University of California San Diego Hong Kong and Mainland China Conflict Paper Complete an 8-10 page reflexive paper. Students will pick an identity-based

University of California San Diego Hong Kong and Mainland China Conflict Paper Complete an 8-10 page reflexive paper. Students will pick an identity-based conflict to organize their paper around. The main questions they will answer in this paper are: What makes this an identity-based conflict? Why is it important? How might it be transformed into identity-based cooperation? Why is this relevant to me?You should combine the presentation I do and my topic was about the Hong Kong and Mainland China. The ppt and the paper outline and sample just in the files, plz check that. double space, and MLA format. Hong Kong – Mainland China
Conflict
INTL 102
Professor Rothman
By Xiaohui L. / Renita Z./ Zihan C./Zhenyu X.
Background
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October 23 2019 Chen tongjia crime
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June 9 2019 people strike on the street to against the
Hong Kong extradition bill,
June 15 2019 Central government office decide to suspend the
bill
History
Sovereign Reason：
Ancient China : Before 1841
British: 1841-1941
Japan: 1941-1945
British: 1945-1997
People’s Republic of China: 1997-Now
Cultural Reasons:
Hong Kong
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Language: Cantonese, English, Mandarin
Education: Western system
Social media: Whatsapp, Facebook
Policy: One Country, Two Systems
policy(more trend to capitalism
Mainland China
●
●
●
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Language: Mandarin
Education: Eastern system
Social media: Wechat, Weibo
Policy: Socialist system with Chinese
characteristics( trend to socialism)
Why is this relevant to us?
1.
Chinese Identity
2.
Family members and friends in Hong Kong are suffered in this conflict
3.
Traffic
Importance
Hong Kong has an important position and role in
China’s national strategy.
There are three main reasons:
A.
international financial center
B. a good example of “One Country, Two
Systems”
C. Resolve incidents of violence, ensure the
safety of the people, and restore stability to
society.
Conflict Solution ARIA Framework
Antagonism – Blames
Mainland China
Hong Kong
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Extradition Bill
Violating their liberty & rights
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Irrational protest
Unpatriotic manifestation
Conflict Solution ARIA Framework – Contin.
Resonance – needs & value
Mainland China
Hong Kong
●
●
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Liberty
Political Control
5 demands
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●
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Peace
Solidarity
Recognize the origin identity
Share Needs
Power, Safety, and recognizing
Conflict Solution ARIA Framework – Contin.
Inventing – Differentiation solution
Hong Kong: Safety & Liberty
China: peace & recognizing
Action
Trust building
a.
China – giving Hongkong fully right to be a democratic state
b.
Hong Kong – accept China as part of their identity
Reflexive
● Life
1. School –student
campus life
2. Friendship
3. Travel
End
Reference
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Mainland-Chinese-lack-sympathy-for-Hong-Kong-protesters
https://theconnectere.com/hong-kong-china-conflict/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019%E2%80%9320_Hong_Kong_protests
Slides 2 Picture Credit: Reuters
Final Paper
•
•
•
•
Students will pick an identity-based conflict to organize their paper around.
The main questions they will answer in this paper are:
o What makes this an identity-based conflict?
o Why is it important?
o How might it be transformed into identity-based cooperation?
o Why is this relevant to me?
8-10 pages
Group Project
Sample Outline (you can use this for your Friday journal)
Background
o Main events
o History
o Reflexivity, talking about your own interest
Problem Definition
o Identify the issue specifically
o Ed Azar’s framework for identity based conflicts
o Why is this an identity based conflict
Problem Solution
o Who are the parties involved?
o Incentives?
▪ What do they have to gain?
▪ Why are they at odds with one another?
▪ Why does one person’s identity hinge on the negation of the other?
o What works? And for whom?
o What’s been already been done?
o What would you like to see? [reflexivity]
o Evidence
o Shortcomings
o Framework we discussed in class
o ARIA frameworks : https://thesystemsthinker.com/the-aria-approachto-conflict-resolution/
o Track 1, 2, 3
Conclusion
Aaron Riley
GPGN 490
December 14, 2019
Track II in Myanmar
Introduction
Ethnic conflict in Myanmar is complicated. Simultaneously it is about some
combination of ethnic identity, religious identity, political autonomy, resource control/rent
management, and national politics. The Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw,
have been fighting a civil war with at least one of the various ethnic groups since
independence in 1948. There are various reasons for these conflicts, chief among them
being the various groups’ desire for independence. The Rohingya are one of these
groups that the Tatmadaw has fought against multiple times over the last 70 years.
However, their situation in Myanmar is unique for two salient reasons. The most obvious
of these is that they are a Muslim minority in a country that is 78% Buddhist and
recognizes Buddhism as the State Religion. As such they are ostracized by both the
national government and the other major ethnic group that shares their land, the
Rakhine. The Rakhine have fought the Rohingya repeatedly as well as the Tatmadaw;
in this case there is no spirit of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The Rohingya
also are the only ethnic minority group in the country to have laws written with the
implicit goal of driving them out of the country. Their citizenship status, and recognition
of being able to even live in Myanmar, is an issue on par with that of the Kurds and
Palestinians and has directly led to violence.
In 2017 things changed and the Tatmadaw launched a military campaign against
the Rohingya that quickly transitioned from counterinsurgency to genocide. Nearly 1
million Rohingya were driven from their homes in northern Rakhine State in western
Myanmar to Bangladesh. In the two years since the start of the genocide, the Rohingya
remain unable to return to their homes while they wait in refugee camps.
I started researching this issue a few weeks after it started for an undergraduate
class on ethnic cleansing. I ended up turning that work into my senior thesis and used it
to apply for graduate school, internships, and jobs. I spent the summer of 2019 at an
internship with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations working primarily on atrocity prevention in Burma, my prior research being
one of the main reasons why I was offered that position. In this role I became intimately
acquainted with the country and my passion for studying conflict in Myanmar was
reignited. It is frustrating to watch the world repeatedly fail to solve this crisis if they
even bother to acknowledge it at all. Myanmar is far away and most constituents of
those leaders in a position to help do not care or even know what has happened.1 Even
if the international community was able to agree on a solution, the overlapping ethnic
and religious identities prevents identifying a clear set of cleavages between all of the
local groups that would need to be involved to help permanently resolve the Rohingya
crisis.
1
I can only speak in any depth in the American context here. Those who are aware and politically active
find it difficult to lobby with the key policy makers in Washington. Largely this impasse has been due to
the relationship these policy makers built with Aung San Suu Kyi during her years under house arrest.
They equate her with the country and view American action against the country to be detrimental to her
status, something they are unwilling to risk after years of equating her with a fight for democracy.
Based on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s statements before the International Court of
Justice in The Hague on December 10, 2019, this crisis seems to have no possible
outcome in which the Rohingya are allowed to return to their homes and allowed to live
in peace. In these statements, she flatly denied the idea that genocide had been
committed, and even suggested it was the fault of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army
for bringing the full force of the Tatmadaw on the Rohingya people.2 Famously
stubborn, the Nobel Peace Prize winner known locally as “The Lady,” as she came to
be known under the military dictatorship when the mere mention of her name was
outlawed, rules Myanmar through a level of influence that is incomparable with any
other figurehead in global politics today. She serves in an unelected position, State
Counsellor, that was created specifically for her by the democratic government after the
Constitution that moved the country from dictatorship to democracy outlawed her from
running for office. Despite her unelected position, she represents the country on the
international stage and her opinions are effectively gospel and the nation’s ruling party,
the National League for Democracy, answers directly to her. The only real pushback
she receives is when her opinions would require the Tatmadaw to cede some of its
authority to the democratic government.
The 2008 Constitution enshrined the Tatmadaw’s role in the democratic political
system Myanmar now has. The military is allocated a minimum of 25% of the seats in
the national legislature, the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, which gives them the ability to veto any
Marlise Simons and Hannah Beech, “Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar Against Rohingya Genocide
Accusations” (The New York Times, December 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-myanmar-genocidehague.html)
2
changes to the constitution. In addition to the seats reserved for military appointment,
they have an alliance with the main opposition party, the Union Solidarity and
Development Party, which helps protect the Tatmadaw from NLD’s attempts to wrest
power away from the military leaders. The Tatmadaw are also given the power to
directly appoint the ministers for the Home Affairs, Defense, and Border Affairs
ministries.3
In the case of the Rohingya, both Aung San Suu Kyi and the Tatmadaw are in
agreement that international actors have no place in settling what they describe as
another chapter in “cycles of inter-communal violence going back to the 1940s.”4 With
this clear aversion to Track I methods of solving this crisis, what are the other potential
ways to solve this problem? Track II diplomacy could be the best hope for what seems
like an intractable issue. Specifically, I think the ARIA model put forward by Jay
Rothman in his book “Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and
Communities” (1997) would be a good method to start with. This model is based on four
steps Antagonism, Resonance, Invention, and Action. Antagonism is the first step in
which both sides are able to present their understanding of the conflict/issue to the other
side. Resonance is the second stage and when both sides have to move past their own
understanding and attempt to see things from the other’s point of view. Invention is the
third stage and requires both sides to come together to find ways of resolving the
Francis Wade, “Burma’s Militarized Ministries,” Foreign Policy, November 15, 2015,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/15/burmas-militarized-ministries/)
3
Marlise Simons and Hannah Beech, “Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar Against Rohingya Genocide
Accusations” (The New York Times, December 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-myanmar-genocidehague.html)
4
conflict, or at least ways to make strides towards addressing the conflict if a magic bullet
solution is not available. Action is the final stage and is when these collaborative ideas
are implemented. This entire process is overseen by neutral third party actors.5
I can see the ARIA model being significantly successful in some ways, primarily
in fostering some improvement in intercommunal relations between the Rakhine people
and the Rohingya. This, by itself, would be an astonishing success. There is historical
conflict between those two peoples going back decades and building a path towards
peace would be fantastic if unlikely. But, as it seemingly always is in Myanmar, solving
the Rohingya crisis is not as simple as stopping conflict between neighbors. By my
count, there are about 3 ½ different levels of intervention that ARIA would have to
succeed at before the most aspirational person could consider the Rohingya crisis
“solved.” First is the conflict between the Rohingya and their Arakanese neighbors, as
previously stated, this seems plausible and is the most similar point of comparison
between Israelis and Palestinians. The second level would be between the Rohingya
and the government, possibly including the Arakanese as a second and a half party that
would be sitting next to, but not with, the Rohingya as they talk to the government. The
third level would be between the Rohingya and the military, by my estimation this is the
most likely level of intervention to fail as I will explain later. The last level is possibly the
most important but I have only counted as half of a level because it cannot be rationally
disaggregated from the other levels but still needs to be distinct for the purpose of the
5
Jay Rothman, Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities (San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1997))
ARIA model, and that is between the Rohingya and the Buddhist community in
Myanmar writ large.
The best way I can think to explain how this could, in a perfect outcome, work,
will require that I start by addressing the religious cleavage between Rohingya Muslims
and hardline Buddhists in Myanmar. The easiest way to explain this how significant this
cleavage has become is with a monk named U Wirathu and Facebook. U Wirathu is
possibly the second most famous Buddhist monk in the world after the Dalai Lama. He
was on the cover of Time with the headline “The Face of Buddhist Terror.”6 He has the
most important voice when it came to turning the Rohingya from a regular other to a
“Fearsome Other.” Due to his influence, this religious cleavage has become extremely
salient and other pockets of Muslim ethnic groups that are not the Rohingya, such as
those that live in Mon State, have been targeted.7 His messages of hate, and similar
messages from other sources, were spread through Facebook and had a significant
impact on support for the ethnic cleansing in 2017.8 These messages of hate are what
led to the important change when “fear of the other is transformed into the notion that
the other is fearsome” (Das 1998, 125). Das’s argument is that for extreme violence to
be made possible, there must be a shift in which the Other is made categorically
fearsome. For Schissler, Walton, and Phyu Phyu Thi (2017) the difference is subtle but
important: the category of a “Fearsome Other” is what enables violence to be exacted
“TIME Magazine Cover: The Face of Buddhist Terror – July 1, 2013,” Time (Time Inc.), accessed
December 15, 2019, http://content.time.com/time/covers/asia/0,16641,20130701,00.html)
6
7
Citation: Conversation with Kyaw Win of the Burma Human Rights Network, July 2019
Paul Mozur, “A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts From Myanmar’s Military” (The New York
Times, October 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebookgenocide.html)
8
on all those who can be placed within such a category. This categorical change marks
the shift from a view that specific individuals within the Other are threatening to the view
that all members of the Other are inherently a threat.
A goal of every Type II intervention between the Rohingya and every other group
would have to be transitioning the Rohingya from a Fearsome Other back to the Other.
The biggest difference between the Other and the Fearsome Other seems to be the
transition from the emotion of contempt to that of hatred as put forward by Roger
Petersen in his book “Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of
Emotion in Conflict” (2011). Petersen describes contempt as
Petersen describes hate as a temporary emotion born out of an activated cultural
schema that is triggered by events that fit the understanding of the dominant group
where the action tendency is to “eliminate the presence of the group” entirely;
something Wirathu has called for multiple times.9 Comparing these understandings of
contempt and hate show how this transition from Other to Fearsome Other can be
manufactured when those in positions of power are able to manipulate the emotions of
their followers.10
Track II in Theory
9
Roger Dale Petersen, Western Intervention in the Balkans the Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011)) P. 43
10
Ibid P. 44
I would put the Rohingya somewhere between being held in contempt by some
of the Burmese population and being hated by other segments. In the case of Buddhist
nationalists, I would put the Rohingya as being hated by this group, if for no other
reason than the Hatred is an extremely difficult emotion to interact with as a third party.
In the case of the Rohingya, the schema of them being a) non-citizens b) Muslim and c)
terrorists has been cultivated by hardline nationalists and the government over the
years. One only has to look at how the government has allowed the systematic Othering
of the Rohingya to be done in order to see this schema being reinforced in the last few
decades. The trigger for this schema is any of the crimes committed, or presumed to be
committed, by Rohingya individuals or the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). In
the past decade there are two major events that stand out as triggers. In 2012, a
Buddhist woman was raped and three Rohingya men were accused and arrested. The
incident sparked outrage and led a state of emergency being declared as mobs swept
through villages committing brutal acts of violence.11 In 2017, ARSA killed 12 police
officers in a coordinated attack on police outposts.12 This singular event, while not
overly significant in a country with more than 70 years of continuous civil war, was the
catalyst for what became the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya by the Tatmadaw. These
triggers have been used by activists, in this case the hardline Buddhist Nationalists, to
turn contempt into hatred or to transform the Rohingya from the Other to the Fearsome
Other.
United Nations, “Myanmar Conflict Alert: Preventing Communal Bloodshed and Building Better
Relations,” Refworld, accessed December 15, 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/4fd85cdd2.html)
11
“Myanmar: What Sparked Latest Violence in Rakhine?,” BBC News (BBC, September 19, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41082689)
12
I would argue that the Rakhine people hold the Rohingya in contempt but with
the action of violence, and not avoidance, occurring primarily due to proximity between
the two groups. I think this is different from the Buddhist nationalist group because the
Rakhine are not nationalists, just Buddhists. There is no ethnic overlap between the
Rakhine and the ethnic Bamar that the nationalists come from. But, as mentioned
previously, this contempt briefly transitioned to hatred in the aftermath of the 2012 rape
incident. Despite this temporary switch, the Rakhine seem largely preoccupied with their
fight against the government in a way that prevents them from consistently activating
the emotion of hatred against the Rohingya. Again, this is somewhat complicated due to
the overlapping venn diagrams of ethnicity and religion. However complicated the
Arakanese-Rohingya relationship is, it is possibly the most promising area for Track II
diplomacy in the country.
Track II in Practice
So how do we address these emotions? Helpfully, for the case of instituting
Track II diplomacy, contempt is something that, while it does not systematically decay,
can be addressed by confronting grievances in a way that the antagonism/agonism
aspect of the ARIA model works perfectly for. I think that an indirect approach to the
Rohingya conflict through Track II is the way forward. The narrative around the
Rohingya has long been that they are invaders brought by the British under colonialism,
if they are even recognized as existing as an ethnic group at all.13 Possibly the single
Marlise Simons and Hannah Beech, “Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar Against Rohingya
Genocide Accusations” (The New York Times, December 11, 2019),
13
largest issue with the Rohingya’s status in the country is the denial of the…
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