tyranny, world war, and mass
murder. What tornado wrecked civilized Old Europe and the world
it then ruled? In retrospect, it may be less of a mystery than some of
those who lived through it imagined. The years 1 9 1 3 and 1 9 1 4 were
ones of dangers and troubles. There were warning signs in the early
decades of the twentieth century that catastrophe might well lie
ahead; we can see that now, and military and political leaders could
see it then.
The sky out of which Europe fell was not empty; on the contrary,
it was alive with processes and powers. The forces that were to devastate it—nationalism, socialism, imperialism, and the like—had been
in motion for a long time. The European world already was buffeted
by high winds. It had been traversing dangerous skies for a long time.
The captain and the crew had known it. But the passengers, taken
completely by surprise, insistently kept asking: why had they received
no warning?
P R O L O G U E
5
(i i) The Importance of the Question
In the summer of 1914 a war broke out in Europe that then spread to
Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific, and the Americas. Known
now, somewhat inaccurately, as the First World War, it ended by
becoming in many ways the largest conflict that the planet had ever
known. It deserved the name by which it was called at the time: the
Great War.
To enter the lists, countries of the earth ranged themselves into
one or another of two worldwide coalitions. One, led by Great
Britain,* France, and Russia, was called the Triple Entente;* the
other, led by Germany and Austria-Hungary, was known at first as
the Triple Alliance. Between them the two coalitions mobilized
about 65 million troops. In Germany and France, nations that gambled their entire manhood on the outcome, 80 percent of all males
between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine were called to the colors.
In the ensuing clashes of arms they were slaughtered.
More than 20 million soldiers and civilians perished in the Great
War, and an additional 21 million were wounded. Millions more fell
victim to the diseases that the war unleashed: upwards of 20 million
people died in the influenza pandemic of 1 9 1 8 – 1 9 alone.
The figures, staggering though they are, fail to tell the whole story
or to convey the full impact of the war on the world of 1914. The
consequences of the changes wrought by the crisis of European civilization are too many to specify and, in their range and in their depth,
made it the turning point in modern history. That would be true even
if, as some maintain, the war merely accelerated some of the changes
to which it led.
On August 8 , 1 9 1 4 , only four days after Great Britain entered the
war, the London Economist described it as “perhaps the greatest
tragedy of human history.” That may well remain true. In 1979 the
5
‘Beginning in 1801, the official title of Great Britain was the “United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland”; for short, the United Kingdom.
Called “the Allies” during the war.
HVith Italy as the third member in peacetime. Called “the Central Powers” during the war.
6
P R O L O G U E
distinguished American diplomat and historian George Kennan
wrote that he had “come to see the First World War, as I think many
reasonably thoughtful people have learned to see it, as the grand seminal catastrophe of this century.”
Fritz Stern, one of the foremost scholars of German affairs, writes
of “the first calamity of the twentieth century, the Great War, from
which all other calamities sprang.”
The military, political, economic, and social earthquakes brought
about a redrawing of the map of the world. Empires and dynasties
were swept away. New countries took their place. Disintegration of
the political structure of the globe continued over the course of the
twentieth century. Today the earth is divided into about four times as
many independent states as existed when the Europeans went to war
in 1914. Many of the new entities—Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia are
examples that come to mind—are countries that never existed before.
The Great War gave birth to terrible forces that would plague the
rest of the century. To drive Russia out of the war, the German government financed Lenin’s Bolshevik communists, and introduced
Lenin himself into Russia in 1917—in Winston Churchill’s words,
“in the same way that you might send a phial containing a culture of
typhoid or of cholera to be poured into the water supply of a great
city.” Bolshevism was only the first of such war-born furies, followed
in years to come by fascism and Nazism.
Yet the war also set in motion two of the great liberation movements of the twentieth century. As Europe tore itself apart, its overlordship of the rest of the planet came undone, and over the course of
the century, literally billions of people achieved their independence.
Women, too, in parts of the world, broke free from some of the shackles of the past, arguably as a direct consequence of their involvement
in war work—jobs in factories and in the armed forces—beginning in
1914.
Another kind of liberation, a wide-ranging freedom from restraint,
came out of the Great War and has expanded ever since in behavior,
sex life, manners, dress, language, and the arts. Not everybody
believes it to be a good thing that so many rules and restrictions have
gone by the way. But whether for good or ill, the world has traveled a
long way—from the Victorian age to the twenty-first century—along
paths that were blasted out for it by the warriors of 1914.
In searching for the origins of any of the great issues that have
P R O L O G U E
7
faced the world during the twentieth century, or that confront it
today, it is remarkable how often we come back to the Great War. As
George Kennan observed: “all the lines of inquiry, it seems to me,
lead back to it.” Afterwards the choices narrowed. The United States
and even Great Britain had a choice, for example, of whether or not
to enter the First World War—indeed disagreement has persisted
ever since as to whether they were wise to do so—but, realistically,
the two countries had little or no choice at all about whether or not
to join battle in the Second.
There was nothing inevitable about the progression from the earlier conflict to the later one. The long fuse could have been cut at
many points along the way from 1914 to 1939, but nobody did cut it.
So the First World War did in fact lead to the Second, even though
it need not have done so, and the Second, whether or not it needed
to do so, led to the Cold War. In 1991 historians Steven E. Miller
and Sean M. Lynn-Jones maintained: “Most observers describe
the present period of international politics as the ‘post-Cold War’
era but in many ways our age is better defined as the ‘post-World
War F era.”
From the start, the explosion of 1914 seemed to set off a series of
chain reactions, and the serious consequences were soon apparent to
contemporaries: In the Introduction to The Magic Mountain (1924),
Thomas Mann wrote of “the Great War, in the beginning of which
so much began that has scarcely yet left off beginning.”
Nor has it entirely left off today. On April 2 1 , 2001, the New York
Times reported from France the return to their homes of thousands
of people who had been evacuated temporarily because of a threat
from munitions left over from World War I and stored near them.
These included shells and mustard gas. The evacuees had been
allowed to return home after fifty tons of the more dangerous munitions had been removed. But a hundred tons of the lethal materials
remained—and remain. So munitions from the 1914 war may yet
explode in the twenty-first century.
Indeed, in a sense they already have. On September 1 1 , 2001, the
Muslim fundamentalist suicide attacks on the World Trade Center in
New York City destroyed the heart of lower Manhattan and took
some three thousand lives. Osama bin Laden, the terrorist chieftain
who seemingly conjured up this horror and who threatened more, in
his first televised statement afterwards described it as vengeance for
8
P R O L O G U E
what had happened eighty years earlier. By this he presumably meant
the intrusion of the Christian European empires into the hitherto
Muslim-governed Middle East in the aftermath of—and as a consequence of—the First World War. Bin Laden’s sympathizers who
hijacked jumbo jets had smashed them into the twin towers in pursuance of a quarrel seemingly rooted in the conflicts of 1914.
Similarly, the Iraq crisis that escalated in 2002-03 drove journalists
and broadcast news personalities to their telephones, asking history
professors from leading American universities how Iraq had emerged
as a state from the embers of the First World War. It was a relevant
question, for had there been no world war in 1914, there might well
have been no Iraq in 2002.
It was indeed the seminal event of modern times.
What was the First World War about? How did it happen? Who
started it? Why did it break out where and when it did? “Millions of
deaths, and words, later, historians still have not agreed why,” as the
“Millennium Special Edition” of The Economist (January 1,
1000-December 3 1 , 1999) remarked, adding that “none of it need
have happened.” From the outset everybody said that the outbreak of
war in 1914 was literally triggered by a Bosnian Serb schoolboy when
he shot and killed the heir to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones.
But practically everybody also agrees that the assassination provided
not the cause, but merely the occasion, for first the Balkans, then
Europe, and then the rest of the earth to take up arms.
The disproportion between the schoolboy’s crime and the conflagration in which the globe was consumed, beginning thirty-seven
days later, was too absurd for observers to credit the one as the cause
of the other. Tens of millions of people could not be losing their lives,
they felt, because one man and his wife—two people of whom many
of them had never heard—had lost theirs. It did not seem possible. It
could not, everyone said, be true.
Because the Great War was so enormous an event and so fraught
with consequences, and because we want to keep anything similar
from happening in the future, the inquiry as to how it occurred has
become not only the most challenging but also the biggest question
in modern history. But it remains elusive; in the words of the historian Laurence Lafore, “the war was many things, not one, and the
meanings of the word ’cause’ are also many.”
P R O L O G U E
9
In the 1940s and 1950s scholars tended to believe that they had
learned all that there was to be known about the origins of the war,
and that all that remained to be disputed was interpretation of the
evidence. Beginning in the 1960s, however, sparked by the research
of the great German historian Fritz Fischer—of whose views more
will be said later—new information has come to light, notably from
German, Austrian, and Serbian sources, and hardly a year goes by
now without the appearance of new monographs adding considerably to our knowledge. Fischer inspired scholars to comb the
archives for what was hidden. What follows in this book is an
attempt to look at the old questions in the light of the new knowledge, to summarize the data, and then to draw some conclusions
from it.
When and where did the march toward the war of 1914 begin?
Recently, in a Boston classroom, I asked university students to pinpoint the first steps—before 1908—along the way. From their
responses, the following may illustrate how many roads can be imagined to have led to Sarajevo.
The fourth century A.D. The decision to divide the Roman Empire
between the Latin-speaking West and the Greek-speaking East had
lasting consequences. The cultural divide that ramified into two different branches of Christianity, two calendars, and two rival scripts
(the Latin and the Cyrillic) persisted. The Roman Catholic Austrians
and the Greek Orthodox Serbs, whose quarrel provided the occasion
for the 1914 war, were, in that sense, fated to be enemies.
The seventh century. The Slavs, who were to become Europe’s
largest ethnic group, moved into the Balkans, where the Teutons
already had arrived. The conflict between Slavic and Germanic peoples became a recurring theme of European history, and in the twentieth century pitted Teuton Germans and Austrians against Slavic
Russians and Serbs.
The eleventh century. The formal split between Roman Catholic
and Greek Orthodox Christianity generated a conflict of religious
faith along the same fault line as those of ethnic group, alphabet, and
culture—Roman versus Greek—a fault line that threatened the
P R O L O G U E
southeast of Europe and was followed by the political …
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